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Abstract
This research project consists in a theoretical and experimental study of
oligopolistic markets. I believe that an experimental approach to this
subject might help to understand the interplay of the many different
factors that affect firms behavior in this context, and to analyze problems
which theory does not provide a clearcut answer to.
My project develops into two main parts: the first concern how firms can
learn to collude tacitly, the second studies deterrence of explicit collusion.
Learning to collude The first part of this research concerns the relation
between the process of information search and players’ behavior in a
repeated Cournot oligopoly. The main question I try to answer is what
happens when information acquiring and processing is too difficult or too
costly for the firm to behave according to the perfect rationality paradigm.
First, I present a review of the literature on bounded rationality in
general – to provide a broad theoretical framework – and in particular on
learning, which is the aspect I will mainly focus on.
The core of this part of my research consists in two experiments designed
to study the relation between the process of information search and
learning in a Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. As
the review of the literature will show, different theories of learning have
been applied to this setting, each yielding a specific market outcome in
the long run, and postulating specific informational requirements.
By allowing players to choose the information they wish to acquire,
and controlling for these choices, I study the features of the learning
xviii
model actually followed by the subjects, and the relation between the
information they gather and the market behavior they adopt.
According to my results, learning appears to be a composite process,
in which different components coexist. Belief learning seems to be
the leading element, as subjects try to form expectations about their
opponents’ future actions and to best reply to them. When subjects
also look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors,
though, they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes
markets more competitive. Finally, reinforcement learning also plays a
non-negligible role, as subjects tend to favor strategies that have yielded
higher profits in the past. I show that these different elements may be
usefully incorporated into a more sophisticated learning model, shaped
after self tuning EWA learning model.
Deterring collusion The second experimental study is more policy
oriented, and concerns the optimal law enforcement against explicit
cartels. This part of the project is a joint work with Giancarlo Spagnolo,
Chloe´ Le Coq and Sven Olof Fridolfsson, and has been financed by the
Swedish Competition Authority.
In this study, we examine the effects of fines, leniency programs and
reward schemes for whistleblowers on firms’ decision to form cartels
(cartel deterrence) and on their price choices.
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced
in ever more fields of law enforcement, though their deterrence effects
are often hard to observe, and the likely effect of changes in the specific
features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally.
Chapter 7 reports results from an experiment designed to examine
the effects of fines, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistle-
blowers on firms’ decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on
their price choices. Our subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game
with differentiated goods and uncertain duration, and we run several
treatments different in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of
fine, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a fine), the existence
of a reward for reporting, the option to communicate, and cartel leaders
xix
access to leniency. We find that fines following successful investigations
but without leniency have a deterrence effect (reduce the number of
cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive effect (increase collusive prices
in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more efficient than
standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they do deter a
significantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also induce
even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing average
market price significantly up relative to treatments without antitrust
enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are
systematically reported, which completely disrupts subjects’ ability to
form cartels and sustain high prices, and almost complete deterrence is
achieved. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program the
deterrence effect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise.
As for tacit collusion, under standard anti-trust enforcement or leniency
programs subjects who do not communicate (do not go for explicit
cartels) tend to choose weakly higher prices than where there is no anti-
trust enforcement. We also analyze post-conviction behavior, finding that
after convictions caused by a report under the leniency program much
fewer cartels form and prices are much lower than when conviction is
due to an independent antitrust investigation. Finally, we find a strong
cultural effect comparing treatments in Stockholm with those in Rome,
suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions differ with culture.
In chapter 8 we investigate the effects of risk preferences and attitudes
towards risk on optimal antitrust enforcement policies. First, we observe
that risk aversion is negatively correlated with players’ proclivity to
form a cartel, and that increasing the level of fines while reducing the
probability of detection enhance deterrence. This confirms that the design
of an optimal law enforcement scheme must keep risk attitudes into
account, as suggested by Polinsky and Shavell [83].
We also notice that players’ propensity towards communication drops
right after detection even if the collusive agreement was successful, and
it declines as the sum of the fines paid by a subject increases. This effect
could be explained by availability heuristic [66] – a cognitive bias, where
people’s perception of a risk is based on its vividness and emotional
xx
impact rather than on its actual probability.
Our results also confirm the crucial role of strategic risk considerations
[10] (analogous to risk dominance for one shot games) in determining
the effects of leniency programs. Indeed, we show that the effectiveness
of leniency programs in deterring cartels is mostly due to the increased
risk of a cartel member being cheated upon when entering a collusive
agreement, while the risk of a cartel being detected by an autonomous
investigation of the Authority seems to play a less important role.
xxi
Part I
Learning to collude
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent developments in economics [. . . ]
have raised great doubts as to whether
this schematized model of economic man
provides a suitable foundation on which
to erect a theory – whether it be a theory
of how firms do behave or of how they
‘should’ rationally behave.
Herbert Simon, 1955
The debate about bounded rationality in economics begun with the
widely known works written in the mid-1950s by Herbert Simon [92;
93], who first extensively investigated the problems connected to those
complex models of strict rationality which are so pervasive in economic
theory. Since then, though, several decades passed before bounded
rationality were given the formal approach which was necessary for it
to really affect mainstream economic theory. It was only in the 1980s that
this topic bloomed and gave birth to a wide and diversified literature.
On the one hand, as noticed by Robert Aumann [5]:
an important factor in making this possible was the develop-
ment of computer science, complexity theory, and so on, areas
of inquiry that created an intellectual climate conducive to the
development of the theory of bounded rationality.
2
On the other hand, in 1979 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman pub-
lished their work on prospect theory in Econometrica [67] drawing econ-
omists attention onto the “fascinating compilation of experimental data
demonstrating the circumstances under which rationality breaks down
and other patterns of behavior emerge” (Rubinstein, [87]) and giving
birth to a new research field, known as “psychology and economics”.
During the last twenty years these topics have been approached by
scholars in ways that were increasingly divergent – as I will try to show
more in detail in the first part of Chapter 2 – and had a considerable
impact on various fields of economics: from finance to marketing, to the
economic analysis of law.
What I plan to do here is to investigate whether they also affected the
theory of industrial organization and if so, how. A rather complete and
up-to-dated work has been recently done by Ellison [33] who wrote a
critical review of the literature focused on consumer irrationalities that
rational firmsmight exploit. I would like to follow his steps but exploring
the other side of the problem; that is, studying if models of bounded
rationality can help us to understand what happens when firms
(i) do not have complete information about the environment they act
in and have to learn which “game” they are playing and how to
play it;
(ii) face costs of getting and processing information and/or
(iii) suffer for computational limitations and bounds.
More specifically, I will focus on the consequences that this kind of
hypothesis can have on the traditional setting of the theory of oligopoly
and tacit collusion.
The classical approach to the theory of tacit collusion entails a model
of repeated interaction between firms which are active on the same
market and compete in at least one dimension. In the basic model market
demand and cost functions are common knowledge, and firms are able to
predict what their profits will be indefinitely in the future, under different
conditions.
3
In practice, firms should be able to determine which is the optimal
joint profits maximizing price/quantity that each of them should set. If
only one firm deviates from the collusive action, for the first period it
will get higher profits, possibly close to monopoly ones, but if the other
firms can detect this defection and are able to punish the deviating firm,
they will surely retaliate in the following periods, so future profits for the
deviating firm will be lower than those it would have got if it had not
broken the tacit agreement. So every competitor in the market knows
that each firm i is willing to stick to the collusive action as long as the
discounted stream of collusive profits piCt,i is higher than or at most equal
to a threshold determined by the deviation payoff piDt,i plus the discounted
flow of payoffs the firm iwill get during the “punishment” phase piPt,i.
Supposing that the punishment phase will start immediately after the
defection and last forever, this means that:
∞∑
t=0
δtt,ipi
C
t,i ≥ piD0,i +
∞∑
t=1
δtt,ipi
P
t,i, pi
D
t,i > pi
C
t,i > pi
P
t,i, ∀t, i
where δt,i represents the discount factor for firm i in period t.
The simplest situation, which can be considered as a baseline model,
is the one in which two symmetric firms sell a homogeneous product
and compete a` la Bertand in a “frozen” market where demand and
cost functions never change and where both competitors have the same
constant discount factor δ. If the firms collude, both of them will be able
to get half the monopoly profit piM while the optimal deviation from the
collusive price would ensure to the defecting firm themonopoly profit for
the first period. In the subsequent period, though, the other firm would
detect the deviation and trigger a never-ending price war, that would lead
both firms to revert to the competitive price p = c getting zero profits.
In this case collusion is sustainable if
∞∑
t=0
δt
piM
2
≥ piM
that is if
δ ≥ δ∗ = 1
2
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The threshold δ∗ appears to be a crucial element in this theoretical
approach; as Ivaldi et al. notice [55]:
Collusion is easier to sustain when this threshold is lower
(then, even “impatient” firms with a lower discount factor
could sustain collusion), and more difficult to sustain if this
threshold is higher (in that case, even firms that place a sub-
stantial weight on future profits might not be able to sustain
collusion). The determination of this critical threshold thus
provides a natural way for assessing the scope for collusion.
In the baseline model it is very easy to determine the value of
δ∗; in more complex environments the evaluation can be much less
straightforward. To evaluate the potential for collusion in a specific
market, one should look at all the industry characteristics that could raise
this critical threshold and to the facilitating factors that could reduce it, and
try to establish which force will predominate in the end1. A significant
theoretical work has been done to provide the analytical tools necessary
to make this kind of evaluations, and a number of different elements has
been considered:
• from basic structural variables – such as the number of competitors,
entry barriers, frequency of firms’ interaction, and market trans-
parency
• to the characteristics of the demand side – is the market growing,
stagnating, or declining? Are there significant fluctuations or
business cycles?
• and of the supply side – Is the market driven by technology and
innovation, or is it a mature industry with stable technologies? Are
firms in a symmetric situation, with similar costs and production
capacities, or are there significant differences across firms? Do firms
offer similar products, or is there substantial vertical or horizontal
differentiation?
1For a wide discussion about this topic see Ivaldi et al. [55], and Motta, chapter 4 [75]
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Each of the mentioned aspects is important to understand the me-
chanics of tacit collusion; but besides the industry characteristics, it could
be useful to study also the features of the firms’ decision process and
the way in which they could affect the sustainability of tacit collusive
agreements. This alternative approach to the problem is to be seen as a
complement – not as an antagonist – of the previous one, as it could offer
an insight on other factors that the regulator or the antitrust authorities
might want to keep in mind when evaluating a specific market context.
In particular looking at imperfect competition in a bounded rationality
setting becomes more relevant when one wants to investigate:
• what is the minimal information requirement for the firms to reach
a collusive agreement,
• how the “optimal” choice made by the firms can be affected by the
costs related to strategic complexity or to the activity of processing
information.
Suppose for instance that firms don’t have the information required in
classical models to sustain collusion. There are at least two ways in
which this can be true: uncertainty about the market demand or about
the opponents’ costs makes it difficult to coordinate on the joint-profit
maximizing outcome and the lack of transparency about the competitors’
past actions constitutes an obstacle to the detection of defections. One
may then wonder whether firms are able to “learn” from past experience
and to get to collusion anyway – if the context is stable enough. If so, it
would be also interesting to know how long this “learning phase” is and
which factors could affect its length.
On the other hand there are also situations in which it could be
“rational to be irrational”: the costs a firm would have to face for the
complete computation of each possible future scenario could be high
enough to force it to a less precise forecast or to use a simpler strategy.
Suppose, for instance that a firm has to face some costs for forecasting.
Could it “rationally” decide to be “boundedly rational” in the sense of
making predictions just till a certain period in the future? And if so: what
kind of consequences would it have onmarket dynamic and equilibrium?
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These are the main reasons that drewmy interest on the topics I study
in this firs part of the thesis. There is though a second issue that I want
to stress here and which is connected to the previous ones: as Chapter
2 will show, many of the models that incorporate bounded rationality
assumptions into oligopolistic settings have a truly dynamic approach
which is usually absent in the traditional approach to the problem2 . This
provide us with a useful tool to study the building up phase of a collusive
agreement, to understand more deeply what happens off the equilibrium
path in order to predict in which direction the system will move when it
is not in a steady state.
Among the many models of strategic interaction in oligopoly, I
decided to focus on the Cournot model. This choice has been driven
by a number of considerations: first of all Cournot model “is one of
the simplest of a large number of market models whose predictions rest
crucially on the notion of equilibrium. Many analyses of the effects of
horizontal mergers are based upon the Cournot framework, and much of
applied industrial organization uses the Cournot model as a benchmark.”
(Rassenti et al. [84]); but the model is interesting also because, how
Offerman et al. [81] observe,
although quantity-setting oligopoly is one of the “workhorse
models” of industrial organization (Martin, 1993), empirically
there is much ambiguity about its outcome. A recent survey
by Slade (1994) indicates that most empirical studies reject the
hypothesis that the outcome is in line with the Cournot–Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game. Interest-
ingly, however, outcomes on both sides of the Cournot–Nash
outcome are found. In the experimental literature, a similar
state of affairs obtains. Many experimental oligopoly games
result in higher than Cournot–Nash production levels, some
result in lower production levels (Holt, 1995).
2see, for example, Aumann [5] “The difficulty is that ordinary rational players have
foresight, so they can contemplate all of time from the beginning of play. Thus the situation
can be seen as a one-shot game, each play of which is actually a long sequence of ‘stage
games’, and then one has lost the dynamic character of the situation.”
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To pursue the goal of studying firms’ behavior in oligopoly under
the hypothesis of bounded rationality, I first did a broad research on
the existing – both theoretical and experimental – literature about this
subject, which is presented in chapter 2. In particular, I focused on several
models of learning, which are obvious candidates to represent firms’
behavior in a repeated game with imperfect and incomplete information,
and limited or constrained computational capabilities, such as the one we
are analyzing.
From this survey, it emerged that the relation between the process of
information search and the model of learning adopted by the firms
has a determinant impact on firms’ actual market choices in a repeated
Cournot oligopoly, and even if some experiments have already been run
to investigate this topic, the results reached so far are not clearcut nor fully
conclusive. The last part of the literature review concerns a new stream
of experiments investigating the process of information acquisition as a
way to understanding the heuristics and mental processes underlying
peoples’ decision making. These works are particularly important for my
research, whose main novel contribution consists precisely in combining
the study of learning with an experimental analysis of the way subjects
select the information they need before choosing their strategy.
More specifically, I adopted this approach in two experiments about
learning in a Cournot oligopoly setting. Instead of comparing subjects
market behavior under different informational frameworks – which is
the approach adopted in all the previous experiments about this topic – I
provide the players with a broad range of information, but force them
to choose only some pieces of it. The players’ process of information
gathering is strictly (but non obtrusively) controlled, bymeans of a special
software, originally called MouseLab and developed by Eric J. Johnson et
al. (1988) [63].
Paying attention not only to what players do but also to what they
know, it is possible to better understand the mental mechanisms which
guide their choices and consequently the impact that the informational
framework has over their behavior.
The framing of the two experiments, described in Chapter 3, is the
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same, and is pretty close to the one adopted in previous experiments on
the same topic. In the first experiment, presented in chapter 4, players
face virtual opponents enacted by computer programs. This allows me to
control for the learning rule adopted by players’ opponents and to check
if and how this affects the information search and market behavior of the
subjects. In the second experiment (chapter 5) subjects interact with each
other.
My results confirm that information gathered by the subjects affect their
choices through a mechanism of learning, which though appears to be a
composite process, in which different components coexist. Belief learning
seems to be the leading element, as subjects try to form expectations about
their opponents’ future actions and to best reply to them. When subjects
also look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors,
though, they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes
markets more competitive. Finally, reinforcement learning also plays a
non-negligible role, as subjects tend to favor strategies that have yielded
higher profits in the past. I show that these different elements may be
usefully incorporated into a more sophisticated learning model, shaped
after self tuning EWA learning model.
My conclusions are presented in chapter 6, where I also mention possible
future developments of this research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter will be devoted to a roundup of themany theories developed
to represent and explain the behavior of boundedly rational players in
games, which can possibly be used also to design models of oligopoly of
the kind I am interested in. First, though, it can be worthwhile to dwell
for a while on the main theoretical approaches developed during the last
twenty years to incorporate into the economic theory the relatively new
hypothesis that agents are not always to be represented as fully rational,
or even “hyperrational”, as they used to be till then. Time and space
constraints do not allow this to be an exhaustive description, while each
of the theories I will mention deserves a much wider coverage. Anyhow,
following Rubinstein [88], Aumann [5] and In-Koo Cho [24], I try at least
to draw a rough distinction between the main theoretical approaches to
bounded rationality, and to sketch some of the most important elements
that characterize each of them.
I will then focus on the principal models of learning, devoting special
attention to those having been already applied to the oligopoly setting
I am interested in. Finally, I will present some experiments which are
related to my research, either because they study a similar situation
(section 2.3), or because they adopt a similar technique (section 2.4).
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2.1 Main Theoretical Approaches
Behavioral Economics This approach sprang from a project initially
launched by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky who not only refuted
the standard use of the economic man paradigm but also identified
psychological elements which are systematically used by decision mak-
ers. Their findings demonstrated that emotions and procedural ele-
ments (“heuristics and biases”) – which were missing from the standard
application of rationality in economics – are indeed involved with the
human decision process. Researchers in this field usually preserve the
assumption that the economic agent is rational in the economic sense
of maximizing a target function; however they do not feel obliged to
define the targets as material rewards. On the one hand, agents in these
models maximize a utility function which also reflects agents’ culture and
psychological motives like fairness, envy and reciprocity, on the other
hand there have beenmany attempt to design an objective functionwhich
reflects some behavioral regularities observed in the lab, such as loss
aversion, reflection effect and changing attitudes towards risk depending
on the size of the stakes.
Experimental methods are widely used, not only to test but also to
develop new theories1. Note also that, in contrast to the “bounded
rationality” approach, for the most part behavioral economics does not
relate to the procedural elements of decision making.
I decided not to follow this approach in this first part of the project
basically because I do not think it fits with the aim of my research: in
fact while such an interest in psychological motives and in behavioral
biases can have an important role also for IO when one focuses on
how consumers behave and how firms – that are modeled as rational
– can play on them, I think that it could not be of much use when one
wants to represent simple strategic interactions between firms.2 Besides,
1see for example the way in which Camerer and Ho set the parameters for their
Experience-weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning model, described in Camerer, chapter 6
[18]
2To my knowledge the most interesting work on oligopolistic models that is somehow
close to this approach has been developed by Friedman and Mezzetti, who propose a
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even if it is true that many lab experiments confirmed the presence
of “anomalies”, that is of attitudes or conducts which are inconsistent
with what traditional theory predicts, it has been also shown that these
anomalies tend to disappear when there are large amounts of money at
stake and when players are experienced or well trained (and I think that
this is the case, when players are firms).
An Evolutionary Approach This second approach, in contrast to the
other two, treats agents as automata, merely responding to changing en-
vironments and lacking any power of deliberating about their decisions.
It imagines that the game is played over and over again by biologically
or socially conditioned players who are randomly drawn from a large
population. Each player is programmed to follow a particular behavior,
representing its “genetic endowment”, and there is no sense in which an
individual can “choose” its own genetic endowment. Note, though, that
single agents in this environment are not to be considered as player in the
classic game-theoretical acceptation, because here, actually, the “players”
are the populations – i.e., the species. Individuals indeed play no explicit
role in the mathematical model; they are swallowed up in the proportions
of the various pure strategies.
This theory studies the link between the classical concepts of equilibria of
the games and the aggregate behavior that emerges from an evolutionary
process that operates over time on the population distribution of behav-
iors.
This approach works completely out the problem of representing
limited computational capabilities of agents – because actually here they
do not have any – but of course it has not been developed with the aim of
investigating the characteristics of decision processes and their impact on
market outcomes; rather, the purpose seems to be to provide an insight
into the dynamic aspects of game-like situations and to demonstrate that
dynamic model of n-firm oligopoly in which each firm solves a dynamic optimization
problem believing that the other firms will alter their future choices in proportion to its
own current change [39]. In the second part of the project, and in particular in chapter 8, we
will see that a behavioral approach turns out to be useful in understanding the motives that
induce subjects to comply or not to antitrust law.
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there exist equilibrium concepts that do not strictly depend on those
assumptions of full rationality and common knowledge that have been
widely questioned. The situation that I intend to study, namely the
presence of imperfect competition in oligopolistic markets, is hardly
representable under this framing, because it requires to investigate the
repeated interaction between a small number of firms who maybe are not
perfectly rational in the traditional economic sense, but for sure follow
an intentional strategy. Nonetheless I will not completely abandon this
approach, because it shares some features with the learning models that
will play a considerable role in my research project.
Bounded Rationality The term “bounded rationality” has a sort of
double meaning, and the time has come to cope with this ambiguity: in
what precedes the term has been adopted with a broad acceptation to
describe all those theories that remove the hypothesis of full rationality
of economic agents. Here instead it is used in a more restrictive way
and refers to an approach which is not based on experimental evidence,
like behavioral economics tends to be, but more on casual observations
of the way in which people deliberate, and more generally of decision
making processes. Models here are mainly intended to increase our un-
derstanding of the effect of decision-procedural elements on the outcome
of an economic interaction. The border between “behavioral economics”
and “bounded rationality” sometimes appears to be evanescent and the
categorization of models into one or the other framework is not always
straightforward. Probably, the main difference lays in that the first
approach usually preserves the hypothesis of optimizing agents, while
in the second one models generally do not even present a well defined
objective function.
The pioneering works pertaining to this approach have been done since
the mid-eighties on automata and Turing machines playing repeated
games. These works were essentially intended to evaluate the effects of
bounds on the complexity of strategies that players can use. In one strand,
pioneered by Neyman [77], the players of a repeated game are limited to
using mixtures of pure strategies, each of which can be programmed on
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a finite automaton with an exogenously fixed number of states. This is
reminiscent of Axelrod’s [7] famous contest on the prisoner’s dilemma
game, who required the entrants in his experiment to write the strategies
in a Fortran program not exceeding a stated limit in length. In another
strand, pioneered by Rubinstein, the size of the automaton is endogenous;
computer capacity is considered costly, and any capacity that is not
actually used in equilibrium play is discarded.
Later on other, rather different models have been developed to study
how decision processes are affected by diverse cognitive limitations –
such as bounded recall3 and limited capability of making forecast4 – or
to investigate how agents can possibly approach and simplify problems
when they turn out to be too complicated for their cognitive abilities.
Consider, for example the “case based decision theory” developed by
Gilboa and Schmeidler [42] who propose a decision rule that chooses
a “best” act based on its past performance in similar cases, and Jehiel’s
“analogy based expectation equilibrium” [61], based on the assumption
that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy
classes, and only try to learn the average behavior in every class; this
model predicts that in equilibrium at every node players choose best-
responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly
represent the average behavior in every class.
In my opinion this field of research is quite fertile for further develop-
ments on the topics I am investigating, and for this reason in what follows
I will focus mainly on models that pertain to it.
2.2 Learning Models
I now turn to examinemore in detail the literature on learning, dedicating
particular attention to those model that have been already applied to
oligopoly, that in many cases have been also tested in the lab. Learning
models are important in this setting for at least two reasons.
First they allow to formalize the behavior of subjects who do not have
3See Aumann and Sorin [6]
4See Jehiel [60; 58; 59]
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full information on the game they are playing. The amount of information
required by the learning rule on which firms base their behavior is not
the same in all the models: in some extreme cases – like models of
learning based on trial and error – it is hypothesized that they do not
even know their own payoff matrix and have to learn the “rules of the
game” just playing it repeatedly and observing the relation between the
action they choose and the result they get. On the other hand, in “belief
learning” models demand and cost functions are common knowledge
and each firm can observe the opponents’ moves. Because of limited
cognitive abilities, though, they are not able to infer immediately the
equilibrium strategy and they just play a best reply to a belief about
other players’ future moves that in turn depends on what they did in the
past. The models also make different predictions about the equilibrium
outcome of the learning processes, so if one could establish a relation
between the amount and the nature of information hypothesized and the
result in terms of collusion/competition in the market, then it would be
possible to develop a theory which could provide some important policy
implications in terms of optimal information disclosure. As we will see
in section 2.3, some experimental economists have attempted to follow
this path, but the results they got are somehow contrasting and not so
clearcut, and some work is still to be done in this direction.
Second, learning models provide an insight also into the dynamics of
market behavior. This could be useful for better understanding what
happens in the “building up” phase of collusion, and which market and
institutional features can accelerate or slow down the process.
In what follows, I try to draw a taxonomy of learning models,
grouping them into four main categories: experiential learning, adaptive
learning, aspiration based models and models based on imitation. It is
difficult to classify these categories under the theoretical approaches to
bounded rationality mentioned above. I would say that imitation-based
and experiential learning models are more close to a “bounded rational-
ity” approach, aspiration based models are influenced by the behavioral
approach while adaptive learning processes does not represent strong
departure from the classical approach.
15
2.2.1 Experiential Learning
Models of learning belonging to this class are characterized by the general
assumption that agents learn exclusively from their own experience.
Agents’ beliefs about other players’ strategies, as well as information
about opponents’ past actions or payoffs do not play any role in these
models. In contrast, models in which this information is important can
be classified ad “observational”.
Reinforcement Learning This is probably the most famous model of
this class. Originally proposed by Roth and Erev (1995) [86], it rests
on the basic hypothesis that players increase the probability of playing
pure strategies that have met with success in previous periods. More
specifically, the model predicts that at the beginning of the game, before
any experience has been acquired, each player has a certain – exogenously
given – initial propensity to play each of his pure strategies. Then, after
each period t, if pure strategy k is played and yields a payoff of pitk, then
the propensity to play strategy k is increased by pitk while the propensity
of playing all other pure strategies remains unchanged. The probability
that a player plays pure strategy k at time t is given by the propensity of
playing that strategy over the sum of the propensities attached to each the
pure strategies in the player’s choice set. Notice that the learning curve
will be steeper in early periods and flatter later, as the impact of new
experiences decreases over time.
Theoretical results on the convergence properties of reinforcement
learning in gameswith a large action space andmore than two players are
scarce. A simulation based analysis of the long run dynamics produced
by this learning model in a repeated Cournot game has been recently
presented by Waltman and Kaymak (forthcoming) [103], who show that
the mean of firms’ joint quantity produced was significantly lower than
what is predicted by Nash equilibrium, yet higher than the joint profit
maximizing quantity. From their results, though, it is not clear whether
the quantities individually produced by each player converge in the long
run.
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Trial and Error This model of learning has been proposed by Huck et
al. [54; 53]. Like reinforcement learning models, the trial-and-error model
makes few assumptions about both the availability of information and the
cognitive abilities of an agent, as it just requires that the firms know their
own past actions and their own profits. The underlying idea of the model,
though, is fairly different. Framed in a standard symmetric Cournot
oligopoly with n firms, this learning rule simply says that a subject would
not repeat a mistake, i.e. if profits last period have decreased due to an
increase in quantity, then one would not increase quantity again. On the
other hand, if profits had increased following an increase in quantity, one
would not decrease quantity next period.
Formally, in discrete time this means that each firm i sets its quantity qti in
period t equal to
qti = q
t−1
i + δ sign(q
t−1
i − qt−2i )× sign(pit−1i − pit−2i )
where piti are the profits of firm i at period t and δ represents some strictly
positive quantity. With some small probability  > 0 each firm chooses an
arbitrary direction of change sti. If each firm can choose its outcome from
a finite grid Γ = {0, δ, 2δ, ..., vδ}, this defines a Markov process. Huck
et al. show that this process converges to the joint profit maximizing
equilibrium for the two-firms symmetric case, under the assumptions
that the cost function is weakly convex and market conditions are such
that there exists only one symmetric situation in which joint profits are
maximized.
The intuition is rather clear for when all firms start from an identical level
of output. The question arises why firms that start from arbitrary initial
quantities could become perfectly aligned. Suppose that two firms with
different quantities move downwards. They will continue to do so until
at least one firm’s profit decreases and it will always be the firm with
the smaller output to be the first. This is so because the firm selling the
higher quantity gains more from the increase in price. Thus, while the
smaller firm already moves upward, the other firm continues to move
downward thereby decreasing the distance between the firms. Similarly,
when moving upward the firm with higher output will be the first to
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experience losses and to change direction. Roughly speaking, there is a
general tendency to equalize quantities.
By means of simulations they extend this result to situations in which
more than two firms – non necessarily symmetric – compete in the
market.
In the continuous time the learning process is determined by the
following equation:
q˙i(t) = α sign(q˙i(t)) sign(pii(q(t)))
and the mathematical approach is more complicated, but it allows the au-
thors to demonstrate that the joint profit maximum is the only stationary
and asymptotically stable state of the process.
2.2.2 Adaptive Learning
In contrast with experiential learning, adaptive learning presumes that
agents are able to observe their rivals’ past play and that their com-
putational capabilities and their knowledge of the game structure are
sufficient for them to compute a best reply, given the strategy profile
adopted by their opponents. More specifically, according to the definition
given by Milgrom and Roberts (1991) [73], a player’s sequence of choices
is consistent with adaptive learning if the player eventually chooses only
strategies that can be justified in terms of the competitors’ past play. This
justification is based on choosing strategies that are undominated if rivals’
strategies are restricted to the most recently observed strategies. The best
response dynamic and fictitious play are two examples of adaptive learning
processes.
Best response dynamics This adjustment process has been analyzed
for many models and was in fact the adjustment process originally
suggested by Cournot (Cournot, 1960) in his duopoly analysis. Under the
best response dynamic each subject sets his current output equal to the
best (i.e., current period payoff maximizing) response to the last period
outputs of his rivals. Cournot demonstrated that this adjustment process
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was stable and converged to the unique NE for a duopoly with linear
demand and constant marginal cost. It is generally well known that best
reply dynamics do not converge in oligopolies with a linear setup and
three or more firms, as proven by the general instability result found by
Theocharis (1960) [101]. Yet, it has been shown byHuck et al. [52] that this
process converges in finite time to the static Nash equilibrium if some
inertia is introduced, namely, if it is assumed that with some positive
probability in every period each player sticks to the strategy he chose
in the previous period.
Fictitious play Under fictitious play (Brown, 1951 [13]) each subject
would take the empirical distribution of the actions taken in past periods
by each of his opponents to be his belief about that opponent’s mixed
strategy, and in every period he would play a best reply to this belief
when choosing his current strategy. It has been proven that in general,
fictitious play does not necessarily converge to the equilibrium (see
Shapley, 1964 [91]), yet Monderer and Shapley (1996) [74] showed that
for a particular class of games, that they call “finite weighted potential
games”, every fictitious play process converges in beliefs to equilibrium.
They also showed that a Cournot game with linear inverse demand
function and arbitrary differentiable cost function belongs to this class
of games.
2.2.3 Aspiration Based Models
Broadly speaking, this class of models in general suggests that firms (or
agents) at any time adopt a pure-strategy. If they are achieving their
aspiration level, then they are likely to continue with the same strategy.
If however, they are below their aspiration level then they are likely to
experiment and try something new. Aspiration based learning models in
general justify cooperation, that means in our case collusion, as the only
equilibrium that can emerge in the long run, irrespective of the initial
conditions.
The first and simpler model of this kind is by Karandikar et al. [68] and
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C D
C σ, σ 0, θ
D θ, 0 δ, δ
Table 2.1: General normal form game
has been developed for 2 × 2 repeated game whose structure is depicted
in table 2.1, where it must be that σ > δ > 0 ∧ 0 ≤ θ 6= δ. Depending
on the parameters this game can be a prisoner’s dilemma game (θ > σ), a
game of common interest (σ > θ) or a coordination game (δ > θ).
The state of the system at period t is
st = (A1t , α
1
t , A
2
t , α
2
t )
whereAit is the action chosen by player i in period t, and αit is his aspiration
level. The behavior rule for both players prescribes that
Ait+1

= Ait if piit ≥ αit
= Ait with probability p if piit < αit
6= Ait with probability (1− p)
where piit is the payoff of player i at time t.
If the process is not perturbed the aspiration levels are updated
according to the following rule:
αit+1 = λα
i
t + (1− λ)piit λ ∈ [0, 1]
This defines a Markov process on the space state E ≡ {C,D}2×R2 which
converges almost surely to a “pure strategy space” (pss) in which the
action pair is playedwith payoffs exactly identical to the aspiration levels:
so every pss is an absorbing state of the process.
The authors then assume that with some probability η the aspiration
levels are subject to a “tremble”, and they show that this perturbed
process has only one limit distribution which weakly converges to the
unique limit invariant distribution of the process µ∗. Finally, it is possible
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to demonstrate that limλ→1µ∗(C,C) = 1, that is: the limit invariant dis-
tribution places almost all weight on the cooperative outcome, provided
that the persistence parameter λ is sufficiently close to unity.
Aspiration based models have been applied to the Cournot oligopoly
problem by Dixon [31]. The structure of the economy envisaged by
Dixon’s model consists of a large number of identical duopolies. The
aspiration level is the same for all the firms, and depends on the average
level of profits among all the markets. If firms are achieving their current
aspiration level, then they do not experiment, whilst if they are below
aspiration they do. The main result of the paper is that the collusive
(joint-profit maximizing) outcome is the (almost) global attractor for this
economic system: it is as if an economy-wide social pressure of the capital
markets forced firms to earn at least average profits in the long-run, thus
enforcing collusion.
Oechssler [79] simplifies and generalize Dixon’s model, introducing a
stochastic stability analysis which assumes that in every period each
player experiments new strategies with a small positive probability and
studies what happens when this probability tends to zero. It is shown
that for games whose joint payoff function has a unique local maximum
the unique stochastically stable state is the state in which every player
chooses the joint profit maximizing action.
Aspiration based models can be classified either as “observational” or
as “experiential”, depending on the specified aspiration updating rule. If,
as in the original model proposed by Karandikar et al., aspiration levels
are updated only on the basis of player’s own past payoffs, then the
model is experiential, since it does not require the players to observe the
actions taken by their opponents, or the payoffs they got in past periods.
On the contrary, Dixon’s and Oechssler’s models assume that players
can observe not only the payoff of their own competitors, but also those
achieved by other firms in different markets.
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2.2.4 Models Based on Imitation
This class includes all the models prescribing that in every period after
the first one each individual chooses an action among those which were
actually chosen by some player in the previous round. Several models of
learning through imitation have been developed, and the main difference
between them consists in who is to be imitated, while the analytical tools
adopted are substantially similar, and all based on the theory of perturbed
Markov processes. All the models mentioned hereafter were specifically
designed to be applied in a Cournot oligopoly setting.
Imitate the best In an article appeared in Econometrica in 1997, Vega-
Redondo [102] proposed a theoretical model of behavior of Cournot
oligopolists which leads to surprising conclusions: the author in fact
shows that in the long run a Walrasian behavior evolves within any
quantity-setting oligopoly producing an homogeneous good, provided that
the market demand curve is downward sloping.
The behavioral rule described in the model essentially prescribes to
“imitate the best”, that is to produce, in each period, the quantity
produced in the previous period by the firm that got the highest profits.
It can be shown that if all the firms present in the market conform to this
rule, the market dynamic which comes forth can be characterized as a
discrete time Markov chain.
If the learning process were to consist only of an imitation component,
each monomorphic state (i.e. each state in which all the firms produce
the same quantity), would be an absorbing state of the Markov process.
To investigate the relative robustness of these outcomes, Vega-Redondo
follows the standard approach and introduces a mutation dynamic. This
implies that, with some common independent probability  > 0, in every
period each firm “mutates” so that all of the possible outcomes can be
chosen with a given positive probability. The dynamic market process
then becomes ergodic, and one can find the unique invariant distribution
µ to which the process converges in the long run and study its behavior
as → 0.
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The main result of Vega-Redondo’s model is that the limit invariant
distribution µ∗ ≡ lim→0µ puts all the probability on the monomorphic
state ω∗, where all the firms produce the Walrasian quantity.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Whenever price is
higher than marginal cost, the firm with the highest quantity makes the
largest profit and vice versa if profits are negative. Hence, as long as
profits are positive, the largest output is imitated which drives up total
output until price equals marginal cost. Note that this also explains why
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not a stable rest point of ‘imitate the
best’. If one firm deviates to a higher quantity, profits of all firms decrease
but profit of the deviator decreases by less.
Imitate the average Huck, Normann, Oechssler, 1999 [52] developed
an alternative model of learning, based on the assumption that it seems
reasonable that subjects who are uncertain about what to do and observe
that the average quantity of the other firms deviates from their own
quantity, imitate this average quantity – thinking along the line of
‘everyone else can’t be wrong’. A preference for cautious behavior and a
taste for conformity could be further reasons for imitating the average. If
all subjects were to follow this rule, clearly the process is bounded above
and below by the highest and lowest initial quantities. Without inertia the
process converges to the average of all the starting values. With inertia
the process depends on the realizations of the randomization device and
is therefore path dependent.
Imitate the “exemplary” firm Offermann, Potters and Sonnemans [81])
proposed another model based on imitation, which assumes that firms
follow the firm that sets the good example from the perspective of
industry profit. The exemplary firm is the firm (one of the firms) with
the quantity that would give the highest sum of profits if it were followed
by all firms. Adopting a stochastic stability approach, the authors also
introduce a tremble in the model, hypothesizing that with some positive
probability, in every period each firm experiments a new strategy from a
distribution with full support on its choice set.
23
If firms adopt the predicted rule and follow the exemplary firm, the
unique stochastically stable state of the process is the collusive outcome.
The intuition for the result is easy. After one round of following, the non-
exemplary firms will follow the firm that was exemplary in the previous
period. From this symmetric outcome, they will only move away if one
of the firms experiments and chooses a quantity which is closer to the
collusive outcome. Eventually, this process will lead to the collusive
outcome.
Broadly speaking, models based on imitation could be classified
as observational learning models. Note, though, that the amount of
information at firms’ disposal varies across them. To imitate the best, firms
must have the opportunity to observe or at least to infer the individual
profits of each of the opponents, while to imitate the average they only need
to know the average output. On the other hand, to imitate the “exemplary
firm”, they must have a wider knowledge of the market because the
firms should be able to evaluate which would be the sum of profits
if all the firms were producing a given level of output. Indeed, the
informational requirement for this model overlaps the one assumed by
adaptive learning models.
Apesteguia et al. (2007) [3] consider the broader case in which players
might observe not only the actions taken and the payoff realized by their
opponents, but also the strategies and payoff of other agents playing the
same game in different groups. They extend the taxonomy of learning
models based on imitation, considering both whom the agents are able
to imitate and whether they imitate the strategy which on average has
yielded the best payoff in the reference group in the previous period
(average rule), or the strategy which has yielded the best payoff ever in
the reference group, in the previous period (max rule). They show that if
one imitates one’s own opponents, the Walrasian outcome predominates
in the long run, while if on the other hand one imitates other players who
face the same problem as oneself but play against different opponents,
Nash equilibrium play is obtained, regardless of the imitation rule
adopted. Finally, if players can observe both their own competitors and
other players in different groups, the process converges to the Cournot
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equilibrium if the average rule is adopted, while it converges to the
perfectly competitive equilibrium if players follow the max rule.
2.3 Information and Learning in Oligopoly Ex-
periments
After Vega-Redondo’s article about imitation-based learning [102], sev-
eral experiments were run with the aim of testing and comparing this
and other learning model, specifically in a Cournot oligopoly setting. In
what follows, I shall summarize themain characteristics and the principal
findings of four among the most representative of these experimental
studies. In these works the same experiment is repeated under different
treatments, varying the quality and quantity of information provided to
the subjects. The authors then compare the actual behavior observed in
the different treatments and make inference about the impact that the
various informational frameworks have on players’ choices. Nonetheless
a number of details changes from one experiment to the other, and
maybe this is the first reason why the results obtained by the authors
are not at all unanimous, nor they are conclusive: for example, the
experiments performed by Huck, Normann and Oechssler [52] and by
Offerman, Potters and Sonnemans [81] provide a rather strong support
to the theory proposed by Vega-Redondo, mentioned before, while the
works presented by Rassenti et al [84] and by Bosch-Dome`nech and
Vriend evidence no trend towards the Walrasian equilibrium and do not
find any clear indication that players tend to imitate the one who got the
best performance in the previous period.
Huck et al.’s experiments (HNO from now on) study a 40-periods
Cournot market with linear demand and cost, in which four symmetric
firms produce a homogeneous good. Across their five treatments, they
vary the information they provide to the subjects, both about market
and about what other players in the same market do. In particular,
information about market can be complete, partial or absent.
When information is complete, participants are informed about the sym-
metric demand and cost functions in plain words and they are provided
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with a ‘profit calculator’, which can compute market price and firm’s
profit when one enters the total output of other firms and his own output,
and can also suggest to the subject the quantity which would yield him
the highest payoff given the hypothetical total quantity produced by the
competitors.
Information is said to be absent when participants do not know any-
thing about the demand and cost conditions in the market nor do the
instructions explicitly state that these would remain constant over time;
in these treatments the only thing subjects know is that they would act on
a market with four sellers and that their decisions represent quantities.
Finally, in treatments with partial information, participants are just told
that market conditions remain constant for all periods and coarsely
informed about demand and profit functions.
In three of the treatments, participants are also informed about com-
petitors’ individual quantities and profits in the previous period, while
in the remaining two treatments they are told only the total quantity
the others have actually supplied. HNO find significant differences in
individual and aggregate behavior across the treatments, and collect
data suggesting that increasing information about the market decreases
total quantity, while providing additional information about individual
quantities and profits increases total quantity. HNO also test other
learning theories besides the one proposed by Vega-Redondo, and they
find that when subjects know the true market structure, their quantity
adjustments depend significantly on themyopic best reply to the quantity
produced by their competitors in the very last period. In general, though,
none of the theoretical learning models they consider, per se, seems to
fully explain the observed behavior.
Offerman et al. [81] conducted a similar computerized experiment,
obtaining results which are consistent and complementary to those pre-
sented by HNO. In their setting, a triopoly with non-linear demand
and cost functions is repeated 100 times, with complete information
about market. The authors study how players’ behavior changes across
three treatments, which differ for the amount of information provided to
the subjects about individual quantities and revenues of the other two
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competitors in their market.
In one treatment (Qqpi) firms were provided with individualized infor-
mation about the quantities and the corresponding profits of the other
two firms; in a second treatment (Qq) they were just told the quantities
produced by the opponents, but not their profits, and in the last treatment
(Q) firms were only informed of the total quantity produced in their
market. As HNO, they observed a substantial difference between the
treatments and the data they collected evidence that the feedback infor-
mation provided to the subjects affects the behavioral rules they adopt.
Moreover, in agreement with what reported by HNO, also in this study
the Walrasian outcome is only reached quite often in treatment Qqpi,
where the players are informed about their opponents’profits. On the
other hand, they observe that the collusive outcome seems to be a stable
rest point only in treatment Qq and Qqpi, but not in the treatment with no
information about others’ individual quantities and profits, in which the
only rest-point is represented by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The experiment performed by Bosch-Dome`nech and Vriend (BDV)
differs from the previous two both for the setting and for the aims.
While HNO and OPS compare the prognostic capability of different
learning rules which lead to different theoretical outcomes, here the
authors focus specifically on Vega-Redondo’s behavioral rule and the
main purpose is to investigate whether people are inclined to imitate
successful behavior and, in particular, whether this behavior is more
prevalent in a more demanding environment. The authors study a
series of 22-periods Cournot duopolies and triopolies with homogeneous
commodity and linear demand and cost functions. They examine six
treatments altogether: for both duopolies and triopolies they consider
three different treatments that differ in the way information is provided
and in the time pressure put on the players.
In the treatment denominated “easy”, the players are given a profit table
that conveniently summarizes all the information concerning the inverse
demand curve and the cost function, and there is no time pressure on
them. After every period, each player gets information about the actions
of each of the other players in the samemarket, but not about their profits.
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In the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ treatments, players have just one minute to
decide on their output level; after each period they receive feedback
information both about the actions of all players and about the profits
obtained by each of them, and the output decision which led to the
highest profit is highlighted.
In the ‘hard’ version, the players get an inconveniently arranged enumer-
ation of the market prices associated with all possible aggregate output
levels and of all possible cost levels. The ‘hardest’ version differs from
the ‘hard’ treatment in that the information about the demand side of
the market is limited to the statement that ‘the price level depends on
aggregate output’.
The purpose of the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ treatments is to explore to what
extent imitation is influenced by the bounds imposed on the subjects’
choice capabilities and to check if it is actually more prevalent when
the task of learning about the market becomes more difficult while the
decision of the most successful firm is displayed more prominently. The
answer the authors give to this question is essentially negative. The
data they collected show that as the learning-about-the-environment task
becomes more complex, average output increases, but the Walrasian
output does not seem to be a good description of the output levels
observed in the experiment and if anything, imitation of successful
behavior tends to decrease rather than to increase when moving to more
complicated environments.
The fourth experiment has been conducted by Rassenti et al. (RRSZ);
it represents an oligopoly with homogeneous product, in which five firms
interact repeatedly for 75 periods, with fixed payoff conditions. The
setting exhibits a substantial difference from the previous three since in
this case the cost functions – linear, with constant marginal costs and
no fixed costs – are private information and are different among the
firms. The demand function is linear, and is public information among
the players.
The authors perform two different treatments: one in which subjects were
able to observe past output choices of each one of their rivals, the other in
which they are informed only about the past total output of rivals.
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They use their experimental results to test a number of learning models –
such as best response dynamics, fictitious play and more general types of
adaptive learning. None of these models receives strong support from the
data they collected: the observation of actual movement of total output
over time appears to be inconsistent with both best response dynamic and
with fictitious play, for most experiments. Moreover the authors show
that their data do not provide any evidence neither in support for learning
models based on imitation, nor for the more traditional hypothesis that
information about competitors enhance the potential for collusion, be-
cause the treatment conditions involving provision of information about
rivals’ outputs and prior experience do not seem to have a significant
effect on total output levels. The evidence relative to individual behavior
is mixed, and no predominant models of learning emerge; the most
prominent result is that in general observed behavior for individual
subject sellers is not converging to the static Nash equilibrium predictions
for individual output choices in these experiments.
In light of these results, I would conclude that it is worthwhile going
on investigating on information and learning in oligopolistic markets,
because the topic is interesting from a theoretical point of view and it
also has interesting practical implications, but a theory consistent with
experimental data is still far from being definitely developed. For this
reason I decided to design an experiment which is similar to the four
previously mentioned under many respects but introduces the use of
an experimental technique that allowed me to monitor the information
acquisition process through a computer interface. The main idea under-
lying this software – originally developed by Johnson et al. (1988) [63]
– consists in hiding relevant pieces of information behind a number of
boxes on the screen so that to access them the decision maker has to
open the boxes and look at their content. He can open just one box at
a time, and by recording the number and the duration of the look-ups
the program provides precious information about the decision makers’
learning process. To my knowledge, this technique has never been
applied to the analysis of learning processes in repeated strategic games.
Next section summarizes four of the most famous experiments using
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Mouselab, with the aim of explaining how this programworks in practice
and of pointing out its strength points. A more detailed survey on the
experimental study of cognition via information search can be found in
Crawford (in press) [28].
2.4 Experiments Controlling the Information
Acquisition Process
One of the most famous experiments using MouseLab has been per-
formed by Johnson, Camerer, Sen and Rymon(JCSR) [62]: in this work the
information acquisition process is observed with the aim of testing the
game theoretic assumption of backwards induction. The subjects were
asked to play eight three-round alternating-offer bargaining games, with
a different anonymous opponent each time. In the first round one of the
two players makes an offer to his opponent about how to share a given
amount of money; if the other player accepts, than the game is concluded,
otherwise he will have to make a counteroffer about how to share a new
pie, smaller than the first one. Again, if the first player accepts, the game
is over and each of them gets his part as established in the agreement;
on the other hand, if the first player rejects the offer the pie shrinks again
and he will have the opportunity to make one last offer to his opponent.
If even this offer is rejected, nobody gets anything. The sizes of the three
pies are represented on the computer screen in front of each player, but
they are hidden under three boxes that can be opened only one at a time,
simply by putting the mouse’ cursor over the box itself. The box will stay
open until the mouse is moved somewhere else.
The authors observe three measures of information search: the number
of times each box is opened in a period, the total time each box stays
opened in a period and the number of transitions from one specific box
to another. They note that most of the looking time is spent looking at
the first round pie size and contrary to the backward induction prediction
there are always more forward predictions than backward ones. From the
data collected through these experiments they conclude that people do
not use backwards induction instinctively, even if an additional treatment
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in which players are previously trained to use backward induction shows
that people are able to learn it when appropriately instructed.
They also find that there is a strong correlation between differences in
information processing and differences in players’ behavior. This and
the other results presented in this paper testify that measuring attention
directly can effectively contribute to the comprehension of both failure
and successes of the game theoretic predictions and help to understand
how information and learning can affect the outcomes of different games.
Another seminal study on information acquisition processes has been
done by Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta [26](CGCB). They asked
the subjects to play 18 two-players normal form games, with different
anonymous partners. The payoff tables are hidden andMouseLab is used
to present them: for every combination of strategies, subjects could look
up their own or their partner’s payoff as many times as they wanted,
but they could only see one of these numbers at a time. Till the end of
the series of games, no feedback was provided to the agents, in order to
suppress learning and repeated game effects as much as possible.
In Johnson et al. the goal was to test a specific theory of behavior – namely
backward induction. On the contrary, here the authors compare nine
different decision rules (or types) and try to make inference about which
one is more likely to inform players’ behavior. As in JCSR, they assume
that each decision rule determines both a player’s information search and
his decision once he gets the information he was looking for. Therefore,
by observing both the information acquisition process performed by the
agents and the choices they actually make when playing the games, it is
possible to deduce what decision rule they adopt.
This study confirms the presence of a systematic relationship between
subjects’ deviations from search pattern associated with equilibrium
analysis and their deviations from equilibrium decisions. Besides, ac-
cording to Costa-Gomes et al.’s analysis most of the subjects are much
less sophisticated than game theory assumes: between 67% and 89%
of the population belong to two types, namely to the Naı¨ve type, who
best responds to beliefs that assign equal probabilities to each of their
partner’s possible strategies and to L2 type, who best replies to Naı¨ve
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subjects.
More recently, MouseLab has been used again in two experiments
that provide further evidence about how the study of the information
acquisition process can be useful to understand what behavioral rules
and heuristics are adopted by subjects who display out of equilibrium
choices.
One experiment has been conducted by Costa-Gomes and Crawford
[25](CGC) and has the same theoretical and econometric framework of
CGCB but it differs for the class of games submitted to the subjects. In
this case, participants were requested to play 16 different two-person
guessing games, with anonymous partners and no feedback till the
end of the series. The games have been designed so that the space
of possible behaviors is wide and there is a strong separation of the
guesses and searches implied by the different decision rules analyzed
in the article. Results are consistent with those presented in CGCB [26],
but they are significantly sharper: many subjects can be easily attributed
to a particular type only by their guesses, and most of the others can
be identified via an econometric and specification analysis keeping into
account also their information search pattern.
Another interesting application of MouseLab has been recently pre-
sented by Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche and Weinberg [40], who experimen-
tally evaluate the directed cognition model: a bounded rationality model
that assumes that at each decision point, agents act as if their next
search operations were their last opportunity for search. As in the other
three aforementioned experiments, the authors register the search pattern
actually adopted by the subjects in two experiments and they compare
it with with what is predicted by the directed cognition model and by the
optimal search model (i.e. the Gittins-Weitzman algorithm), traditionally
adopted in economics.
In the first experiment they ask the participants to choose among three
projects whose outcome is uncertain, but can be discovered at a given
cost. In the second experiment the subjects are requested to solve a highly
complex choice problem in which the classical optimal choice model is
analytically and computationally intractable: they have to choose one out
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of eight goods which each have nine attributes that could be discovered
by opening different boxes on the computer screen. The players cannot
collect all the information about the goods, because in this game time
is a scarce resource. Individual information acquisition processes are
recorded through the MouseLab interface, and the data collected this
way reveal that the directed cognition model successfully predicts the
empirical regularities observable in subjects’ behavior.
The four experiments mentioned in this section evidence how the
study of the information acquisition process is complementary to the
observation of subjects’ actual choices which traditionally constitutes the
empirical basis for testingmodels of decisionmaking or trying to develop
new ones.
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Chapter 3
Market Setting and
Theoretical Benchmarks
In this chapter I describe the market environment characterizing both
the experiments I have run, and derive some theoretical results applying
three of the learning models described in section 2.2 to this specific
setting.
3.1 Experimental Environment
The market setting I have chosen for my experiments is similar to the
one proposed by HNO [52]; if possible it is even simpler. In all the
sessions and treatments, the setting remains the same. Four identical
firms compete a` la Cournot in the samemarket for 40 consecutive periods.
Their product is perfectly homogeneous. In every period t each firm i
chooses its own output qti from the discrete set Γ = {0, 1, ..., 30}, which is
the same for every firm. The choice is simultaneous.
Price pt in period t is determined by the inverse demand function:
pt = max(0, 81−
∑
i
qti)
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LetCi(qti) = q
t
i be the cost function for every firm i; firm i’s profit in period
twill be denoted by
piti = p
tqti − Ci(qti).
The shape of these functions has been chosen so that the three main the-
oretical outcomes – namely collusive, Cournot and Walrasian outcomes
– are well separated one from the other and belong to the choice set Γ.
More precisely, collusive equilibrium is denoted by ωM = (10, 10, 10, 10),
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is ωN = (16, 16, 16, 16) and Walrasian equilib-
rium is ωW = (20, 20, 20, 20).
3.2 Three Theoretical Benchmarks
We are interested in studying the market dynamics when the stage
game so defined is repeated several times, and the firms do not have
all the information (or the computational capabilities) to evaluate what
the standard theory predicts is an optimal behavior for them. As a
Required
information
Predicted
equilibrium
Best Reply
Dinamics
Competitors’
aggregate quantity
and BR function
Nash (q = 16)
Imitate the Best
Last period
individual profits
and quantities
Walrasian (q = 20)
Trial and Error Own past profits andquantities Collusive (q = 10)
Table 3.1: Theoretical benchmarks
first benchmark to evaluate the experimental results, we individuate
three among the theoretical learning models introduced in section 2.2.
The choice has been driven by three main motives: first, these three
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models are particularly simple; second, they are based on very different
informational requirements; third, they yield well distinct market out-
comes in the long run, namely the Cournot, Walrasian and joint profit
maximizing outcomes, respectively. These models are summed up in
table 3.1 and presented more in detail in the following paragraphs, where
they are applied to the specific market environment characterizing my
experiments.
3.2.1 Best Response Dynamics
Following Huck, Normann and Oechssler [52] we consider here the
simplest model of best reply dynamic. This model theorize that in every
period each player myopically chooses his output as a best reply to the
sum of the quantities produced by the other three in the previous period.
More precisely, the best reply correspondence for player imaps
∑
j 6=i q
t−1
j
to the set
BRti := {q ∈ Γ : piti(q,
∑
j 6=i
qt−1j ) ≥ piti(q′,
∑
j 6=i
qt−1j ), ∀q′ ∈ Γ}.
Under the hypotheses I made onmarket structure, due to the discreteness
and finiteness of the choice set, we have:
BRti =

{0}, if ∑j 6=i qt−1j ≥ 80
{30}, if ∑j 6=i qt−1j < 20{
80−∑j 6=i qt−1j
2
}
if 20 ≤∑j 6=i qt−1j < 80 and ∑j 6=i qt−1j is even{
80−∑j 6=i qt−1j
2 − 0.5,
80−∑j 6=i qt−1j
2 + 0.5
}
otherwise.
In this last case, it is assumed that the player chooses qti from BR
t
i
according to some probability distribution with full support.
The best reply dynamic defined this way yields a Markov chain over
the state space Ω = Γ4 which does not necessarily converge to a stable
equilibrium, consistently with what has been shown by Theocharis [101]
for the case in which quantities are chosen in a continuous space.
To catch an intuition of this result, suppose for example that the system
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reaches one of the two states of the absorbing set s = {(30, 30, 30, 30), (0, 0, 0, 0)}:
once this has happened, the system will keep on oscillating between this
two states and will never be able to escape the set.
HNO state the following theorem:
THEOREM 1 The best reply dynamic with inertia converges
globally in finite time to the static Nash equilibrium.
Within the framework considered here, this implies that the learning
process brings the system to converge to the state ωN = (16, 16, 16, 16).
For sake of completeness I replicate here HNO’s demonstration,
applying it to the specific context under exam.
To introduce inertia into the learning model, HNO simply hypothesize
that in every period each player i chooses qti from the set BR
t
i with some
fixed probability (1− θ), while with probability θ he sticks to the quantity
he chose in the previous period, so qti = q
t−1
i . We will see that the best
reply dynamic with inertia can be represented by an ergodic Markov
chain having only one recurrent set, therefore the probability distribution
over the state space approximate the unique invariant distribution of the
process, regardless of the initial state, and that this invariant distribution
puts probability one over the state ωN , which is the only recurrent state
in Ω.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: It is clear that ωN is an absorbing state,
since the process we have defined can never escape from it; in order to
prove the result, it is necessary to demonstrate that no other state in Ω is
recurrent, namely ωN is accessible from any other state:
ω′ → ωN ∀ ω′ ∈ Ω, ω′ 6= ωN
which means that there exist a τ ∈ N\{0} such that the probability p(τ)
ω′,ωN
of reaching state ωN from ω′ in τ periods is positive.
To prove this result we shall first show that the state ωN is accessible
from any ω+ ∈ Ω+, where Ω+ = {(q1, q2, q3, q4) ∈ Ω : qi > 0, i =
1, 2, 3, 4}, then we shall conclude by verifying that for any ω0 ∈ Ω \ Ω+
there exists an ω+ ∈ Ω+ such that ω+ is accessible from ω0 (ω0 → ω+),
therefore, by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, it follows that ω0 →
ωN . ∀ω0 ∈ Ω.
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The first part of the proof requires the preliminary definition of the
concepts of “ordinal potential”, “ordinal potential game” and “improve-
ment path”, introduced by Monderer and Shapley [74].
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, Yi denote the set of strategies
of player i and ui : Y → R the payoff function of player i, where
Y = Y1 × Y2 × ...× Yn is the set of the strategy profiles.
A function P : Y → R is an ordinal potential for the game G = (N,Y, u) if,
for every i ∈ N and for every y−i ∈ Y−i
ui(x, y−i)− ui(z, y−i) > 0⇔ P (x, y−i)− P (z, y−i) > 0 ∀x, z ∈ Yi
An ordinal potential game is a game that admits an ordinal potential.
An improvement path in Y is a sequence γ = (y0, y1, ...) of elements of Y
such that, for every k ≥ 1, there exists a unique player – say player i –
such that the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
• yk = (x, yk−1−i ); x ∈ Yi, x 6= yk−1i
• ui(yk) > ui(yk−1)
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following Lemma by Monderer and
Shapley [74]:
Lemma 1.1 Every improvement path of a finite potential game is finite.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.1: For every improvement path γ = (y0, y1, ...), by
the definition of ordinal potential we have:
P (y0) < P (y1) < P (y2) < . . .
As Y is a finite set, this sequence must be finite.
This result can be applied to our model, since – as shown by HNO
– the function P (ω) = (p(ω) − 1)∏4j=1 qj is an ordinal potential for our
game if the strategy set of each player is restricted to Γ \ {0}. Therefore,
there is a finite improvement path departing from every state ω+ ∈
Ω+ where Ω+ = {(q1, q2, q3, q4) ∈ Ω : qj > 0, j = 1, 2, 3, 4}.
By definition this improvement path ends in a state ωk such that no player
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can improve his own payoff by changing his strategy if the quantities
chosen by the other players remain the same, i.e.
@i s.t. pii(ωk+1) > pii(ωk)where ωk+1 = (q′, qk−i) for some q′ 6= qki , q′ ∈ Γ\{0}
This condition is clearly satisfied only by ωC = (16, 16, 16, 16), represent-
ing the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Finally, note that the Best Reply process with inertia can give rise to
an improvement path over Ω+, since with positive probability in every
period only one player changes his strategy while the others stick to the
quantity they previously chose. So, under the Best Reply process, ωN is
accessible from every state in Ω+.
As mentioned before, to complete the proof of Theorem 1 it is enough
to show that
∀ω0 ∈ Ω \ Ω+ ∃ω+ ∈ Ω+ s.t. ω0 → ω+
Let ω0 = (q01 , q02 , q03 , q04) ∈ Ω \ Ω+ and ωBR be a state in which every
player i chooses qi ∈ BR0i , giving a best reply to ω0. By definition,
ωBR is accessible from ω0 under the process defined by the Best Response
Dynamics (ω0 → ωBR).
If
∑
i q
0
i < 79 it is straightforward to see that ω
BR ∈ Ω+ since the best
reply to a quantity strictly smaller than 79 is always positive.
If
∑
i q
0
i ≥ 79 it can be shown that the sum
∑
iBR
0
i ≤ 162 − 32
∑
i q
0
i ≤
43.5, since for every player i BR0i ≤
80−∑j 6=i q0j
2 +
1
2 . Therefore ∃ω+ ∈
Ω+ s.t. ωBR → ω+, thus the system moves from ω0 to ω+ with positive
probability in at most 2 steps.
This concludes the proof.
The problem with the analysis I have just concluded is that it makes
prediction for the long run outcomes, and for a positive, but undefined
degree of inertia. Since it might be interesting also to check how the
process behaves in the short run, for various degrees of inertia, I complete
this and the following sections by presenting the results of simulations I
have done for this and the other two models, under the setting presented
in section 3.1. My simulation then reproduces a market with four firms,
facing the demand and cost functions characterizing my experiments,
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and interacting for 40 consecutive periods. The quantities produced in
the first period are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over
the set {0, 1, . . . , 29, 30}, while firms’ behavior in the following periods
– in this case – is determined by the best response dynamics with a
degree of inertia equal to θ, taking values 0.05, 0.1, 0.15. I ran 10000
cycles of simulation per each value of θ. The frequency distributions
of individually chosen quantities in period 40 are reported in figure 3.1.
According to my simulations, the higher is the degree of inertia, the
Figure 3.1: Frequency distribution of individual choices in the 40th round; 10000
cycles of simulation.
faster the convergence to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. More
specifically, we notice that a degree of inertia below 10% is not sufficient
to obatin some convergence within 40 periods.
3.2.2 Imitate the Best
The learningmodel presented here has been originally proposed by Vega-
Redondo [102]. The core of the model is represented by the imitation
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dynamic: a discrete time dynamic which assumes that at every time t each
firm chooses its output qti from the set:
Bt−1 = {q ∈ Γ : ∃j ∈ I s.t. qt−1j = q and pit−1j ≥ pit−1i ∀i ∈ I, i 6= j}
This learning process, when applied to the specific context of our
fictitious market, defines a Markov chain over the state space Ω = Γn
(where n = 4 in our case). Let ωq stand for themonomorphic state (q, q, ..., q)
in which every firm chooses the same quantity q ∈ Γ. It is easy to
verify that ∀q ∈ Γ the monomorphic state ωq is absorbing and that all
the non-monomorphic states are transient. Therefore, the process has
a number of recurrent sets equal to the cardinality of Γ, and there is
a stationary distribution µq corresponding to each of them, which puts
probability one over ωq. Thus, the long run behavior of the evolutionary
process consisting only in the imitation dynamic displays a large potential
multiplicity, since it can rest forever in any monomorphic state.
To investigate the robustness of each of these multiple outcomes,
Vega-Redondo introduced a perturbation into the process, assuming that
in every period t each firm sets its quantity according to the imitation
rule with probability 1 − , while with probability  it departs from
the rule and chooses its quantity according to a distribution with full
support over Γ. The interpretation here can be that with small probability
every firm makes an error or it experiments a different strategy. This
perturbed process defines a Markov chain irreducible and ergodic – since
each state is accessible from any other one and all the states are aperiodic.
As a consequence, the chain has only one stationary distribution µ,
which clearly depends on ; moreover, the τ -steps transition matrix
P (τ) converges to a rank-one matrix in which each row is the stationary
distribution µ, that is:
lim
τ→∞P
(τ) = uµ
where u is the unit vector: namely, the Markov chain converges to its
stationary distribution, regardless where it began.
Recall that the perturbation has been introduced into the imitation
process in order to test the robustness of the multiple outcomes of the
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unperturbed process. We are then interested in investigating the behavior
of the perturbed process as → 0.
The crucial result for our application is a straight consequence of the
theorem stated by Vega-Redondo:
THEOREM 2 The limit distribution µ0 = lim→0 µ is a well
defined element of the unit simplex ∆(Ω). Moreover, µ0 puts
probability one over the state ωW = (qW , qW , qW , qW ) where
qW is such that p(nqW )qW−Ci(qW ) ≥ p(nqW )q−Ci(q) ∀q ∈ Γ.
This implies that under the “imitate the best” dynamic, the only stochas-
tically stable outcome in our setting is the Walrasian outcome ωW =
(20, 20, 20, 20), in which all the firms get zero profits.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
The proof of this theorem relies on the graph-theoretic techniques devel-
oped by Freidlin and Wentzell [38], therefore some basic concepts should
be introduced in order to expose it.
A directed graph G is an ordered pair G := (V,A)with
• V , a set of vertices or nodes,
• A, a set of ordered pairs of vertices, called directed edges, arcs, or
arrows.
An edge e = (x, y), x, y ∈ V is considered to be directed from x to y, so y
is said to be a direct successor of x, and x is said to be a direct predecessor
of y. More generally, if there exists a path leading from x to y, then y is
said to be a successor of x, and x is said to be a predecessor of y.
To apply this idea to the situation under analysis, first letO be the directed
graph havingΩ as the vertex set and inwhich for every vertex ω ∈ Ω there
exists an edge e(ω, ω′), ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, ω′ 6= ω.
A resistance r(ω′, ω′′) can be associated to every edge e(ω′, ω′′), where
r s.t. 0 < lim
→0
−rP ω′,ω′′ <∞
and P ω′,ω′′ denotes the (one step) transition probability from ω
′ to ω′′
according to the perturbed process defined by the Imitation Dynamics
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with a probability of error equal to . The resistance simply measures the
total number of mistakes (or experiments) involved in the transition from
state ω′ to ω′′.
An ω-tree H for any vertex ω of O is a tree spanning O so that for every
ω′ 6= ω, ω′ ∈ Ω there exists a unique directed path from ω′ to ω. Let
r(H) =
∑
(ω′,ω′′)∈H r(ω
′, ω′′) denote the resistance of the ω-tree H, and
Hω be the set of all the ω-trees in O.
The stochastic potential of a state ω ∈ Ω is:
γ(ω) = min
H∈Hω
r(H)
Let γ∗ = minω∈Ω γ(ω).
Now we can provide the proof for theorem 2, which follows directly
from the following three lemmata:
Lemma 2.1 Let P  denote the Markov chain defined by the perturbed
process, and µ be its unique stationary distribution.
Then lim→0 µ = µ0 exists and µ0 is a stationary distribution of P 0
– the Markov chain defined by the unperturbed process. Moreover,
the probability µ0ω associated to the state ω by the limit stationary
distribution µ0 is strictly positive if and only if γ(ω) = γ∗.
Lemma 2.2 The stochastic potential γ(ωW ) equals the cardinality of Γ
minus 1.
Lemma 2.3 For all q 6= qW , the monomorphic state ωq has a stochastic
potential
γ(ωq) ≥ |Γ|
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1:. We shall follow the demonstration provided
by Peyton Young [82] (Appendix), that we report here for sake of
completeness.
First we can apply to P  a result established by Freidlin and Wentzel
[38](Chapter 6, Lemma3.1) for every aperiodic, irreducible stationary
Markov processes the unique stationary distribution is given by the
formula:
µω = p

ω/
∑
ω′∈Ω
pω′
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where
pω =
∑
H∈Hω
∏
(ω′,ω′′)∈H
P ω′,ω′′
Choose the ω-tree H with minimum resistance and consider the identity:
−γ
∗ ∏
(ω′,ω′′)∈H
P ω′,ω′′ = 
r(H)−γ∗ ∏
(ω′,ω′′)∈H
−r(ω
′,ω′′)P ω′,ω′′ (3.1)
By the definition of r,
lim
→0
−r(ω
′,ω′′)P ω′,ω′′ > 0,∀(ω′, ω′′) ∈ H (3.2)
If r(H) = γ(ω) > γ∗ it follows from (3.1) and (3.2) that
lim
→0
−γ
∗ ∏
(ω′,ω′′)∈H
P ω′,ω′′ = 0
therefore
lim
→0
−γ
∗
pω = 0.
Similarly, if r(H) = γ(ω) = γ∗ we obtain
lim
→0
−γ
∗
pω > 0.
Since
µω = 
−γ∗pω/
∑
ω′∈Ω
−γ
∗
pω′
it follows that
lim
→0
µω =
{
= 0 if γ(ω) > γ∗
> 0 if γ(ω) = γ∗
Finally, since lim→0 P ω′,ω′′ = P
0
ω′,ω′′ ∀ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω and µ satisfies the
equation µP  = µ ∀ > 0, then µ0P 0 = µ0. µ0 is therefore a
stationary distribution of P 0, hence it puts probability 1 over one of the
monomorphic states. This concludes the proof for Lemma 1.
We shall now show that the monomorphic state having positive probabil-
ity under the stationary distribution is precisely ωW .
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PROOF OF LEMMA 2.2: here we shall apply the proof provided by Vega
Redondo [102] to the specific context we are analyzing, to show that:
γ(ωW ) = |Γ| − 1 = 30.
Note that
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ωq s.t. P 0ω,ωq > 0 and therefore r(ω, ωq) = 0.
Consider anymonomorphic state ωq, q ∈ Γ, and a state ω˜q = (q1, q2, q3, q4)
such that ∃i ∈ I : qi = qW and qj = q ∀j 6= i, j ∈ I . By the definition of r
it is easy to check that r(ωq, ω˜q) = 1 since P ωq,ω˜q > 0 if  > 0, according to
the previously stated definition of the perturbed process.
To conclude the proof, it is enough to verify that, for any q 6= qW , the
resistance r(ω˜q, ωW ) is equal to zero. Indeed, it is straightforward to check
that P 0ω˜q,ωW > 0 under our hypotheses, because the firm producing q
W
gets always the highest profit, regardless of the output produced by the
others:
pi(qW , 3q) > pi(q, 2q + qW ) ∀q ∈ Γ, q 6= qW .
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.3: to prove that γ(ω) > |Γ| ∀ωq 6= ωW it suffices to
show that at least two mistakes are necessary to escape from the basin of
attraction of ωW , namely: there is no
ω˜W = (q1, q2, q3, q4) : ∃i : qi 6= qW , qj = qW ∀j 6= i, j ∈ I
such that r(ω˜W , ωq) = 0, since P 0ω˜W ,ωq = 0 because the profit of the firm
producing q 6= qW is always lower than the profit earned by each of the
other three firms, producing qW :
pi(q, 3qW ) < pi(qW , 2qW + q)∀q ∈ Γ, q 6= qW .
As for the best response dynamics, I ran a simulation to depict
the behavior of this model in the short run, with different levels of
experimentation. Again, I ran 10000 cycles of simulation per each value of
, taking values 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. The frequency distributions of individually
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Figure 3.2: Frequency distribution of individual choices in the 40th round; 10000
cycles of simulation.
chosen quantities in period 40 are reported in figure 3.2.
Simulation results, show that with any of the considered levels of experi-
mentation, the process converges pretty quickly to the predicted outcome,
but convergence is faster as experimentation becomes more probable.
3.2.3 Trial and Error
This model of learning has been firstly proposed by Huck, Normann and
Oechssler in 2000 [53] then revised by the same authors in a subsequent
article [54] where they present a continuous time version of it.
Both versions of the learningmodel are, in principle, very simple. Assum-
ing that the strategy set of the player is ordered, the model predicts that
every time a player changes the strategy he adopts, he will check whether
his payoff has consequently increased or decreased. If he observes a raise,
in the following period he will keep on changing his strategy in the same
direction as before. On the contrary, if the payoff declines the player will
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change his strategy in the reverse direction. This is the model with the
most lax hypotheses about information: it just requires that the firms
know their own past actions and their own profits.
Huck et al. show that Trial and Error learning yields a collusive outcome.
They proove this result analytically for the continuous time version, and
for the discrete version with only two firms, and they extend it to the
discrete case with more than two firms by means of simulations.
Since in the case we are analyzing both time and the strategy set are
discrete, we will consider the discrete version of the model, applying it to
the oligopoly setting described above.
Given the quantity qi1 ∈ Γ chosen by any firm in period one, in every
following period t > 1 each firm will set how much to produce according
to the following rule:
qit =

0 if qit−1 + sit−1 < 0
30 if qit−1 + sit−1 > 30
qit−1 + s
i
t−1 otherwise.
where the direction of change is given by
sit = sign(q
i
t − qit−1)sign(piit − piit−1)
if (qit − qit−1)(piit − piit−1) 6= 0; otherwise s is randomly chosen among the
values −1, 0, 1, each having positive probability.
This defines a Markov chain over the state space Ω = Γ4 × {−1, 0, 1}4.
As for the previous model, we assume the possibility of experimentation
or mistakes, thus defining a perturbed process, in which with some small
probability  > 0 each firm chooses an arbitrary direction of change sti.
This defines a Markov process which is irreducible and aperiodic, there-
fore has a unique stationary stable distribution. By contrast, in principle
the unperturbed process may have many stationary distributions.
In what follows, I will show that (i) the unperturbed process has
several absorbing sets, (ii) all the states belonging to these absorbing sets
have the same stochastic potential, therefore (iii) they are all stochastically
stable, meaning that all the absorbing sets of the unperturbed process
belong to the support of the limit distribution µ0 = lim→0 µ.
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first recurrent
set
11 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓
average quantity:
10
10 ↓ 10 ↓ 10 ↓ 10 ↓
9 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑
10 ↑ 10 ↑ 10 ↑ 10 ↑
second
recurrent set
11 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓ 10 ↑
average quantity:
10.25
10 ↑ 10 ↑ 10 ↑ 11 ↑
11 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓ 12 ↓
10 ↓ 10 ↓ 10 ↓ 11 ↓
9 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑ 10 ↓
10 ↑ 10 ↑ 10 ↑ 9 ↑
third
recurrent set
11 ↓ 11 ↓ 10 ↑ 10 ↑
average quantity:
10.77
10 ↑ 10 ↑ 11 ↑ 11 ↑
11 ↓ 11 ↓ 12 ↓ 12 ↓
10 ↓ 10 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓
9 ↑ 9 ↑ 10 ↓ 10 ↓
10 ↑ 10 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑
fourth
recurrent set
11 ↓ 10 ↑ 10 ↑ 10 ↑
average quantity:
10.47
10 ↑ 11 ↑ 11 ↑ 11 ↑
11 ↓ 12 ↓ 12 ↓ 12 ↓
10 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓ 11 ↓
9 ↑ 10 ↓ 10 ↓ 10 ↓
10 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑ 9 ↑
Note: the numbers indicate the quantity produced by each of the four
firms, the arrows the direction of change.
Table 3.2: Recurrent sets of the unperturbed process
Recall that under the maintained assumptions, the cardinality of the
state space is 314 × 34. If we disregard the order of the players, then
the number of possible states reduces to
(
96
4
)
. Among these states, we
want to individuate those, if any, which are recurrent. This was done
by means of simulations and numerical analysis. First, the evolution
of the unperturbed process was simulated over 200 iterations of the
stage game, replicating this cycle for 10000 times. Regardless of the
initial state of each cycle, which was randomly chosen from a uniform
distribution over the whole state space, it emerged that during the last
ten iterations the process rests over only 22 of the possible states, and
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that these 22 states belong to four recurrent sets, as displayed in table
3.2. Through a following numerical analysis I checked that all the other
states are transient under the unperturbed process, meaning that the t-
steps transition probability from each of these states to at least one of the
states belonging to the recurrent sets is positive, for a finite t 1.
It is easy to verify that one and only one mistake is sufficient to transit
from a recurrent set to the following one. It follows that all the states in the
four recurrent sets have the same stochastic potential, which equals the
number of recurrent sets minus one. As a consequence following directly
from the aforementioned Lemma 2.1, all the states in the recurrent sets
are stochastically stable.
A quick look at the quantities produced by the four firms in all of
the recurrent states confirms the result previously stated by Huck et al.,
namely that the Trial and Error process converges to a neighborhood of
the joint profit maximizing outcome, which in this case is obtained when
all the firms produce a quantity equal to 10.
I conclude this chapter by presenting the results of the simulation I did
to study the short run behavior of the trial and error model, with different
probabilities of mistakes. As in the previous two models, I ran 10000
cycles of simulation per each level of the error probability , taking values
0.01, 0.05, 0.1. Alike the imitate the best process, also trial and error turns
out to converge to states which are close to the stochastically stable one
within the number of repetitions that will take place in my experiments,
regardless of the probability of error. In particular, we observe that as the
probability of error decreases, the variance of the distribution decreases
too and convergence is more precise.
1The analysis was performedwithMatlab c©. The code is available from the author upon
request.
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Figure 3.3: Frequency distribution of individual choices in the 40th round; 10000
cycles of simulation.
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Chapter 4
First Experiment: playing
against robots
4.1 Experimental Design
The way people behave and the way they learn might be affected by
what their peers (namely their opponents, in our experiment) do. For
this reason, the analysis of the results could be very complicated if the
experiment included interaction between subjects, because the individual
characteristics of the players could affect the dynamics that emerge in
every single group in different ways1. Therefore, I decided to run this
first version of the experiment in which I let subjects play against three
“virtual” players enacted by the computer and programmed to follow
a specific learning rule. This way I can control for the effect of the
opponents’ behavior on the players’ choices. The treatment variable is
then represented by the learning rule adopted by the “robot” opponents.
Note that the three opponents of the same subject are all programmed to
follow the same learning rule.
To avoid deception, subjects are informed that their opponents are
“robots”, that is: they are enacted by the computer. Subjects also know
that these “robots” do not play at random but choose according to some
1I thank Magnus Johannesson for having pointed out this possible complication.
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rule, nonetheless they do not necessarily choose the same output. No
other information is provided about the way these “robots” play.
The experiment will be repeated under three treatments. I shall
present first the elements which are common across the three treatments,
then explain the differences between them.
4.1.1 Information Provided to the Subjects
Participants know howmany competitors they have. Instructions explain
in plain words that there is an inverse relation between the overall
quantity produced by the four firms and market price and that a firm’s
production costs increase with the number of goods it decides to sell.
Besides, players are told that per-period profit is given by market price
times the number of goods sold by the firm, minus production costs.
(see the instructions in Appendix A.2).
Subjects are also endowed with a profit calculator similar to the one
proposed by Huck et al. [52]. This device has two input fields that the
subject can fill in: one for the total quantity produced by the other three
firms in the market, one for the quantity produced by his own firm. If the
player enters two (arbitrary) values, one for each of these fields, the profit
calculator evaluates market price and the profit the subject would earn;
if the player just fill in the field pertaining to competitors’ quantity and
leaves the other one blank, the profit calculator computes the quantity
that would yield him the highest profit and inform him about market
price and profits he would earn if he produced the suggested amount of
good. The answers provided by the profit calculator are always displayed
both graphically and textually (Figure A.1(a) and A.1(b)). The software I
developed for this experiment records how many times the subject uses
the profit calculator and every trial he does.
The number of rounds is common knowledge among the subjects.
According to game-theoretic predictions, cooperation should be sustain-
able only if our stage game were repeated in(de)finitely many times, but
according to Selten et al. [90]
Infinite supergames cannot be played in the laboratory. At-
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tempts to approximate the strategic situation of an infinite
game by the device of a supposedly fixed stopping probability
are unsatisfactory since a play cannot be continued beyond
themaximum time available. The stopping probability cannot
remain fixed but must become one eventually.
In light of this consideration and of the results obtained by Normann
and Wallace [78] – who show that the termination rule does not have a
significant effect on players’ behavior except for an end effect – I decided
to adopt a commonly known finite horizon, for sake of transparency and
practicality.
After the first round, each player has the opportunity to look at three
plots summing up information about what happened in the previous
periods (Figure A.2). The first graph is a bar-plot showing the quantity
produced by each of the four firms in the market in the previous period,
and the relative profit. The second graph displays the quantity produced
by the player’s firm compared with the aggregate quantity produced by
his three competitors in each of the previous periods, since the game
began. The last plot shows the quantity and the profit obtained by the
player’s firm in each of the previous periods.
The subjects, however, are not able to look at all the three plots at the same
time, since these plots are hidden behind three boxes on the computer
screen and the player can open just one box at a time. Behind a fourth
box is hidden the answer provided by the profit calculator. A box can
be opened just putting the mouse cursor over it, and its content will be
displayed on the screen until the cursor moves out of the box’s borders.
As mentioned before, the software automatically records subjects’ look-
ups sequences and look-ups durations.
Besides these four boxes, on the computer screen there is a counter
showing the running cumulative profits earned by the player since the
game began, and a timer displaying how long it is since the current round
started, that is how long has the subject been thinking about what choice
to make next. Figure A.4 shows how subjects’ computer screen looks like.
After the last round the participants are shown their overall profit,
compared with those of their three opponents (Figure A.3).
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4.1.2 Treatments
This experiment has been run under three different treatments (T&E,
BRD and ItheB), which differ only by the learning rule adopted by the
computer. For sake of simplicity, I have chosen the three basic learning
rules described in section 3.2. In what follows I briefly recapitulate the
rule adopted by the robot players in each of the treatments.
Trial and Error (T&E) I programmed the computer so that in this
treatment each “robot” player i sets its quantity qti in round t equal to
qti = q
t−1
i + s
t−1
i
where the direction of change sti is given by
sti = sign(q
t
i − qt−1i )sign(piti − pit−1i )
if (qti − qt−1i )(piti − pit−1i ) 6= 0, where piti are the profits of firm i at round t.
If instead (qti − qt−1i )(piti − pit−1i ) = 0, the direction of change is randomly
chosen among the values −1, 0, 1, each having equal probability.
I also introduced a positive probability of error in the model, so in every
period, with probability  = 0.05 each “robot” chooses an arbitrary
direction of change sti randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over
{−1, 0, 1}.
Best Response Dynamics (BRD) In this treatment, the three robots
player behave according to the best response dynamics. Therefore, in
every period after the first one, they set their quantity qti according to the
following rule:
qti =

{0}, if qt−1−i ≥ 80
min
{
30,
80−qt−1−i
2
}
if qt−1−i < 80 and q
t−1
−i is even
min
{
30,
80−qt−1−i
2 + 0.5
}
if qt−1−i < 80 and q
t−1
−i is odd
Notice that, in the last case – when according to the original model the
choice would have been ambiguous – I assumed that the players choose
the smallest integer greater than
80−qt−1−i
2 .
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I introduced some degree of inertia into the learning rule guiding
the behavior of the “robot” players in treatment BRD: with independent
probabilities equal to 0.05 in every round each of them chooses qti =
qt−1i , otherwise follows the myopic best response dynamic. The level of
inertia is pretty low, and according to my simulations it should not be
sufficient to guarantee convergence to the Nash equilibrium within 40
periods. Since in this experiment I am more interested in studying how
the opponents’ behavior affects human subjects’ information acquisition
and learning processes, than to observe whether the market outcomes
indeed converge to some theoretically predicted level, I decided to keep
the level of “noise” low in all the three treatments, and set the probability
of trembles at 5% in each of them.
Imitate the Best (ItheB) In the last treatment (ItheB) the “robot” play-
ers behave according to the learning model firstly proposed by Vega-
Redondo [102]. Robots are then programmed to choose their output qti
from the set:
Bt−1 = {q ∈ Γ : ∃j ∈ I s.t. qt−1j = q and pit−1j ≥ pit−1i ∀i ∈ I, i 6= j}
where, in our case, Γ = {0, 1, . . . , 29, 30}.
Notice that this set is always a singleton in the setting of my experiments.
To introduce a small degree of experimentation in the robot’s behavior,
I programmed them to choose their quantity according to the imitate the
best rule, with a probability equal to 95%, while with a 5% probability
they choose a quantity randomly drawn from the set {0, 1, . . . , 29, 30},
according to a normal distribution centered on the quantity they have
chosen in the previous round, whith a standard deviation equal to 10.
In all the three treatments, the quantity set by the robot players in the
first period is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the set
{0, 1, . . . , 30}.
I adopted a within subjects design, so every subject played against
a unique type of “robot” players. The program was designed using
MouselabWEB (see www.mouselabweb.org), a process tracing tool
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developed by Martijn Willemsen and Eric Johnson and derived from the
aforementioned software MouseLab.
Two sessions of this experiment were run at the Stockholm School of
Economics, on April 2, 2007. Twelve undergraduate students took part in
the first session and eleven took part in the second one. Sessions lasted
about one hour and a half each, and the average payment (including the
show up fee) was equal to 179 SEK 2
In total, 7 subjects played under the ItheB treatment, and 8 under each of
the other two treatments.
At the beginning of each session the participants were disposed in the
lab so that they could not communicate with each other. Instructions were
written on a page that appeared on the computer screen of each subject,
but common knowledge of the information they contain is ensured by
telling the participants that the pages they are reading are perfectly
identical. Instructions were divided in several parts and at the end of
each of them an understanding test was submitted to the reader, who
had to answer correctly to proceed to the next page.
When a player finished reading the instructions he could start playing.
After the last round of the game, subjects were asked to answer a short
questionnaire including some questions about their individual character-
istics (age, gender, education) and about the strategies they adopted in
the game; then participants were called one by one in private and paid
according to their total profits.
4.2 Results
In what follows I shall present the results from the two sessions of this
experiment. I will first examine the quantities chosen by the players,
then the way they used information, and finally I’ll present an attempt
to establish a relation between information search patterns and actual
behavior by means of two learning models.
21 SEK was about 0.107 eat the time the experiment took place.
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4.2.1 Quantities
Table 4.1: Avearge quantities and prices across treatments
treatment player’s competitors’ predicted price predicted
quantity quantity quantity price
40 periods
BRD 17.98 15.56 16 17.19 17
ItheB 14.72 18.46 20 12.69 1
T&E 19.05 13.01 10 22.93 41
Total 17.36 15.56 17.82
last 10 periods
BRD 19.16 15.30 16 16.64 17
ItheB 13.39 18.25 20 14.60 1
T&E 20.79 11.45 10 25.88 41
Total 17.97 14.86 19.23
Table 4.1 displays the quantities produced on average by the subjects
and by their “robot” competitors in the three treatments, first across all
the 40 rounds, then just for the last 10 rounds.
The first important thing to notice is that, unsurprisingly, subjects
react differently when faced with different opponents: the average
quantity chosen by the subjects under T&E is significantly higher than
the one produced under BRD, which in turn is higher than under ItheB
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the hypothesis that observed quantities
under ItheB and under BRD come from the same distribution at any
significance level, and the hypothesis that observed quantities under T&E
and under BRD come from the same distribution at 1% significance level).
Under the – somehow unrealistic – hypothesis that subjects follow
exactly one of the three learning rules simulated by the computer, we
should have observed at least in one of the three treatments a convergence
towards the predicted equilibrium. In fact, the average choice of the
robot players is not so far from what is predicted by the theory – still
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it is significantly different from it according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank3
test under the three treatments – but the average quantity chosen by the
players is even less close to the theoretically anticipated one and the
distance increases if we look only at the last ten rounds: the observed
values seem to depart from the predicted ones as the game proceeds (cfr.
figure 4.1).
Note: the dotted line represents the theoretically predicted quantity.
Figure 4.1: Average quantities chosen by subjects and by their “robot” competitors.
Quantities chosen in this game appear to be substantially driven by
the mechanical behavior adopted by the virtual players. What is really
interesting here, instead, is the way players use the information they are
provided, and how this affects their choices.
4.2.2 Attention
Figure 4.2 shows the average share of the time dedicated by each subject
to the four pieces of information they could look up during the game.
The first noticeable fact is that most of the players’attention is devoted
to the plot that represents profits earned and quantities produced in the
previous period by the player himself and by each of his competitors.
35% significance level
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of players’ attention in the three treatments.
This means for example that if they wanted to imitate the best performer
in the previous period, as suggested by Vega Redondo, in general they
know the information necessary to do it. On the other side, a theory of
learning such as Trial and Error is less supported by our data, because
subjects do not seem to be very interested in the graph representing the
series of player’s own profits and quantities, which includes the only
information required to apply this learning model.
It also interesting to observe that the type of competitor the players
face seems to affect not only their average choice but also the way they
distribute their attention to the different pieces of information. Wilcoxon
rank sum tests support the hypothesis that under treatment ItheB the
share of time spent looking up last period profits and quantities is higher
than in the other two treatments, while the time spent on the other three
pieces of information is shorter. No significant difference in the allocation
of attention emerges between the other two treatments. Given the small
sample we are dealing with, though, it is not clear whether the observed
difference among treatments is due to subjects’ individual characteristics
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or if it is driven by the diversity in virtual competitors’ behavior.
On the other hand, if we observe how the allocation of attention evolves
Figure 4.3: Allocation of players’ attention along the game.
along the whole game (see figure 4.3), we notice the presence of a trend
which is common across treatments. In the first round, obviously all
the look up time is devoted to the profit calculator which is the only
information available, probably in the attempt of figuring out how the
market works. Then, from the second round on, players’ attention seems
to be mainly attracted by the plot displaying individual profits and
quantities in the previous round, and, to a minor extent, from the graph
showing the cumulated quantity chosen by the three virtual opponents in
all the previous round. The attention dedicated by players to their own
past remain scarce all over the game, reenforcing our skepticism about
the trial and error learning model.
4.2.3 Learning
The sharp decrease in the decision time during the first 20 rounds (Figure
4.4) together with the decrease in the use of the profit calculator suggests
that most of the learning about the market structure takes place during
the first half of the game. Once they have clearly understood the relation
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between quantities, prices and profits, subjects focus their attention to
what the other players do.
Figure 4.4: Average decision time across rounds, in milliseconds.
The question is: do they only react to the past – as suggested by
the three simple learning rules I adopted for my “robot” players? or do
they also try to predict their competitors future choices? To answer this
question, I started to compare the explanatory power of the three simple
learning models described above.
Simple learning models In a first attempt to have a picture of the
learning model adopted by the players in this game, I adopted a measure
proposed by HNO to assess to which extent the three simple learning
rules presented in section 4.1.2 are able to predict each single choice the
subjects made.
Let
zti =
qti − qt−1i
ati − qt−1i
where ati is the quantity predicted, in turn, by Imitate the Best (IB),
Trial and Error (TE) and Best Response Dynamics (BR)4. Clearly, zti = 1
indicates that the rule perfectly predicted themove taken by the player. In
general, zti > 0 implies that the rule has correctly anticipated the direction
4zti was set equal to 1 if both the numerator and the denominator were null, it was set
equal to minus the absolute value of the numerator when only the denominator was null.
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of the variation in the quantity produced, while the opposite is true when
zti < 0.
Table 4.2 shows that Best Response Dynamics is the rule that seems
to better fit with our data, predicting the right direction of change in
quantities in at least 70% of the cases and providing a rather precise
forecast (0.5 ≤ zti < 1.5) in at least 19.41% of the observations. Contrary
to what observed by HNO, Imitate the Best is the rule with the worst
perfomance, since in two treatment it predicts the wrong direction of
change in at least half of the cases.
Table 4.3 shows howmany subjects report positive zti values in at least
70% of the rounds and how many present hits close enough to 1 (0.5 ≤
z < 1.5) at least 30% of their decisions. We observe that, again, Best
Response Dynamics appears to be the only rule that is applied with a
certain degree of consistency. No subjects seem to adopt the Imitate the
Best rule, while two subjects behave in accordance with Trial and Error
rule in the treatment in which this is the rule that inform the behavior of
the vitual players.
Table 4.3: Hit ratios at the individual level.
z > 0 in at
least 70% of
the rounds
0.5 ≤ z < 1.5 in at
least 30% of the
rounds
Total
TE IB BR TE IB BR
Best Response Dyn. 1 0 5 0 0 1 8
Imitate the Best 1 3 5 0 0 3 7
Trial and Error 2 1 5 2 0 3 8
Since from the analysis presented above it emerges that none of the
three simple learning rules considered so far is able to exactly predict
players’ choices, I now shift focus to the direction of the players’ output
decisions. Following BDV, I shall consider a model in which the sign of a
player’s output change, ∆q, is a function of the direction, x, indicated by
the target output levels according to each of the three learning rules. This
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way, I should be able to determine to what extent each behavioral rule
affects the way players adjust their output in every round of the game.
Let:
∆qti = sign(q
t
i − qt−1i )
and, for every learning rule r, let
xtr,i = sign(a
t
r,i − qt−1i )
where atr,i denotes the quantity predicted for player i at round t by rule
r, as above. In this experiment, I also observe which different pieces
of information each subject looked at in every single period. This data
are incorporated into the model, to see whether and how information
affects the way players adapt their choices as they gain experience of the
game. Remember that in this game information is hidden behind four
boxes on the computer screen. Denoting with b the box, I then created
four dummy variables, dtb,i, indicating whether in the generic period t
subject i opened the box b containing (i) the results provided by the
Profit Calculator (ProfCalc), (ii) information about quantities individually
produced by each of the players in the last period and corresponding
profits (LastRound), (iii) quantities produced and profits obtained by
the player herself in all the previous rounds (HistPl) or (iv) the sum
of quantities produced by the player’s three opponents in each of the
previous rounds (HistOpp).
The ordered-probit model, then, assumes a latent response variable, z,
that is a linear function of the independent variables plus a normally
distributed error term, u 5:
z =
∑
r
βrxr +
∑
b
γbdb +
∑
r
∑
b
δb,rdbxr + u
Altogether, the model includes 19 explanatory variables. Data from
the three treatments were pooled, to obtain a sufficiently large number
of observations. I first estimated the full model, then I progressively
obtained a more compact model using Likelihood-Ratio tests with a
5For simplicity, I omit here subscripts for round and individual players.
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significance level of 5%. For sake of simplicity, I present only the last
estimate in table 4.4. To take into account the possible correlation between
observations pertaining to the same subject, the variance-covariance
matrix is corrected by clustering at the subject level.
Table 4.4: Ordered Probit Model: Estimations
Coefficient Standard Error
βs
TE 0.069 0.078
BR 0.917*** 0.300
IB 0.592*** 0.086
γs
LastRound 0.448* 0.240
δs
HistPlxBR -0.229** 0.096
ProfCalcxBR 0.449*** 0.151
LastRoundxBR -0.615** 0.310
cut1 0.184 0.232
cut2 1.065 0.249
N 874
logL -863.324
Likelihood-Ratio test χ2(7) = 162.22
Note: In this table and in the following ones, the symbols ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 4.4 evidences some noticeable facts. First, regardless of the
information observed by subjects, the learning rule based on myopic best
reply seems to inform their choices to a great extent, which confirms what
already highlighted through the hit ratios. Second, this attitude towards
myopically best replying is counterbalanced by a tendency to imitate
the best performer. Third, the information observed by the subjects
significantly affect the way they behave. In particular, when a subject
observes the quantities produced and the profits individually earned by
each of her competitors in the previous round, her choices tend to be
driven away from what predicted by the Best Response rule, and in
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general her output is likely to increase. Similarly, when subjects look at
their own history of play – in terms of output produced and profits earned
– their choices are generally less consistent with a myopic best reply,
whose predictive power appears instead to be enhanced when subjects
use the profit calculator. Finally, the learning rule based on Trial and
Error does not find strong support in our data: the coefficient is never
significant, no matter what information a subject looked at.
The first impression is that the hypothesis that subjects follow some
very simple heuristic to choose their strategy in our game should be
rejected. Learning through trial and error does not seem to be a plausible
explanation of subjects behavior, both because the players pay too little
attention the their own past profits and quantities, which is the only
information required to apply this learning rule, and because their
choices are not in line with what is theoretically predicted according to
this model. On the other hand, imitating the best performer – per se – is
not able to forecast the observed choices correctly, even if subjects’ look
up patterns are consistent with this learning model. Myopic best reply
seem to drive players’ choices, at least partially, and is supported by the
information they acquire, on average. In fact, to apply this learning rule
the subjects need to know the sum of the quantities produced by their
competitors in the last period – an information they almost always look
at – and they must be able to compute a best reply, which means that
either they use the profit calculator or they have used it extensively in
the past and already know what the best reply is. Still, this model does
not fully explain the observed variations in players’ behavior. In fact,
myopic best reply cannot be the only driver of players’ choices. If it was,
under treatment BRD we should have observed convergence towards the
Cournot equilibrium, but our data do not provide any evidence in this
direction.
According to my ordered probit regression, players’ behavior is rather
driven by the interplay of best reply and imitation, which in a sense
confirms Vega-Redondo’s idea: even if subject are incline to adopt the
best reply when they know the market structure sufficiently well, if they
are provided with information about their rivals’ strategies and choices,
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they will be tempted to imitate those who are more successful, which
yields more competitive outcomes.
Still, the model I estimated is essentially based on three extremely
simple learning rules, and could therefore be too rigid to encompass
all the facets of players learning behavior. For this reason, I decided to
estimate a second, more complicated learning model, based on the self-
tuning experience weighted attraction learning model proposed by Ho,
Camerer and Chong (2007) [48].
EWA Learning Model The parametric version of the Experience-
Weighted Attraction (EWA) model was first proposed by Camerer and
Ho [19] and [49]. It is a model that hybridizes features of other well
known learning rules, such reinforcement learning and belief learning,
and that thanks to its flexibility has proven to fit data better than other
models. This model is based on the idea that every player assigns to each
strategy a given level of attraction, which can be represented by a number.
Attractions are updated after every period, according to the players’
experiences, and determine every player’s probability distribution over
his or her choice set.
In the original model, attractions are updated using the payoff that a
strategy either yielded, or would have yielded, in a period: the rule for
updating attraction Aji (t) attached by player i to strategy j in period t is
Aji (t) =
φN(t− 1)Aji (t− 1)
N(t)
+
[δ + (1− δ)I(sji , si(t))]pii(sji , s−i(t))
N(t)
(4.1)
where sji denotes strategy j of player i, s−i(t) the strategy vector played
by player i’s opponents in period t and N(t) is a measure of the weight
players put on past attractions relative to present ones; it can be inter-
preted as the number of “observation-equivalents” of past experience
relative to one period of current experience.
I(x, y) is an indicator function which takes value 1 if x = y and value 0
otherwise. So, according to this model, we assume that players are able
to evaluate the foregone payoffs they would have earned in period t had
they chosen a different strategy sji .
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The parameter δ measures the relative weight given to hypothetical pay-
offs, compared to actual payoff pii(si(t), s−i(t)). The second parameter to
be estimated is φ: a discount factor that depreciates previous attractions.
The variable N(t) is also updated after every period according to the
rule:
N(t) = φ(1− κ)N(t− 1) + 1 t ≥ 1 (4.2)
where parameter κ determines the growth rate of attractions, which
reflects how quickly players lock into a strategy: a third parameter that
has to be estimated. When κ = 0 attractions are weighted averages
of lagged attractions and past payoffs, so that attractions cannot grow
outside the bounds of the payoffs in the game. When κ = 1 attractions
cumulate, so they can be much larger than stage-game payoffs.
Attractions determine probabilities. More specifically: the probability
P ji (t+ 1) that player i chooses strategy j in period t+ 1 is monotonically
increasing in Aji (t) and decreasing in A
k
i (t), k 6= j. The relation between
attractions and choice probabilities is represented by a logistic stochastic
response function:
P ji (t+ 1) =
eλA
j
i (t)∑
k e
λAki (t)
(4.3)
where the parameter λmeasures sensitivity of players to attractions.
One of the main criticisms on parametric EWA concerns the number
of parameters to be estimated. To solve this issue, Ho, Camerer and
Chong (2007) [48] developed a simpler version on the model in which
some parameters are fixed at plausible values, while others are replaced
with functions of experience, that no longer need to be estimated. More
specifically: parameter k is set equal to 0, because this capture almost
all familiar learning models, and also because according the previous
work by the same authors this parameter does not affect fit much. The
initial experience N(0) is restricted to be equal to 1, which is not a
crucial assumption since in general subjects come to the experiment with
weak priors, whose influence gradually disappears as the experiment
proceeds. Finally, parameters δ and φ are replaced with functions of
players’ experience.
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Parameter δ – representing weight of foregone payoffs – is substituted
with the function:
δji (t) =
{
1 if pii(s
j
i , s−i(t)) ≥ pii(si(t), s−i(t))
0 otherwise.
meaning that subjects reenforce, by a weight of one, only chosen strate-
gies and all the other strategies that would have yielded a weakly higher
payoff.
The discount factor φ is instead replaced by the “change detector”
function φi(t) varying across time within the same game. The hypothesis
made by the authors, here, is that the weight put on previous experiences
should be lower when the player senses that the environment is unstable
or that the strategies adopted by her opponents are changing. They then
build a “surprise index” Si(t) measuring the difference between oppo-
nents’ most recently chosen strategies and the strategies they adopted in
all previous periods, and let φi(t) = 1 − 12Si(t). The surprise index is
made up by two main elements: a cumulative history vector hi(t) and a
recent history vector ri(t). The vector element h
j
i (t) =
∑t
τ=1 I(s
j
−i,s−i(τ))
t
measures the frequency with which strategy sj−i was adopted by player
i’s opponents in period t and in all the previous ones. Vector ri(t) instead
has all the elements equal to 0 but the k-th, where sk−i = s−i(t). The
surprise index Si(t) simply sums up the squared deviations between the
cumulative history vector hi(t) and the immediate history vector ri(t):
Si(t) =
∑
j
(hji (t)− rji (t))2.
Self-tuning EWA model has two important advantages: first, it is
particularly flexible since the functions δji (t) and φi(t) naturally vary
across time, people, games and strategies; second, it can shift from a
learning model to a different one as the game proceeds.
A modified version of self-tuning EWA model According to EWA
learning model, attractions are updated keeping into account also fore-
gone profits, but in the experiment I present here foregone payoffs from
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unused strategies are not known by the players. Subjects, though, can
use the profit calculator to discover the profit a particular strategy would
yield, given the strategies chosen by the other players. As explained in
section 4.1.1, the profit calculator can be used in two different ways:
1. the profit calculator can be used by the players to evaluate the quan-
tity that would yield them the highest profit given the aggregated
quantity produced by their competitors, and inform them about the
profit they would earn if they produced the suggested amount of
good.
2. it can be also used to know the profit given both the quantity
produced by the player and the sum of the quantities produced by
his opponents.
By checking how a player used the profit calculator in each period, I know
precisely which information he used to evaluate each strategy in every
period.
If they wish, players can also access information about the profits
earned in the previous period by their competitors. If they wanted to
imitate the strategy chosen by the player who got the highest profit in the
previous period – as suggested by Vega Redondo – they would attach a
higher attraction to that strategy.
Keeping this peculiar characteristics of the game in mind, I decided to
change the attraction updating rule, so that attractions in every period t
are modified considering three elements:
• the profit pii(sji , s−i(t− 1)) actually obtained by the player in period
t− 1;
• the profits piji,imit(t− 1) obtained by each of the player’s opponents
playing strategy sj in the previous period;
• the profits piji,PC1(t) and piji,PC2(t) evaluated by the player using the
first and the second function of the profit calculator respectively,
given his or her expectations about the competitors’ choices 6.
6If the second function of the profit calculator is used more than once by player i in
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While the player always knew the strategy he played in the previous
round and the profit he obtained, piimit, piPC1 and piPC2 may be known
or unknown to the player, depending on the pieces of information he or
she decided to look up.
To check for the information the subject is aware of, we define three
dummy variables:
dji,imit(t) =

1 if in period t player i opened the box containing informa-
tion about quantities produced and profits earned by each
of his opponents in period t − 1 and in that period one of
the opponents had played strategy sj .
0 otherwise.
dji,PC1(t) =

1 if in period t player i used the first function of the profit
calculator, and this device indicates strategy sj as the best
reply to the strategies played by the three opponents, and
associates it to some profit piji,PC1(t)
0 otherwise.
dji,PC2(t) =

1 if in period t player i used the second function of the profit
calculator, and this device associates strategy sj to some
profit piji,PC1(t) given the opponents’ strategies.
0 otherwise.
These dummy variables, in a sense, replace the function δji (t) represent-
ing the weight of foregone profits in the original version of self-tuning
EWA learning.
Now, it is possible to state our modified updating rule for attractions:
period t, the profit piji,PC2(t) is calculated as an average of the various profits associated
to strategy sji by the device (different profits correspond to different hypotheses about the
other players’ behavior).
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Aji (t) =
φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + αpii(sji , s−i(t− 1))
N(t)
+
+
βdji,PC2(t)pi
j
i,PC2(t) + γd
j
i,PC1(t)pi
j
i,PC1(t)
N(t)
+
+
δdji,imit(t)pi
j
i,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
(4.4)
In this new formula, attractions in period t are updated according to a
weighted average between (some of) the information the player has about
the profit each strategy yielded in the previous period and the profit it
may yield in the future.
Parameters α, β, γ and δ then measure, respectively, the relative weight
given to player’s own experience, to the results potentially provided by
the the profit calculator and to the profits earned by player’s opponents,
if observed.
Note that, in our model, Aji (t) depends on the profits actually earned
and (possibly) on the profits the opponents achieved in the previous
period, and may be updated in period t with the profits evaluated by
the profit calculator. So, the probabilities P ji (t) depend on A
j
i (t), and not
on Aji (t− 1), as in the original model. The updating rule is then:
P ji (t) =
eλA
j
i (t)∑
k e
λAki (t)
(4.5)
Estimation procedure Model’s parameters are estimated via maxi-
mum likelihood, using our small samples of experimental data for the
three treatments we have.
I estimated my modified version of the EWA learning model, first
assuming all players have the same parameters values regardless of the
treatment – then keeping the three treatments separated.
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The log-likelihood function is given by:
LL(α, β, γ, δ, λ) =
40∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
ln
 m∑
j=1
I(sji , si(t))P
j
i (t)

=
40∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
ln
 m∑
j=1
I(sji , si(t))
eλA
j
i (t)∑
k e
λAki (t)
 (4.6)
where n is the number of players, andm the number of strategies.
As Ho et al. [49] and Camerer et al. [21], I assumed that initial
attractions are the same for all players:
Aj1(1) = A
j
2(1) = · · · = Ajn(1) = Aj(1), ∀j
and I used first period data to initialize attractions. Estimating initial
attractions as parameters of the model, in fact, would introduce too many
degrees of freedom into the model.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to apply here the technique adopted by
Ho et al. [49] and Camerer et al. [21] to initialize attractions, and simply
set:
eλA
j(1)∑
k e
λAk(1)
= f j (4.7)
where f j is the frequency of strategy j in the first period, because in our
data-set a number of strategies are never played in the first round.
I then had to follow a somehow more complicated procedure and set the
initial attractions so to maximize the likelihood of the first-period data,
separately from the rest of the data, for a value of λ derived from the
overall likelihood-maximization.
Our objective function is:
O(A1(1), A2(1), ..., Am(1)) =
n∑
i=1
ln
 m∑
j=1
Iji (1)
eλA
j(1)∑m
k=1 e
λAk(1)

= n
 m∑
j=1
f jλAj(1)− ln
(
m∑
k=1
eλA
k(1)
)
73
Clearly, the objective function is always decreasing in Ah(1), for all the
strategies h having fh = 0. So, Ah(1) should be arbitrarily set for these
strategies. I chose to set Ah(1) so that
Ph(1) =
eλA
h
i (1)∑
k e
λAki (1)
=
1
1000
, ∀h : fh = 0
For the other strategies, we have to solve the system given by the
equations:
eλA
j(1)∑
fk>0 e
λAk(1)
= f j j : f j > 0 (4.8)
I let the strategy j with the lowest frequency to have Aj(1) = 0 (which
is necessary for identification) and solve for the other attractions as a
function of λ and the frequencies f j .
I made one last modification to the model proposed by Ho, Camerer
and Chong (2007) [48], in the way I computed the “change-detector”
function φi(t). Since in this game the strategy space is rather big, I
used the sum of the quantities produced by player’s opponents instead
of s−i(t) – representing the strategy adopted by the three opponents in
period t – when calculating the surprise index Si(t).
Finally, as Camerer and Ho ([20]), I restricted λ to be positive.
Estimation Results Table 4.5 displays the results of the four regressions
based on my modified version of self-tuning EWA learning model. From
these estimates it emerges that the learning process taking place in this
game is complex and results form the interplay of different components.
First, we can observe that the use of profit calculator exerts a strong
influence on players’ choices: parameters β and γ – measuring the weight
attached to the answers provided by the first and second function of
the profit calculator, respectively – are both highly significant in all the
treatments. Moreover, both β and γ are also always higher in value
than the estimate for δ, the parameter sizing the importance attributed
to competitors’ profits, when a player observes them. On the other
hand, it is worth noting that the estimate for δ is positive under all the
treatments, and significant in two out of three of them. This seems to
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suggest that even if imitation is not the main driving force of learning, it
does play a non negligible role. Finally, we notice that also the estimates
for α are positive and highly significant everywhere, which means that
reinforcement learning based on player’ own past experience, rather than
on imitation or on beliefs about what the other players are going to do, is
also important in this game.
We observed that in general the strongest weight is attributed to
foregone and expected profits, measured bymeans of the profit calculator.
Does this lead players towards forms of learning close to myopic best
reply, or do they adopt more sophisticated forms of belief learning?
Remember that players could use the profit calculator to find out the best
reply to a given quantity produced by the opponents (PC1), or simply
to evaluate the profit they would earn given the quantity chosen by the
opponents and their own output choice (PC2). In both cases, the profit
evaluated depends on player’s expectations about the strategy adopted
by the opponents. So we can use the opponents’ quantity imputed into
the profit calculator as a measure for players’ expectations.
Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of the distance between the opponents’ quantity
entered in the profit calculator and the one observed in the previous period.
Figure 4.5 presents the frequency distribution of the difference be-
tween this quantity and the aggregate quantity actually chosen by com-
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petitors in the previous period. According to these data, in most of the
cases in which players used the profit calculator, they expected their
opponents not to change their strategy much; but this can simply mean
that they decided to use this device only when the opponents’ strategy
was stable enough to let them make predictions about the future.
In fact, I showed in section 4.2.2 that the information provided by
the profit calculator is not the element to which players dedicate most
of their attention. Table 4.6 shows also that on average only half of the
players used the profit calculator in each round. So, even if Best Response
Dynamics seems to inform players’ behavior to a great extent, it is not the
only force underlying the learning model adopted by the subjects: first
because they are not always able to best reply since they do not use the
profit calculator in every period, and because other models of learning –
based on imitation or reinforcement – play a role.
Table 4.6: Average usage of the first and the second function of the profit calculator,
by treatment
treatment PC1 (best reply) PC2 overall
BRD 0.497 0.078 0.575
ItheB 0.214 0.129 0.343
TandE 0.297 0.259 0.556
Total 0.341 0.157 0.498
4.3 Remarks
From the data collected through this first experiment emerges that players
behavior cannot be encompassed by the simple models of learning I
shortly described in section 4.1.2, namely learning through trial and
error, imitation of the best and best response dynamics . My results
confirm that information provided to the subject has an important effect
on the way they behave. I observe that players tend to best reply to
the strategy adopted by their opponents in the last period, when they
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have the necessary information to do so. Still, this is not the information
they are most interested in: they dedicate most of their attention to the
strategies individually adopted by their opponents and the payoffs each
of them earned in the previous round. This piece of information seems
to drive them away from the best reply, and possibly leads them to a
more “imitative” behavior. Even if imitation is not the driving force of
subjects’ learning – so the market outcomes we observe are far away
from those predicted by Vega-Redondo (1997) [102] – it still leads to a
more aggressive competition than the one that would emerge if all players
adopted a learning model only based on myopic best reply. According to
the data I collected, finally, it also seems that the learning rule adopted
by the opponent – extreme as it was – does not have a very strong impact
on the model of information acquisition and processing adopted by the
players.
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Chapter 5
Second Experiment: human
opponents
The first experiment, in which subjects played against computers, pro-
vided us with an interesting overview of how information and learning
interact in determining subjects choices. Yet, it presents some drawbacks:
first, the rather rigid behavior of the robot opponents does not allow us to
draw sound conclusions about the market outcomes that may arise in the
virtual market reproduced in the lab. Second, the absence of a time limit
for taking decisions encouraged subjects to look at all the information
they were provided, instead of forcing them to choose only the elements
being really salient for their choices. Third, the experimental design does
not allow us to verify if players really want to imitate the best performer
or if they are influenced in some other way by the strategies adopted
by the opponents, since a player could discover the quantities produced
by each of his competitors by opening a single box on the screen. One
last possible problem with the design of the first experiment concerns the
way subjects opened the boxes hiding pieces of information. Since it was
possible to open these boxes simply putting the mouse cursor over them,
we cannot be sure that some of the lookups were unintentional.
I collected more data and fixed these problems by running an in-
teractive version of the experiment, in which subjects played against
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each other. In this second variant of the experiment I introduced a time
limit of thirty seconds for subjects to make their choice in each round,
I increased the number of boxes on the subjects’ computer screens to
hide only a single piece of information behind each of them, so to have a
more detailed control on players’ information search pattern, and I let the
subjects open a box by clicking on it to avoid unintentional look-ups.
5.1 Experimental Design
As I mentioned above, this second experiment was designed and run to
improve and complete the results of the preceding one. The structure of
the game – including market characteristics, number of competitors and
number of repetitions – remained substantially unchanged. The major
difference is in that this time each player’s opponents are represented by
other participants to the experiment, not enacted by the computer. Three
other important innovations are introduced.
First, the graphical interface was radically changed; figure A.5 in the
appendix shows how subjects’ computer screen looks like 1 .
In every period after the first one, the profits earned in the previous
period by the player himself and by each of his opponents were dis-
played. Three distinct buttons – each corresponding to one of the player’s
competitors – served to display the strategy they chose in the previous
period, that is the quantity they decided to produce. Another button
allowed the subject to open a window displaying, by means of a table
and a couple of plots, the quantity chosen and the profits earned by the
player himself in every previous period. As in the first experiment, it was
also possible for the player to look at the aggregate quantity produced
in each of the previous periods by his competitors. This information
was conveyed through a table and a plot, if the subject pushed the
corresponding button. Finally, subjects could use the profit calculator,
which had the same two functions described for the previous experiment
(see section 4.1.1). As before, it was not possible to access various pieces of
information at the same time, since opening a newwindow automatically
1A translation of the instructions is available in Appendix A.4
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closed the previous one. This new interface granted me a greater control
over the subjects’ information search behavior, allowing me to check
whether subjects are in fact more interested in the strategy adopted by the
competitor who got the highest profit in the previous period, and making
sure that every look-up is intentional.
Second, a time limit of 30 seconds per round was introduced, so to force
subjects to choose the information they are really interested in, and to
reproduce an environment in which rationality is bounded because of
external factors. If a subject failed to make his choice within the time
limit, his quantity was automatically set equal to 0, granting him a profit
of 0 for that period.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007 [35]), more suitable thanMouselabWEB tomanage
interaction between subjects.
5.2 Results
The experiment was run on November 29 and 30, 2007, in the computer
lab of the faculty of Economics, at the University of Bologna, in Italy.
It involved 48 undergraduate students in Business Administration, Law
and Economics, Commercial Studies, Economics, Marketing and Finance.
Three identical sessions were organized, with 16 participants each. The
length of the sessions ranged from 1 hour and 1 hour and 15 minutes,
including instructions and payment. The average payment was 13 ewith
a maximum of 17 and a minimum of 9, including a show-up fee of 4 e.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were welcomed into the
computer room and sat in front of personal computers, and they were
instructed not to communicate in any way with other players during the
whole experiment. They received a printed copy of the instructions 2,
which were read aloud so to make them common knowledge. Thereafter,
they had the opportunity to ask questions, which were answered pri-
vately. Before starting the real game, subjects were also asked to complete
a test on their computer, aimed at checking their understanding of the
2A copy of the instructions, in Italian, can be found in Appendix
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graphical interface they would have had to use during the game.
Only when all the players managed to answer correctly to all the ques-
tions in the test, the real game began. Each subject was randomly and
anonymously matched with other three participants, who were to be
his “opponents” throughout the whole game. At the and of the game,
subjects were paid in cash, privately, in proportion to the profits they
scored during the game.
In what follows I will first present some qualitative results about the
output choices made by the subjects, and about their information search
pattern. I will then try to establish a relation between the information
acquired and the choices made by the subjects by means of the same two
learning models adopted for the previous experiment. We will notice
that, notwithstanding the differences between the two experiments, the
results are surprisingly consistent.
Finally, I will briefly comment on the effects of education on the learning
model adopted by the subjects.
Quantities
Figure 5.1: Frequency Distributions of Individual Output Levels.
Figure 5.1 displays the frequency distribution of the individual output
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choices in all the periods and sessions of the experiment. First, we observe
that the average (17.76)3 is higher than the Cournot output (16), but
lower than the Walrasian one (20), which is instead the modal output.
We also observe peaks corresponding to multiples of five, revealing a
tendency to simplify the game focusing only on some of the available
strategies, which can probably explain why 15 is chosen more often than
16, representing the Nash equilibrium in the stage game. The Pareto-
dominant collusive outcome of 10 is chosen only in 5.36% of the cases.
Table 5.1: Average individual output choice
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
Periods 1-10 17.238 17.013 16.968
Periods 11-20 17.101 17.385 18.038
Periods 21-30 17.585 17.623 19.815
Periods 31-40 17.478 17.912 18.911
Total 17.353 17.487 18.436
Looking at table 5.1, we observe an increase in the average output as
the game proceeds. For all the three sessions, though, a non parametric
Wilcoxon rank-sum test fails to reject (at the 1% significance level) the
hypothesis that observations for the first and the last ten periods are
drown from the same distribution. We also notice that the average
quantity produced in the third session is significantly higher than in the
other two4.
Figure 5.2 presents the aggregate quantity produced in each group
across all the periods of a game. We notice that the variability in
total outcome remains high even towards the end of the game, with
fluctuations between the Cournot and Walrasian equilibrium outcomes.
In general, therefore, we cannot speak of convergence.
3 In this figure and in the following ones, the average is evaluated dropping the 40
observations in which the outcome was zero because a subject did not answered in time.
4According to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, at 1% significance level.
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Figure 5.2: Aggregate quantity produced within each group.
5.2.1 Attention
Figure 5.3 shows that in this case most of players’ attention is devoted
to the profit calculator, contrary to what we observed in the previous
experiment where subjects played against robot and were found to
dedicate most of their look-up time to check the outcomes chosen and
the profits obtained by each competitor in the previous period. Indeed, in
this second experiment, the share of look-up time spent using the profit
calculator is on average significantly higher than the time spent looking
at any other piece of information, according to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test (1% significance level). In line with what observed for
the first experiment, in all the sessions players paid limited attention to
their own past, so the trial and error learningmodel – which only requires
this sort of information to be applied – finds weak support in these data.
On the other hand, if we observe the results for the three sessions, we
notice that some differences emerge. In particular, in the third session the
time spent using the profit calculator is significantly less that in the other
two sessions (according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, at 1% significance
level), while more attention is paid to the outcome individually chosen
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of players’ attention in the three sessions.
by each of the player’s opponents in the previous period. We have
already observed above that the average outcome in the third session
was significantly higher than in the other two sessions. So, these data
provide some support to Vega-Redondo’s idea that information about the
strategies chosen by the opponents yields a more aggressive competition
between players. In the following, we will see that this impression is
supported also by a deeper econometric analysis.
Another noticeable fact emerges from figure 5.4: similarly to what
already observed in the first experiment, the fraction of look-up time
dedicated to the profit calculator decreases along the game, and on
average is significantly higher in the first than in the last 20 periods (see
table 5.2), while the opposite is true for the time spent looking at the
output individually chosen by the player’s competitors in the previous
period. Again, this shift in players attention together with the previously
observed increase in the average output level seems to be in line with
Vega-Redondo’s model, even if the evidence is weak due to the lack of
significance of the increase in quantities.
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Figure 5.4: Allocation of players’ attention along the game.
Use of the Profit Calculator We have already noted that players made
wide use of the profit calculator in this game. In particular, this device has
been used in almost half of the observations collected through the three
sessions, mostly to evaluate the myopic best reply to some aggregate
quantity hypothetically produced by the player’s opponents (see table
5.3), which is in line with what we observed in experiment one (table 4.6).
Suppose a subject followed the aforementioned Best Response Dy-
namics rule and best replied to the aggregate output chosen by his
opponents in the previous period: before using the profit calculator
he should have gathered information about his competitors aggregate
output in previous periods, by opening the appropriate box. When
this happened, I claim that the look-up sequence is consistent with best
response dynamics (BRD), and it turns out that this is the case in more
than 80% of the times the profit calculator was used.
When using the profit calculator, subjects had to enter a number
corresponding to the hypothetical aggregate quantity produced by their
opponents. This quantity can be seen as a proxy for their expecta-
tions about their competitors’ future strategies. Figure 5.5 presents the
frequency distribution of the difference between this quantity and the
aggregate quantity actually chosen by competitors in the previous period.
86
Table 5.2: Fraction of look-up time dedicated to the profit calculator and to
competitors’ output choices in the first and in the second half of the game.
Periods Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Total
profit
calculator
1-20 0.384 0.414 0.319 0.371
∼ >∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗
21-40 0.370 0.309 0.261 0.315
competitors’
output
choice
1-20 0.276 0.172 0.271 0.241
∼ <∗∗∗ <∗∗∗ <∗∗∗
21-40 0.293 0.295 0.338 0.308
Note: the symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 5.3: Use of the two functions of the profit calculator, and percentage of
observations in which the look-up sequence is consistent with a myopic best reply.
% of L.U. sequences
consistent with BRDUse of the p.c. N. obs (%)
both functions 130 (13.56%) 91.54%
1st function (best reply) only 584 (60.90%) 82.86%
2nd function only 245 (25.55%) 79.62%
total 959 82.06%
Profit calculator not used 961 –
According to these data, more than half of the times the profit calculator
was used the quantity inputed belonged to the interval [Q−1(t − 1) −
3, Q−1(t − 1) + 3], where Q−1(t − 1) represents the sum of the quantities
produced by the player’s opponents in the previous period. This is
consistent with what previously observed for the first experiment, and
provides further support to the best response dynamics as a model of
learning in this setting.
Interest for the strategies adopted by opponents. As we have seen
above, a considerable amount of attention is dedicated to the boxes show-
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Figure 5.5: Frequency distribution of the distance between the opponents’ quantity
entered in the profit calculator and the one observed in the previous period.
ing the output individually chosen by each of the player’s opponents in
the previous period. Table 5.4 shows that on average the look-up time
Table 5.4: Average look-up time
Best Not Best
Opponent 1 2.07 >∗∗∗ 1.53
Opponent 2 1.44 >∗∗∗ 0.78
Opponent 3 2.45 >∗∗∗ 1.69
Note: The statistical test is a two sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum test. The symbol ∗∗∗ indicates signifi-
cance at the 1% level
dedicated to each of the opponents was greater when he had gotten the
highest profit in the previous period. Still, if we compare the time spent
looking at the strategy adopted by “the best” with the total time dedicated
to the strategies adopted by the other opponents, we notice that the latter
is significantly higher (see table 5.5).
So, in partial contradiction with what suggested by Vega-Redondo’s
theory of imitation, players in this experiment seem to be concerned not
only with the choice made by the competitor who best performed in the
previous period, but also with the output chosen by each of the others.
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Table 5.5: Average look-up time
Session Best opponent Other opponents
Session 1 1.700 <∗∗∗ 3.088
Session 2 1.317 <∗∗∗ 2.146
Session 3 2.309 <∗∗∗ 3.211
Total 1.775 <∗∗∗ 2.815
Note: The statistical test is a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The
symbol ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 1% level
5.2.2 Learning
As for the previous experiment, I start the analysis of the learning
mechanisms adopted by the players by comparing the explanatory power
of the three aforementioned simple learning models: trial and error,
imitation of the best and best response dynamics.
First, I use the same measure adopted in section 4.2.3 to assess to
which extent these three simple learning rules are able to predict each
single choice the subjects made. So again I let
zti =
qti − qt−1i
ati − qt−1i
where ati is the quantity predicted, in turn, by Imitate the Best (IB), Trial
and Error (TE) and Best Response Dynamics (BR).
Table 5.6 confirms what we already observed for the first experiment,
namely that best response dynamics is the rule that provides the most
precise forecast (0.5 <= ztBR < 1.5) and predicts the right direction of
change (zBR > 0) with the highest frequency. It is also worth noting
that “imitate the best” in general overshots, when it predicts the right
direction of change, meaning that it forecasts a variation in quantity that
is more than twice as big as the actual one (0 <= zIB < 0.5); the reverse
is true for “trial and error” model. Table 5.7 shows how many subjects
report positive zti values in at least 70% of the rounds and how many
present hits close enough to 1 (0.5 ≤ z < 1.5) at least 30% of their
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Table 5.6: Hit ratios (%)
z < 0 0 <= z < 0.5 0.5 <= z < 1.5 z >= 1.5
IB 45.45 26.70 21.38 6.47
BR 29.61 27.74 28.29 14.36
TE 47.09 13.21 6.14 33.55
decisions. None of the subjects seems to adopt the “trial and error” rule,
while nine players behave according to what predicted by “imitate the
best” in at least 12 periods. Yet, “best response dynamics” is the model
that seems to inform the behavior of most of the players.
Table 5.7: Hit ratios at the individual level
0.5 <= z < 1.5 z > 0 total
IB 9 3 48
BR 18 25 48
TE 0 0 48
Being interested also in how information affects the learning model
players adopt, I grouped observations by the type of information subjects
spent most of their look up time on and measured the percentage of
observations in which (0.5 <= zti < 1.5), for each of the three basic
learning rules (Table 5.8). We notice that in general “best response
dynamics” prevails over the other two rules, but when players dedicated
the greatest part of their attention to the output individually chosen by
each of their competitors in the previous period, then is “imitate the best”
rule that gets the highest score, and this effect is even more pronounced
when the time spent looking at the strategy adopted by the best among
the opponents is longer than the time dedicated to the others. This is
one more element in favor of Vega-Redondo’s theory claiming that when
subjects have information about their opponents strategies and payoffs,
they tend to become more competitive since they are tempted to imitate
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the one who got the best result.
Ordered probit estimation
Estimation procedure Analogously to what has been done above
for the first experiment, I now consider a model in which the sign of a
player’s output change, ∆q, is a function of the direction, x, indicated by
the target output levels according to each of the three learning rules. This
way, I should be able to determine to what extent each behavioral rule
affects the way players adjust their output in every round of the game.
As above, let:
∆qti = sign(q
t
i − qt−1i )
and, for every learning rule r, let
xtr,i = sign(a
t
r,i − qt−1i )
where atr,i denotes the quantity predicted for player i at round t by rule r,
as above. In this experiment, I also control for the information gathered
by players in every period. As mentioned above, each of the three basic
learning models considered here requires a different type of information:
more precisely, to imitate the best one must have looked at the output
produced by the best competitor in the previous period, to play according
to trial and error a player needs to remember the strategy he has chosen
and the profits he has obtained in the last two periods, meaning that he
probably would have to open the box containing information about his
own history of play, while to best reply he must know the aggregate
output of his competitors in the previous period and he must use the
profit calculator. For this reason, I created three dummy variables dtb,i,
which indicate respectively if player i in period t had the information
necessary to best reply (InfoBR), to imitate the best (InfoIB) or to follow
the “trial and error” model (InfoTE).
These dummy variables enter the model per se, but are also interacted
with the variables x denoting the sign of the output variation predicted
by the three learning models considered here.
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Since subjects repeatedly interact with the same three opponents
throughout the whole game, a critical point in this analysis is how to
control for repeated observations of the same individuals or the same
group. Moreover, I also wanted to check for possible correlation between
data collected within each of the three sessions. For this purpose, I
adopted a multilevel model with a random effect at the subject level
nested within a random effect at the group level, which in turn is nested
within a random effect at the session level.
More specifically, I assume the latent response variable, z, be a linear
function of the independent variables plus a subject specific error term
ζi,g,s, a group specific error term ηg,s, a session specific error term θs and
finally and i.i.d. error term ut,i,g,s. Random intercepts are assumed to
be independently normally distributed, with a variance that is estimated
through the regression.
The full model is then:
z =
∑
r
βrxr +
∑
b
γbdb +
∑
r
∑
b
δb,rdbxr + ζ + η + θ + u
where subscripts r and b both take values in {IB, TE, BR}. For
simplicity I omitted the subscripts for individual, group, session and
period.
The dependent variable is derived in the standard way for an or-
dered probit given the latent variable and cutoffs between categories.
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to fit values for the cutoffs, β, γ
and δ, and for the variances of the subject, group and sessions specific
error terms. The model was estimated using GLLAMM 5, a software
specifically designed to provide a maximum likelihood framework for
models with unobserved components, such as multilevel models, certain
latent variable models, panel data models, or models with common
factors.
I first estimated the full model, then I progressively obtained a more
compact model using Likelihood-Ratio tests with a significance level of
5%. First, I checked for significance of the variances at the session and
5see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004 [94] and http://www.gllamm.org
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group levels; the null hypothesis that these were not significant was not
rejected, so I adopted a more compact model with a random effect only
at the subject level. Then, in steps, I eliminated the dependent variables
that turned out not to be significant. For sake of simplicity, I present only
the last estimate of this reduced model in table 5.9.
Results This regression evidences some results that confirm what
we already observed for the first experiment, and some which instead
go in a different direction. As for the first experiment (see table 4.4),
we notice that the rule based on trial and error does not find strong
support in these data even if it seems to guide, at least in part, players’
behavior when they acquire the information necessary to apply it. In
the previous experiment, we noticed that when players looked at the
strategies adopted in the previous period by their opponents, and at the
relative profits, they tended to increase their quantity. Here a similar
effect emerges, since the estimated coefficient for InfoIB is positive and
highly significant.
Remarkably, if the impact of information is not taken into consid-
eration, the “imitate the best” model seems to account for the greatest
part of output variations; the coefficient for “best response dynamics” is
also positive and significant, but is smaller in magnitude. This relative
weakness of the best response model disappears if we consider the effect
of information: indeed, according to these statistics, if a subject acquires
any of the three pieces of information considered here he will be more
incline to move in the direction predicted to best reply, and particularly
so if he uses the profit calculator after having looked at the aggregate
output produced by his competitors in previous periods (namely, when
InfoBR= 1).
One possible reason why in this experiment the coefficient for xIB is
higher than the one for xBR – contrary to what observed in the first
experiment – is that here subjects were always informed about the profits
individually obtained in the previous period by each of the players in
their group. It is possible, then, that any time they realized that their profit
was not the highest they tended to increase their output, then moving in
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Table 5.9: Ordered Probit Model: Estimations
Coefficient Standard Error
βs
TE -0.022 0.041
BR 0.134** 0.066
IB 0.484*** 0.053
γs
InfoIB 0.327*** 0.080
δs
InfoTExTR 0.148** 0.068
InfoTExBR 0.151** 0.067
InfoBRxBR 0.520*** 0.067
InfoIBxBR 0.258** 0.075
cut1 -0.041 0.065
cut2 0.369*** 0.066
N 1824
logL -1576.005
Note: In this table and in the following ones, the symbols
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
the direction predicted by “imitate the best”, even if they did not know
the exact output chosen by the player who had got the best profit.
EWA learning model I conclude my analysis of the learning process
adopted by players in this game with the EWA learning model, originally
proposed by Camerer and Ho and already described in section 4.2.3.
Remember that in this model I hypothesized that after each period play-
ers update the attraction associated with every pure strategy according
to the information they collected in that period, and these attractions
are assumed to determine the choice probability distribution over the
strategy set. More specifically, in the first experiment attractions were
updated on the basis of the (i) the profit actually obtained by the player
in the previous period, (ii) the profits obtained by each of the player’s
opponents in the previous period, if the player had this information and
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(iii) the profits evaluated through the profit calculator, in case it was used
by the player.
As mentioned above, I modified the design of this second experiment
in order to be able to disentangle the effect of information about profits
and strategies of the best among player’s opponents, and of the same
information concerning other opponents. I therefore introduced a slight
modification to the way attractions were updated in equation (4.4):
Aji (t) =
φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + αpii(sji , s−i(t− 1))
N(t)
+
+
βdji,PC2(t)pi
j
i,PC2(t) + γd
j
i,PC1(t)pi
j
i,PC1(t)
N(t)
+
+

∑
h6=i d
j
i,h(t)bi,h(t)pi
j
i,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
+
+
ζ
∑
h6=i d
j
i,h(t)(1− bi,h(t))piji,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
(5.1)
where the dummy dji,h(t) indicates whether player i in period t knew that
his opponent h had played strategy sj in the previous period, the dummy
bi,h(t − 1) takes value one if player h had the highest profit in period
t − 1 among the opponents of player i, and piji,imit(t − 1) represents the
profit obtained in period t−1 by player i’s opponent choosing strategy sj .
All the other terms of the equation have exactly the same meaning as in
equation (4.4), and the rest of the estimated EWAmodel is perfectly alike
the one I estimated for the previous experiment.
In order to test whether the difference between the estimated weight
attributed to the profits achieved by the best competitor and the profits
earned by other competitors is significant, I also estimated a restricted
version of EWA model, in which equation (5.1) is replaced by equation
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(5.2)
Aji (t) =
φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + αpii(sji , s−i(t− 1))
N(t)
+
+
βdji,PC2(t)pi
j
i,PC2(t) + γd
j
i,PC1(t)pi
j
i,PC1(t)
N(t)
+
+
δ
∑
h6=i d
j
i,h(t)pi
j
i,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
(5.2)
which basically replicates equation (4.4) for this second experiment.
Results Table 5.10 displays estimation results for the unrestricted
and restricted version of the EWA model. These results are surprisingly
Table 5.10: Results of the EWA learning models
unrestricted restricted
b se b se
α 0.476*** 0.097 0.477*** 0.148
β 0.845*** 0.171 0.848*** 0.263
γ 1.187*** 0.241 1.189*** 0.373
δ – – 0.356*** 0.114
 0.338*** 0.077 – –
ζ 0.383*** 0.089 – –
ln(λ) 0.499** 0.197 0.497 0.308
Log-Likelihood -5680.350 -5680.603
Sample size 1920 1920
in line with those obtained for the first experiment and presented in
table 4.5, notwithstanding the differences between the two experiments,
and the two subject pools. Learning in this setting appears to be a
blended process in which different components play an important role.
The component related to belief learning seems to predominate: subjects
attach the highest weight to strategies hypothetically tested by means of
the profit calculator. A Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that β and
γ are equal, so according to my results subjects tended to attribute less
importance to the results from the first function of the profit calculator
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– evaluating best reply – than from the second one – which computes
the profit given the output choice of the player and the aggregate output
hypothetically produced by his opponents.
Both a Wald test on the results of the unrestricted model, and a likelihood
ratio test between the restricted and the unrestricted model fail to reject
the hypothesis that  and ζ are equal. This means that subjects, when
evaluating a strategy, do take into account the profits realized by other
players choosing that strategy (the coefficient is always positive and
highly significant), but do not attach more weight to the profit realized
by the best among their competitors.
Finally, we notice that the estimates for α are positive, significant, and
higher than those for parameters δ and  and ζ, respectively for the
restricted and unrestricted models. This suggest that reinforcement
learning, based on player’s own past experiences – plays a role, which
seems to be even more important than the one played by “imitation”.
5.2.3 Individual Characteristics
Finally, I would like to point out some interesting differences emerging
among students having different educational backgrounds. Table 5.11
shows some facts about the composition of our subject pool.
Table 5.11: Subjects’ education
master bachelor
Business Administration 8 3
Law and Economics 1
Commercial Studies 6
Economics 6 3
Finance 2 7
Marketing 12
First, it is worthwhile noting that master students pay relatively less
attention to the strategies individually adopted by their opponents, and
more to the profit calculator. According to our previous results, this
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should make them less incline to imitate and more to best reply, which
in theory should be viewed as a more “rational” behavior. In fact,
master students turn out to be less aggressively competitive: the average
quantity they choose is significantly lower, and so are their profits. They
seem to adopt a follower behavior, best replying to opponents who tend
to keep their own output high.
Table 5.12: Comparison between bachelor and master students
bachelor master
Average share of L.U time
competitors’ individual output 0.314 >∗∗∗ 0.204
player’s own history of play 0.119 <∗∗∗ 0.133
competitors’ past aggregate output 0.213 <∗∗∗ 0.259
profit calculator 0.329 <∗∗ 0.368
Average output 17.76 >∗∗∗ 16.72
Average profit 176.82 >∗∗∗ 158.14
Second, sizable differences emerge between students with different
curricula of studies. In particular, students in Finance, Marketing and
Law and Economics show much less interest in the profit calculator, and
much more in their competitors’ output. This is somehow surprising,
since all curricula except Commercial Studies and Law and Economics
envisage an introductory course in microeconomics – including elements
of the theory of oligopoly – for first year bachelor students, while
only master students in Economics have a specific training in Industrial
Organization and Game Theory. So, it is not clear whether this different
attitude towards information and learning – which as we have seen
has an impact on the level of market competition – derives from a
different approach to economics characterizing different curricula or from
individual attitudes that in turn have affected also subjects’ choice for a
certain course of studies.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter I presented an experiment in which subjects were asked to
play a repeated Cournot gamewith incomplete information. The first aim
of the experiment was to check what feedback information subjects are
really interested in, and to test how information is linked to the learning
model adopted and in turn to the market outcome.
Two versions of this experiment were presented here: a first pre-
liminary version was run in Stockholm, letting subjects play against
virtual opponents, simulated via computer programs, and a second, more
complete version run in Bologna, asking subjects to play against each
other.
Notwithstanding the differences between the two experiments, some
common results emerge.
First, learning appears to be a composite process, in which different
components coexist. The leading element seems to be a sort of belief
learning, in which subjects form expectations about their opponents’
future actions and try to best reply to them. It is also noticeable that in
most of the cases the opponents’ output inputed in the profit calculator
– a proxy for players’expectations – is pretty close to the aggregate
opponents’ output observed in the previous period, meaning that either
subjects expected their opponents not to change their strategy much or
that they decided to use the profit calculator only when the opponents’
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strategy was stable enough to let themmake predictions about the future.
Second, a considerable amount of look-up time is dedicated to the
strategies individually adopted by competitors, especially in the first
experiment, when they are enacted by a computer program. As predicted
by Vega-Redondo’s theory, this piece of information generally boosts
competition. Yet, the results of the second experiment suggest that
players are not only interested in output produced by the most successful
competitor, but by all of their opponents. These results are confirmed by
the estimates obtained via my modified version of EWA learning model,
suggesting that there is no difference between the weight attached to
the profits collected by the most successful opponent and by the other
competitors by subjects assessing the “strength” of a particular strategy.
Anyhow, all tests I have done agree on that imitation is not the main
driving force in the observed learning process.
Third, the “trial and error” learning model which was found to perform
quite well in HNO does not find strong support in my data. Subjects are
not interested in their own past history of play, which is the only piece
of information required by this learning rule, and the model often fails to
predict even the direction of change in players’ output.
Fourth, the model I derived from Camerer and Ho’s EWA learning
stresses the importance played by reinforcement learning in this setting:
when assessing the strength of a strategy subjects seem to take into
greater consideration their own experience than what they know about
other players’ results.
Finally, from the data collected in Italy with my second experiment,
it emerges that subjects’s specific training in economics might affect their
behavior both in terms of information search pattern and in terms of ac-
tual choices. This aspect deserves further investigation and suggests that
it could be interesting to repeat the experiment withmarket professionals,
in order to see whether their experience in the field affects their approach
to the game.
With my experiment I meant to contribute to the understanding of
learning mechanisms in game-like situations. I also wanted to test
experimental devices based on the “Mouselab” technique as scientific
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instruments that might be usefully adopted in other experiments on
learning and to investigate other interesting situations in which imperfect
information of some of the agents plays a crucial role, or in which
reputation is an asset. Examples might be auctions and financial markets,
but also markets where hiding some attributes of the good being sold or
the price of its add-ons may enable the sellers to get profits well above
the competitive level.
In situations like those, a better comprehension of the relation between
the data and stimuli provided to economic agents and their choices might
help the regulator to set rules of information disclosure that bring the
market outcome towards a more efficient equilibrium.
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Part II
Deterring Collusion
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Chapter 7
Fines, Leniency, Rewards
and Organized Crime 1
joint with Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloe´ Le Coq and Giancarlo
Spagnolo
7.1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed major innovations in the law enforcement
against price cartels. Following the US example, leniency programs that
reduce sanctions for cartel members that self-report to the competition
authority have been introduced in most OECD countries and have
become the main tool for cartel discovery and prosecution.2 The Euro-
pean Competition Network, a forum including all European competition
1Many thanks to Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johanneson, Dorothea Kuebler, Joe Harrington,
Charles Plott, Patrick Rey, Jean Tirole, for discussions and advice related to this project,
and to audiences in Berlin (ESMT, WZB), Copenhagen, Gerzensee (ESSET 2007), Mannheim
(RNIC 2007), Toulouse, Stockholm (Ifn and Konkurrensverket) and Naples (Universita`
Federico II) for comments and suggestions. We also gratefully acknowledge research
funding from Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority) that made this
research possible.
2The Antitrust Division of the US DoJ has had a leniency programs for cartels since the
seventies but reformed the program in 1993 and 1994, introducing the novel Corporate and
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authorities also launched a ”model” for the design of effective leniency
programs.3 In some jurisdictions (e.g. Korea) reward schemes for whistle-
blowers that report a cartel have also been adopted, following their
successful use in the fight of government fraud (US False Claim Act) and
tax evasion.4
The introduction of leniency programs increased dramatically the
number of cartels detected and convicted in the US and the EU, and
this is why they are considered a tremendous success (see Spagnolo 2008
[99] for details). A higher number of detected and prosecuted cases,
however, is not always a good indicator of the effectiveness of Anti-trust
policies.5 For example, an extremely lenient policy that reduces fines
to almost all parties of a discovered cartels in exchange for information
will enormously facilitate prosecution and generate many spontaneous
reports. Such a policy could well make a competition authority famous
as a successful agency, but is likely to heavily damage society by at the
same time (a) encouraging cartel formation through the drastic reduction
in expected fines that such a overly lenient policy generates, and (b)
increasing the cost of prosecution (by the higher number of prosecuted
cartels, given that prosecution costs are a pure dead weight losses for
society). Law enforcement’s main objective is crime deterrence, i.e.
prevention. An efficient and successful antitrust policy against cartels
should have tough ex ante deterrence effects that keep low both the costs
of prosecution and those of price fixing activities.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the deterrence effects of an-
titrust fines, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistle-blowers.
Individual Leniency Policy, and later on introduced the Amnesty Plus scheme. Analogously,
the EC’s DG Comp introduced a first Leniency Notice in 1996, and revised it in 2002.
3The ECN leniency ”model” is substantially more lenient than the US program, as it
allows to partially reduce fines practically to all members of a cartel, while the US leniency
program is restricted to the first party that reports only.
4In December 2006 The US Congress strengthened the legislation that already allowed
whistleblowers to cash as rewards 15 to 30% of taxes and fines recovered by the IRS thanks
to their help, by making the payment of the reward almost automatic. A change that, by
reducing the agency discretion on the payment of the reward, resembles the 1993 change in
the US Corporate Leniency Program.
5This was often mentioned in the lively debate on the effectiveness of antitrust enforce-
ment (see e.g. Crandall andWinston 2003 [27], Baker 2003 [8], Kwoka 2003 [70], andWerden
2003 [104], among others).
106
In particular we focus on how monetary fines, leniency programs, and
reward schemes against price fixing cartels affect market participants’
decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and their price choices. We
also analyze how different design of antitrust policy may affect firms’
ability to enter in tacit collusive agreements instead, since as Whinston
(2006) [106] recently reminded us, the final objective of competition policy
is to keep prices at competitive level, not to deter explicit horizontal
agreements per se. The main questions raised in this paper are, therefore,
the following:
1. What are the effects of traditional antitrust law enforcement, fines
following successful investigations of the competition authority but no
leniency, on cartel formation and on pricing behavior in and outside the
formed cartels?
2. What are the effects of introducing a leniency program when
reporting the cartel? Does it make a difference if the report is secret or
not? Do things improve when expected fines are higher, or when the
ringleader is banned from leniency as in the US (but not in the EU)? Is the
possibility to report used as improved opportunity to undercut the cartel,
or as a threat to punish defectors and thereby stabilize cartels, or both?
3. What are the effects of rewarding the first party that applies for
leniency with a bonus equal to the fines paid by the co-conspirators in
that cartel? Also, do agents exploit the reward scheme taking turn in
reporting and cashing the reward when the scheme is too generous and
makes this a profitable option?
4. What are the effects of these different law enforcement instruments
on agents’ choice of collusive price and on their ability to sustain tacit
collusion, given the importance of this issue in the recent debate?
The big problem with optimizing law enforcement policy by looking
at its real world performance is that for cartels and analogous forms of
organized crime (fraud, corruption, earning management, etc.) there
is precious little else to look at than discovered and prosecuted cases.
Contrary to most other types of crimes, where there are conscious victims
that denounce and thereby signal the frequency of the crime indepen-
dently from the fraction of these crimes where the criminal is detected
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and convicted, victims of cartels and analogous forms of organized crime
(corruption, fraud, etc.) are mostly not aware of them. This implies
that we cannot directly observe the total population of cartels in society
and how this changes with the introduction of new policies, though
indirect methods offer partial indications (see e.g. Harrington, 2007 [44];
Miller, 2007).6 This intrinsic lack of observability, accompanied by the
fact that many design features of the proposed and theoretically analyzed
schemes have never been implemented in reality, makes experimental
investigation a crucial policy tool, an almost unique possibility to try to
measure the likely change in deterrence, prices and welfare caused by the
many different possible designs of law enforcement policies.
We consider an experimental framework, as close as possible to the
strategic situation agents face in an oligopolistic industry subject to cur-
rent antitrust laws, in which subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game
with differentiated goods. Subjects can decide to coordinate on price (and
thus they form a cartel). We consider several treatments different in the
probability of cartels being caught, the level of fine, the possibility of self-
reporting (and not paying a fine), the existence of a reward for reporting,
the option to communicate, and cartel leaders access to leniency. We
are not the first to look at these issues experimentally. Apesteguja,
Dufwemberg and Selten (2006) [2] and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006)
[47], for example, have already produced instructive pieces of work in
this direction. However, as will be explained in depth in the next section
discussing the literature, we found that both those previous experiments
could be further improved in one way or another, and that they do not
cover most of the important policy issues we wanted to deal with in our
experiments. In particular we find new results on secret reports, reward
6Harrington (2007) [44] develops a smart indirect method to estimate the likely changes
in deterrence caused by the introduction of a new law enforcement instrument based on
the observed changes in duration of the detected cartels. Miller (2007) further develops the
approach and applies it to cartels detected in the US in the last decades, finding positive
deterrence effects of cartel formation consistent with those we observe in our experiment.
Unfortunately this work appears not to offer results or implication regarding price and
welfare changes, which as our results show may not go in the expected direction (Sprouls
1993 [100] offers empirical evidence that prices weakly increase after antitrust conviction,
which is also consistent with our experimental results).
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schemes, the interaction between fines, leniency and deterrence and tacit
collusion.7
Not all our results could be included in this first and very preliminary
draft of the paper. Among the results in this paper, we found that
traditional antitrust law enforcement, fines following successful inves-
tigations of the competition authority and no leniency, has a deterrence
effect (reduces the number of cartels formed) but also has a pro-collusive
effect (increases collusive prices). Leniency programs might not be
more efficient than standard antitrust enforcement, since they do deter
a significantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also
induce higher prices in cartels that are not reported. With rewards for
whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, disrupting
completely subjects’ ability to form cartels and to sustain high prices.
Also, we find that when the reward scheme is ’wrongly designed’ in the
sense that can be exploited, in our case by completely eliminating the
risk of being fined at no cost, subjects do not recognize the possibility
to manipulate and gain from the scheme, a result in line with recent
experiments in other fields (see e.g. Dal Bo, 2005 [29]). If the ringleader is
excluded from the leniency program, as under the US leniency policy, the
deterrence effect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise.
We also analyze tacit collusion, and find that under standard antitrust
enforcement or leniency programs, subjects who do not communicate
(do not go for explicit cartels) choose significantly higher prices than
where there is no anti-trust enforcement whatsoever. This is not the case
anymore when reward schemes are introduced.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses related literature, theoretical and experimental. Section 3
7We are aware of two other studies that deal with not exactly the same issues but are
somewhat related. Hamaguchi and Kawagoe (2005) [43] design an experiment where
subjects are forced to collude. Most obviously, such a setup cannot address the issue of
how different policies perform in terms of cartel deterrence. Hamaguchi et al. (2005)
adapt the setup of Hinloopen and Soetevent but to a repeated procurement auction with
leniency programs. They consider a different game since there is only one winner at each
period, so when players are colluding, they have to decide who will win the auction. They
found evidence of deterrence effects with Leniency programs as well as higher prices under
leniency and antitrust than under communication.
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describes the underlying theoretical model and the experimental design,
contrasting it with previous ones. Section 4 presents our results. Section
5 concludes, discussing implications for the theory and practice of de-
signing deterrence mechanisms for cartels and similar forms of organized
crime. An appendix contains the instructions for the experiment.
7.2 Literature review
7.2.1 Theory
Starting with the contributions of Motta and Polo (2003) [76], Rey (2003)
[85], and Spagnolo (2000a [96],b [97]), a theoretical literature has blos-
somed in the last decade that analyzes the optimal design of anti-cartel
policies based on the provision of incentives to breach trust and to self-
report.8 Different effects of leniency and rewards are considered in this
literature. The focus here is on the deterrence effects of the first part
of the leniency policies, restricted to firms that self-report before an
investigation by the competition authority has invested them. The most
important effects identified by the literature in this respect are:
1. The protection from fines effect. Spagnolo (2000a [96], 2004 [98])
and Rey (2003) [85] suggest that amnesty offered to the first firm
reporting before an investigation is opened may have deterrence
effects by ensuring that if a cartel member wants to undercut the
cartel, it can report and avoid paying the fine.9
2. The reward effect. Spagnolo (2000a [96], 2004 [98]), Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2001 [14], 2006 [15]), Rey (2003) [85] and Aubert et al.
(2006) [4] suggest that rewards could further increase deterrence
by generating stronger temptations to undercut the cartel and cash
the reward by reporting. Spagnolo (2000a [96], 2004 [98]) shows
8Other early pieces include Aubert et al. (2006) [4], Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001 [14],
2006 [15]), Ellis and Wilson (2001), Harrington (2007) [44] and Harrington and Chen (2007)
[23]. See Spagnolo (2008) [99] for a review of this growing theoretical literature.
9More recently Harrington (forthcoming) [45] coined a perhaps nicer acronym for the
same effect, deviator amnesty effect, but here we stick to temporal priority.
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that such a mechanism can for the first time deliver the first best
in a model a la Becker (1968) [9], complete deterrence without
investigation costs, provided that fines are sufficiently but finitely
large, and that the reward is lower than total fines.
3. The ’reporting as a threat’ and ’what does not kill us makes us stronger’
effects. Spagnolo (2000b) [97] and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001
[14], 2006 [15]) show that when self-reporting becomes attractive
thanks to leniency programs, the threat of self-reporting to punish
an agent that did not behave as the cartel agreed upon may also
become credible, andmay be exploited to enforce cartels that would
not be sustainable otherwise. Building on this idea, Ellis andWilson
(2001) obtain a related effect, showing that, for cartels that are not
deterred, leniency programs have the effect of reinforce/stabilize
collusion. The reason is that if a cartel is formed, then leniency
induces cartel members to self-report after any defection from
agreed collusive strategies, thereby strengthening the punishment
for defections of an amount equal to antitrust fines.
4. Tacit collusion and post-conviction pricing. Antitrust doctrine agreed
in the 50s that the focus should be restricted to ’explicit cartels’, i.e.
to conspiracies where firm managers meet or communicate with
the explicit objective of coordinating on higher prices, and leave
alone tacit collusion, i.e. cases where firms manage to coordinate on
and sustain high prices without explicit communication. Whinston
(2006) [106] reopened the debate, arguing that what is important for
welfare are prices, so that we should reflect more on how antitrust
enforcement may affect firms’ ability to sustain prices, even when
high prices are sustained by tacit collusion. On a different but
related stance, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) [16] suggest that
antitrust fines might have the effect of inducing firms to increase
collusive prices following conviction, either because they do not
realize they are a ’sunk cost’ and try to recover them through higher
margins, or because paid fines may help firms coordinating on
higher post-conviction prices sustained by tacit collusion.
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We discuss such effects when we present the experimental results.
7.2.2 Experiments
Apesteguja, Dufwemberg and Selten (2006) [2], and Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2006) [47] are the first to analyse experimentally the effects of
leniency policies on cartel deterrence.10
Apesteguja, Dufwemberg and Selten (2006)
Apesteguja et al. (2006) [2] conducted the first experimental investigation
of the effects of Leniency policies and rewards schemes on cartel deter-
rence. This elegant paper first develops a stylized but static theoretical
framework that tries to capture the main points made in the theoretical
literature mentioned earlier on the general deterrence effects of leniency
policies, and then uses it to undertake an experimental analysis of these
effects. The market game they focus on is a one-shot homogeneous
discrete Bertrand oligopoly. This is embedded in four alternative legal
frameworks: in Ideal there is no antitrust law, cartels are not possible
(communication is not allowed), and colluding firms face neither full
nor reduced fines; in Standard convicted firms face fines equal to 10%
of their revenue and no reduction if they report; in Leniency firms that
report a cartel they took part in receive a reduction in their fine; in
Bonus reporting firms receive part of the fines paid by other firms as
a reward. Strategically equivalent collusive subgame perfect equilibria,
including one implementing the monopoly price, exist in both Standard
and Leniency, sustained by the threat of reporting if a defection takes
place. The reason is that if a firm defects in an homogeneous Bertrand
game, its opponent will have no revenue, so even if there is no leniency
self-reporting is costless for a party whose opponent defected and is
10We are also aware of a third experimental paper on leniency programs, by Hamaguchi
and Kawagoe (2005) [43]. However, in their experimental design subjects are forced to
collude, to look then at the effects of leniency on the likelihood of cartels’ disruption. Such a
setup focuses only on desistance, and has therefore nothing to say about relative efficiency
of different policies in terms of general deterrence, i.e. of prevention of voluntary cartel
formation, which is the object of the present study.
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therefore a credible threat that can sustain collusion in the one-shot game.
The experimental setting allows for pre-play communication and let
subjects play in groups of three, and for the rest it follows closely the
theoretical model just described.
The experimental results confirm that agents understand and use the
threat of reporting to sustain collusion in the one-shot Bertrand game:
prices are substantially higher in Standard and in Leniency, where collu-
sive equilibria exist sustained by the threat to self-report if cheated upon,
than in Ideal where no such threat is available and the only equilibrium
is the Bertrand one. Leniency has a significant deterrence effect relative
to Standard, although prices are much higher than in Ideal, without
any antitrust. Surprisingly, the experimental results are inconsistent
with the theoretical predictions that rewarding reporting firms should
reduce cartel formation: the Bonus treatment has non-significant effects
on collusion.
As also argued by the authors, this paper can be seen as a first
exploratory step in the experimental analysis of cartel deterrence mecha-
nism. The reason is that both theory and experiment make a number of
simplifications that may affect the result in a non trivial way.
First, the game and experiment allow for only one round of decisions,
leaving experimental subjects no way to learn. This may be a problem
for the interpretation of the experimental results. The equilibria agents
are choosing among in Standard and Leniency, and the difference with
Bonus are not that easy to understand. Most recent experimental studies
of one-shot games allow for some repetition precisely because it is well
known from earlier work on public goods games that the first decisions
are typically mistaken. In fact, it is possible that the surprising result on
the ineffectiveness of Bonus is driven by subjects not fully grasping the
situation.
In our experiment we try to improve on this point by having both
a repeated game, and five initial rounds for subjects to experiment the
game.
Second, the theoretical framework used for the experiment resembles
closely that in Spagnolo (2000b) [97], but for fines chosen equal 10% of
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firms’ revenue, so that reporting if a partner-cartelist undercuts becomes
a credible threat even without leniency programs in place (in Standard).
However, the 10% revenue cap for EU fines that inspired the 10% of
revenue fines is relative to firms’ total yearly turnover in the last period
the cartel was active. In an appropriately dynamic framework, therefore,
fines would never be zero because of a defection. Moreover, it is hard
to imagine a market where, if a firm undercuts the cartel, other firms
have zero revenue for one full year. Firms are active in many markets
and total business stealing appears impossible in reality, so that absent
leniency policies, a firm that reports a cartel would be subject to a positive
fine, the multiplicity of equilibria in Standard would disappear as after a
defection reporting is dominated by not doing it (and avoiding the fine),
and Leniency may then fare much worse than how depicted. Relatedly,
homogeneous good Bertrand competition is a degenerate case of price
competition with differentiated products, and the collusive equilibria in
Standard would disappear with a little product differentiation.
To improve on these points, in our experiment we chose an infinitely
repeated differentiated product Bertrand game, and fixed fines rather
than fines that go to zero for some price choices.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006)
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) [47] study experimentally both the gen-
eral deterrence and desistance effects (shortening non-deterred cartels’
duration) of Leniency Programs. They use an infinite horizon set up
that allows for communication before prices are chosen each period, and
where the stage game is the same homogeneous Bertrand game used by
Apesteguja et al. (2006) [2]. Subjects are matched in groups of three at the
beginning of each treatment, and then play without re-matchings for at
least 20 rounds, after which the continuation probability falls to 80%.
They embedded these oligopoly games in four different treatments:
Benchmark, where subjects cannot communicate; Communication, where
subjects can communicate before choosing prices; Antitrust, where sub-
jects that communicated are exposed to a positive probability of being
detected and fined; and Leniency, which differs from Antitrust by the
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possibility to self-report after the choice of price and before the random
audit by the competition authority. In Leniency, therefore, subjects can
only self-report after prices have been chosen and made public, so that
subjects cannot both secretly report and secretly undercut the collusive
price, as is possible in reality where competition authorities may keep the
report secret to arrange for dawn raids allowing (or even asking to) the
reporting firm the possibility to secretly undercut former cartel partners.
Although they also use fines equal to 10% of revenue in the period of
conviction, Hinloopen and Soetevent include a fixed cost of reporting
under the leniency program that destroys Apesteguja et al.’s (2006) [2]
one-shot collusive equilibria sustained by the threat of reporting after
defections.
These authors’ main findings are that leniency: (i) increases cartel
deterrence (fewer cartels are formed); (ii) reduces the duration of cartels
that are not deterred (agents that form a cartel defect more afterwards);
and (iii) make agents defect more aggressively than in the absence of the
Leniency Program. They do not find that the leniency program affects
the likelihood that a detected and fined cartel forms again thereafter (no
effects on recidivism).
Although Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) [47] is the experimental
work which is closest to what we do, our experiments differ from theirs
in several respects.
First, in each stage-game we will allow subjects to both self-report and
set prices before any of these choices is observed by other subjects. In
our experiment, therefore, subjects have the possibility to simultaneously
secretly report and defect/undercut cartel partners, much like in reality,
and then they will have also the possibility to self-report after observing
price choices, if nobody reported before price became public. We consider
this a major improvement towards the realism of the experimental set
up that allows agents to defect from the cartel and avoid fines, as
possible in reality, and us to disentangle and quantify reports linked
to defections (protection from fines effect) and reports that are made to
punish defections from the cartel (’reporting as a threat’ or ’what does
not kill us makes us stronger’).
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Second, wewill have fixed fines rather thanHinloopen and Soetevent’s
fines equal to 10% of the revenue of the period in which a cartel is
detected, because in this second case fines vary a lot with the outcome
of the stage-game in which a cartel happens to be detected, so that it
is not clear what the expected fine perceived by subjects actually is,
which makes it impossible to cleanly analyze the role of fines and their
interaction with leniency.
Third we follow Apesteguja et al. (2006) [2] in framing the experiment
explicitly as a cartel/antitrust game, rather than having a ”neutral” frame
as in Hinloopen and Soetevent, as we want to make sure that subjects do
not misunderstand the situation, and we want to minimize the possible
impact of social preferences on subjects’ choices.
Fourth, we use a perhaps more realistic oligopoly model, a repeated
differentiated product Bertrand game.
Fifth our subjects are rematched with positive and constant proba-
bility all along the treatments, so that each supergame has a constant
continuation probability, like in Dal Bo´ (2005) [29], Dal Bo´ and Frechette
(2007) [30], and Blonski et al. (2007) [10].
Sixth, we use duopolies rather than triopolies, to avoid that agents
may be unwilling to punish defections too hard by the unwillingness to
harm a third ’innocent’ (non-defecting) party, as suggested by Holt (1995)
[50].
In addition, and again differently from Hinlopen and Soetevent, we
consider other important effects:
- we look at the effects of rewards for whistleblowers; indeed, veri-
fying their deterrence effects in an appropriately dynamic environment
to test the robustness of Apesteguja et al.’s (2006) [2] surprising mixed
finding is one of the central research questions motivating our study;
7.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is most closely related to the one by Hinloopen
and Soetevent, but we introduce a number of crucial modifications.
Our innovations are mainly relative to the timing when subjects can
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self-report, the fines’ structure, the oligopoly game, and the framing of
the experiment. We also consider two extra treatments, REWARD and
LENRING, which will be discussed in detail below when we describe our
experiment.
In our experiment, each subject represented a firm and played in
anonymous two-persons groups a repeated duopoly game. In every stage
game, the subjects had to take three types of decisions. First, they had
to choose a price in a discrete Bertrand price game with differentiated
goods. Second, they had to decide whether or not to form a cartel by
discussing prices. Third, the subjects could choose to self report cartels
to a competition authority. The attractiveness of this latter opportunity
depended on the details of the antitrust law enforcement institution - the
treatment variables of our experiment.
7.3.1 The Bertrand game
In each period, the subjects had to choose a price from the choice set
{0, 1, ..., 11, 12}. The resulting profits depended on their own price choice
and on the price chosen by their competitor and were reported in a profit
table distributed to the subjects (see Figure 7.1). This table was derived
from the following standard linear Bertrand game. (The details of the
Bertrand game were not described to the subjects.)
The demand function for each firm iwas given by:
qi(pi, pj) =
a
1 + γ
− 1
1− γ2 pi +
γ
1− γ2 pj
where pi (pj) is the price chosen by firm i (competitor j), a is a parameter
accounting for the market size and γ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the degree of
substitutability between the two firms’ products. Each firm faced a
constant marginal cost, c, and had no fixed costs. The profit function,
pii(pi, pj), was thus given by
pii(pi, pj) = (pi − c)qi.
In our experimental setup, we chose a = 36, c = 0 and γ = 4/5 and
restricted the subjects’ choice set to {0, 2, ..., 22, 24}. These parameters
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Figure 7.1: Payoff table
yield the payoff table distributed to each subject. To simplify the table we
also relabeled each price by dividing it by 2 and rounded the payoffs to
the closest integer. In the unique Bertrand equilibrium, both firms charge
a price equal to 3 yielding per firm profits of 100. The monopoly price
(charged by both firms) is 9, yielding profits of 180. Note also that a firm
would earn 296 by unilaterally and optimally undercutting the monopoly
price, i.e. by charging a price of 7. In this case the other (cheated upon)
firm only earns a profit of 20. Similarly, there are gains from deviating
unilaterally from other common prices than the monopoly price as well
as associated losses for the cheated upon firm; in the range of prices in
between the Bertrand price and the monopoly price, i.e. in the range
{4, ..., 8}, these gains and losses are smaller than when a subject deviates
unilaterally from the monopoly price.
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7.3.2 Cartel formation
Throughout the experiment, the subjects could form cartels by discussing
prices. At the beginning of every period, a communication window
opened if and only if both subjects agreed to communicate. This commu-
nication stage, which is described in more detail below, was designed in
such a way that it would result in a common price on which to cooperate.
This agreed upon price was non-binding, however, and therefore each
subject could cheat on the agreement by subsequently charging a price
different from the agreed upon price.
Whenever two subjects chose to communicate, they were considered
to have formed a cartel. In this case, the subjects risked to be fined as long
as the competition authority had not yet detected the cartel. This implied
that two subjects could be fined in a period even if no communication
took place in that specific period; for example, two subjects could be fined
in a period in which they did not communicate if they had communicated
in the previous period and the competition authority had not detected the
associated cartel in that period. Once a cartel was detected, however, it
was considered to be dismantled and in subsequent periods, the former
cartelists did not run any risk of being fined unless they communicated
again.
7.3.3 Antitrust law enforcement (Treatments)
Whenever two subjects had formed a cartel, a competition authority
could detect the cartel and convict its members for price fixing. Detection
could happen in two ways. First, in every period, the competition
authority detected cartels with an exogenous probability, α. If this
happened, both cartel members had to pay an exogenous fine, F . Second,
the cartel members could self-report the cartel, in which case the cartel
members were convicted for price fixing with certainty. If this happened,
the size of the fine depended on the details of the law enforcement
institution.
We ran five types of treatments and we adopted a between subjects
design, so that every subject only played the game under a single
119
treatment. Each treatment corresponded to a specific type of antitrust
law, that is our treatment variables were the different law enforcement
institutions. The differences between the treatments are summarized in
table 7.1.
Our baseline treatment corresponds to a laisser faire regime and is
denoted COMMUNICATION: in this treatment, α = F = 0 so that forming
a cartel by discussing prices is legal. To simplify the instructions and
to eliminate irrelevant alternatives, subjects were not allowed to report
cartels. In the four other treatments, denoted ANTITRUST, LENIENCY,
LENRING and REWARD, the expected fine (given that no reports took
place) was strictly positive (α = 0.1 and F = 200 yielding an expected
fine αF = 20) and cartel members were allowed to report cartels in which
they participated. The ANTITRUST treatment corresponds to traditional
antitrust laws without any leniency program: in case a report took place,
both cartel members (including the reporting one) had to pay the full
fine F . The LENIENCY treatment corresponds to current antitrust laws
embedded with a leniency program: in case the cartel was reported
by one of the cartel members only, the reporting member paid no fine
while the other one paid the full fine, F ; if instead both cartel members
reported the cartel simultaneously, both paid a reduced fine equal to F/2.
The treatment LENRING was identical to LENIENCY except that the first
subject attempting to communicate was treated as the cartel’s initiator -
the so-called ringleader - and, as a result, was not eligible for the leniency
program. (The way the ringleader was identified is described in more
detail below). Finally, the REWARD treatment differed from LENIENCY in
one respect only: if only one cartel member reported the cartel, his/her
fine was not only reduced to 0; in addition, he was rewarded with the full
fine, F , paid by the other cartel member.
In addition to these five treatments, we also ran a number of other
treatments to check the robustness of our results to changes in α and F .
First, we ran two additional antitrust and leniency treatments with higher
expected fines equal to 60 (α = 0.2 and F = 300). These treatments
were denoted ANTIHIGH and LENHIGH respectively. Second, we ran
two additional reward treatments, both with an expected fine equal to 0
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(α = 0) but with different fines. The treatment denoted REWLOW had a
relatively low fine (F = 200) while REWHIGH had a high fine (F = 1000).
7.3.4 The experiment’s timing and the rematching proce-
dure
At the end of each period, subjects were rematched with the same
competitor with a probability of 85%. With the remaining probability
of 15%, all subjects were randomly matched into new pairs. When this
happened, the history in the previous match did no longer matter; for
example, a subject could no longer be fined for a cartel formed in a
previous match. The subjects were also informed that the experiment
would end if more than 20 periods had passed and the 15% probability
event took place or if the experiment lasted for more than 2 hours and 30
minutes. This latter possibility was so unlikely that it never happened.
This re-matching procedure had several advantages. First, the subjects
were playing truly infinitely repeated games without problems associated
with end effects. Second, each subject played several repeated games
against different competitors. Thereby we observed the subjects’ behav-
ior in a larger number of repeated games.
Before the experiment started, the subjects were paired with the same
competitor for five practice periods. During these practice periods,
subjects were assigned to different competitors than those that they faced
in the first period of the ‘true’ (i.e. remunerated) experiment. Participants
were informed about this.
7.3.5 The timing of the stage game
With the exception of the COMMUNICATION treatment, a stage game
consisted of 7 steps. In COMMUNICATION, steps 4,5 and 6 were skipped.
An overview of the steps is given in Figure 7.2.
Step 1: Communication decision. Each subject was asked whether or
not he wished to communicate with his competitor. If both subjects
pushed the yes button within 15 seconds, the game proceeded to step 2.
Otherwise the two subjects had to wait for additional 30 seconds before
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Figure 7.2: Timing of the stage game
pricing decisions were taken in Step 3. In all periods, subjects were also
informed whether they were matched with the same opponent as in the
previous round or if a re-match had taken place.
In the treatment LENRING, the first subject to push the button within
the time window of 15 seconds was treated as the ringleader. If instead
only one of the subjects pushed the yes button, then this subject was
treated as a ringleader even if the cartel was formed in later periods. In
either case, both subjects were informed at the end of Step 1 about the
identity of the (possibly only potential) ringleader.
Step 2: Communication. If both subjects decided to communicate in
step 1, a window appeared on their computer screen asking them to
simultaneously state a minimum acceptable price in the range {0, ..., 12}.
When both of them had chosen a price, they entered a second round of
price negotiations, in which they could choose a price from the new range
{pmin, ..., 12}, where pmin was defined as the minimum among the two
prices selected in the previous negotiation round. This procedure went
on until 30 seconds had passed. The resulting minimum price pmin was
referred to as the agreed upon price.
Step 3: Pricing. Each subject had to choose his price from the choice set
{0, ..., 12}. Possible price agreements reached in step 2 were not binding.
The subjects were informed that if they failed to choose a price within
30 seconds, then their default price would be so high that their profits
became 0.
Step 4: First Reporting Decision. If communication took place in the
current period or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been
discovered by the competition authority, subjects had a first opportunity
to report the cartel.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision. Subjects learn the
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prices set by their opponent. If communication took place in the current
period or in one of the previous periods and was not yet discovered by
the competition authority and nobody has reported it in step 4, subjects
have again the opportunity to report the cartel. The crucial difference
between this second reporting opportunity and the first one is that the
subjects knew the price chosen by the competitor. In addition the subjects
were informed about their own profits and the profits of their competitor,
gross of the possible fine.
Step 6: Detection. If communication took place in the current period
or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been discovered or
reported in steps 4 or 5, the competition authority discovered the cartel
with probability α.
Step 7: Summary of the current period. At the end of each period, all the
relevant information about the stage game was displayed: agreed upon
price (if any), prices chosen by the two players, possible fines and net
profits. In case players were fined, they were also told how many players
reported. This step lasted 20 seconds
Note that with our experimental setup subjects have two opportuni-
ties to report the cartel: first at step 4, right after having set their price,
then again at step 5, after having been informed about the price chosen
by their opponent. In our design, reporting can thus be used for two
different purposes: (i) deviating subjects may report to get protection
against prosecution and (ii) cheated upon subjects may report to punish
their opponents, if they have not reported before.
7.3.6 Experimental procedure
Our experiment took place in March, April and May 2007 at the Stock-
holm School of Economics (Sweden) and at Tor Vergata university (Rome,
Italy). Some additional sessions were run in November 2007 in Stockhlm
and in December 2007, in Rome. Session lasted on average 2 hours,
including instructions and payment. The average payment was: (i) in
Stockholm SEK 23911, with a minimum of 112.5 SEK and a maximum of
11At the time of the experiment, 1 SEK=0.109 Euro
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387 SEK and (ii) in Rome Euros 22.65 with a minimum of 11.5 Euros and
a maximum of 31.5 Euros, including a show up fee equal to 50 SEK in
Sweden, and to 7 Euros in Italy. We ran a treatment for every session; the
number of subjects per session ranged from 16 to 32, and the total number
of subjects was 444. No subject took part in more than one session.
Subjects were welcomed in the lab and seated, each in front of
a computer. When all subjects were ready, a printed version of the
instructions and the profit table was distributed to them. Instructions
were read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the rules of the game.
The subjects were then asked to read the instructions on their own and ask
questions, whichwere answered privately. When everybody had read the
instructions and there were no more questions (which always happened
after about fifteen minutes), each subject was randomly matched with
another subject for the five practice rounds. After the practice rounds,
participants had again a last opportunity to ask questions about the rules
of the game. Again, they were answered privately. Then they were
randomly rematched into new pairs and the real play started.
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid privately in cash.
The subjects started with an initial endowment of 1000 points in order
to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. At the end of the experiment
the subjects were paid an amount equal to their cumulated earnings
(including the initial endowment) plus a show up fee of 50 SEK in
Stockholm and 7 Euros in Rome. The conversion rates were 20 points
for 1 SEK in Stockholm and 200 points for 1 Euro in Rome.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)[35].
7.3.7 Equilibrium set
In the games presented above, the equilibrium structure can be described
in the following way. For each treatment and each price that the firms
want to collude on, there exists a critical discount factor such that the
firms can collude on the desired price level if and only if the firms’
discount factor is larger than the critical discount factor. While it is not
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trivial to find these critical discount factors for each treatment, it is pos-
sible to rank them. Let δCommunication, δAntitrust, δLeniency , δLenRing and
δReward denote the critical discount factors for the, COMMUNICATION,
ANTITRUST, LENIENCY, LENRING and REWARD treatments respectively.
Provided that the probability of detection, α, and the size of the fine, F ,
are equal in all treatments, then it can be shown that
0 = δAntitrust < δCommuniction < δLen = δLenRing < δReward < 1.
The only surprising feature of this ranking is that collusion can be
sustained for any discount factor in the ANTITRUST treatment (δAnti =
0). The reason is simple: in the stage game, it is a subgame perfect
equilibrium to collude. Indeed, if both firms’ strategies stipulate that
one should report the cartel whenever a firm unilaterally deviates from
the collusive price, then it is no longer profitable to deviate due to
the reports. Furthermore, the reports are credible: since both firms
(including the deviating one) report the cartel following a deviation,
both firms are indifferent between reporting and not reporting, and
thus reporting is an equilibrium in the reporting subgame. Of course,
the weakness of this subgame perfect equilibrium is that it is sustained
through weakly dominated strategies. When the stage game is infinitely
repeated, however, it is easy to construct strategies with the same flavor,
which are not weakly dominated.
The key to the above observation is that in the ANTITRUST treatment,
reports can be used as punishments against deviators. This is not the
case in the other treatments. In the COMMUNICATION treatment, it is
trivial that reports cannot be used. To see that reports cannot be used as
punishments in the remaining treatments, note that optimal deviations
involve secret reports. Thus cartels are dismantled after unilateral
deviations and therefore reports cannot be used as punishments. For
this reason, the ranking of the remaining critical discount factor is the
expected one.
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7.3.8 Empirical Methodology
A critical point in our analysis is how to control for repeated observations
of the same subject or the same duopoly, when testing the significance
of the observed differences across treatments. Before explaining more
in detail the procedure we adopted, it is useful to introduce here some
terminology: we call “individual-level” data the data representing indi-
vidual decisions of the subjects, e.g. the decision to communicate or not
in a given period or the decision to unilaterally deviate from a collusive
agreement; we call instead “duopoly-level” data the data that refer to
variables that always have the same value for the two members of a
duopoly. Thus, the presence of a cartel within a duopoly in a given
period, or the fact that a given cartel is detected by the antitrust authority,
are duopoly-level data.
Given the structure of our game, we need to account for correlation
between two observations from the same individual, as well as correla-
tion between two observations from different individuals who belong to
the same duopoly. Moreover, since we have run the experiment in two
different cities, we also have to control for the possible correlation among
observations collected in the same city. To this purpose, we adopted
multilevel random effect models.
Since in our experiment a subject may take part in more than one
duopoly during the game, the random effects at the subject level and at
the duopoly level are not nested, which makes it difficult to estimate a
model with a random effect at the duopoly level and a random effect at
the subject level at the same time.
To overcome this complicacy, when analyzing individual-level data, we
hypothesized the presence of a random effect for every subject within any
particular match (which accounts for the correlation among observations
pertaining to the same match), nested with a random effect for every
subject across different matches, which is in turn nested with a random
effect at the city level.
To analyze duopoly-level data we make the assumption that correla-
tion between observations belonging to the same subject but to different
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duopolies can be disregarded. We therefore hypothesize to have only a
random effect at the duopoly level, nested with a random effect at the city
level.
The only independent variable of our simple regressions is the treat-
ment, as a dummy. To analyze individual-level data, we adopt a four-
levels model of the following form:
yhijk = β0 + β1TREAThijk + η
(2)
ijk + η
(3)
jk + η
(4)
k
where h, i , j and k are indices for measurement occasions, subjects in
matches, subjects across matches and cities, respectively. TREAT is the
dummy variable for the treatment. Since we always compare only two
treatments at a time, this variable takes value 1 in correspondence of one
of the two treatments, and value 0 in correspondence of the other one.
η
(2)
ijk represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city k
(second level), η(3)jk represents the random intercept for subject j in city k
(third level) and η(4)k represents the random intercept for city k (fourth
level). Random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally
distributed, with a variance that is estimated through our regression.
The general three-levels model we adopt when looking at duopoly-
level data has the following form:
yhlk = β0 + β1TREAThlk + η
(2)
lk + η
(3)
k
As above, h and k are indices for measurement occasions and cities, while
l is the index for duopolies. η(2)lk and η
(3)
k represent random intercepts at
the duopoly and city levels.
When comparing observations collected in a single city, we adopt a
model which is analogous to the previously described ones, but without
the last level.
We ran logit regressions to analyze the decision to communicate,
the decision to deviate, and the rates of cartel formation and of cartel
detection; we adopted instead linear regressions for prices and agreed
upon prices. To estimate our model we used an ordinary panel regression
with random effect, when the number of considered levels was equal
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to 2, while we used GLLAMM (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004
and http://www.gllamm.org) when the number of considered levels was
equal or higher than three.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Traditional and modern law enforcement
In this section we report the subjects’ behavior in the COMMUNICATION,
ANTITRUST and LENIENCY treatments. The purpose is to assess how
traditional antitrust law (ANTITRUST) andmoremodern law enforcement
institutions embedded with a leniency program (LENIENCY) perform
relative to a laisser faire regime (COMMUNICATION). Our primary interest
is to document how these different policies perform in terms of ex ante
deterrence and their implications for the subjects’ price choices. In
addition we also report post conviction deterrence and prices, that is
whether cartelists, after having been convicted, are deterred from reform-
ing the dismantled cartel. We postpone our analysis of the LENRING and
REWARD treatments to two subsequent sections.
Cartel Deterrence
Table 7.2 reports the rates of communication attempts and of cartel
formation provided that subjects are not currently cartel members. These
rates are our main measures for evaluating the success of the different
policies in terms of ex ante deterrence, that is the main objective of
Antitrust policies.
Result 1 (Ex ante deterrence) 12Traditional antitrust laws (ANTITRUST)
12As explained above, we used a multilevel random intercept model to compare the
results across treatments. We ran a regression per each couple of treatments.
For theRate of communication the single observation is the binary decision to communicate
of a subject in every single period. We test the significance of the differences between
treatments by modeling the binary outcome by a four-level random intercept logistic
regression, since here we analyze individual-level data.
Similarly, for the Rate of individual deviation the single observation is represented by the
individual decision to deviate from the last collusive agreement. Here we consider only the
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are effective in deterring explicit cartel formation and modern
antitrust laws (LENIENCY) even more so.
Result 1 stems from the fact that the rates of communication attempts
and of cartel formation are significantly lower in ANTITRUST than in
COMMUNICATION. Moreover LENIENCY was even more successful in
terms of ex ante deterrence since the rates of communication attempts
and of cartel formation were significantly lower in LENIENCY than
in ANTITRUST. Relative to COMMUNICATION, the rates of individual
communication attempts decreased by 31% in ANTITRUST and by 56%
in LENIENCY. These differences were even more striking for the rates
of cartel formation, with a 55% and 77% decrease in ANTITRUST and
LENIENCY respectively.. This is line with Miller’s (2007) estimate that
leniency may be associated with a 52 percent decrease in the rate at
which cartels form. These results are also (partly) consistent with
previous experimental results. Apesteguja et al. do find a reduction in
the percentage of formed cartels (from 67% to 50%) when Leniency is
introduced (compared to the case when firms can report but there is no
reduced fine). Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) [47] find a similar pattern
as we do concerning the rate of cartel formation although they observe
no significant differences between their antitrust and leniency treatments
with respect to the rate of communication attempts.13
Table 7.2 also reports the rates of detection due to self reporting by
subjects - a first source of cartel instability. The rate of reporting is
cases in which the subjects had previously formed an agreement on prices. Again, these are
individual-level data, so to evaluate the significance of the observed differences we adopted
a four-level random intercept logistic regression.
For theRate of cartel formationwe have a single observation per duopoly per period, which
indicates if in that period a cartel has been formed within that duopoly. We consider only
the cases in which no cartel pre-existed. The analysis here concerns duopoly-level data, the
binary response is therefore modeled by a three level random intercept logistic regression.
For the Rate of reporting we consider only the cases in which a cartel exists. We have
a single observation per duopoly per period, which indicates whether the cartel has been
discovered in that period because at least one of the two cartel members reported it to the
antitrust authority. As for the rate of cartel formation, we adopted a three level random
intercept logistic regression, because the analysis concerns duopoly-level data.
13Our results are not perfectly comparable with those of Hinloopen and Soetevent
because they report the rate of communication for all periods while we report the rate of
communication provided that no cartel has been formed previously.
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small in ANTITRUST while it increases substantially and significantly in
LENIENCY. Hence:
Result 2 (Cartel stability and self-reporting) Modern antitrust laws (LE-
NIENCY) reduce cartel stability due to self reporting.
Result 2 is in line with Miller’s (2007) conclusion that leniency pro-
grams are associated with a 62% increase in the rate of detection, even
though we observe an even higher increase. This is also consistent with
Aspeteguja et al. who find an increase of 50% of the detection rate.
Our experimental design also allows us to distinguish between differ-
ent motives behind reporting behavior. As already mentioned, subjects
can either report in order to protect themselves against fines using the
first reporting opportunity or they can report and punish their competitor
after having observed the competitor’s price choice. Clearly, we should
expect to observe the former type of reports in LENIENCY only. By
contrast, the latter opportunity to report in order to punish deviators may
be observed both in ANTITRUST and LENIENCY, although one may argue
that reports to punish should be rare in both treatments. In ANTITRUST,
subjects may find it too costly to report and in LENIENCY, an optimal
deviation involves a simultaneous secret report, implying that a cheated
upon subject should not be able to punish by reporting.
Table 7.3 reports the number of first and second reports in ANTITRUST
and LENIENCY. There are almost no first reports in ANTITRUST (as
expected) and only few second reports. It is interesting to note, however,
that the few subjects who used the second report did so systematically in
order to punish an undercutting rival. Thus some subjects were willing
to take a quite large cost in order to punish deviators. Whether this
reflected that these few subjects used optimal punishments or altruistic
punishment as described by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002) [34] is an open
question.14
14Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002) [34] analyze a repeated one shot public good game experiment
and argue that subjects are willing to bear the cost of punishing free riders. They
explain that ”Free riding may cause strong negative emotions among the cooperators and
these emotions, in turn, may trigger their willingness to punish the free riders”. Their
experimental evidence gives stronger support to the hypothesis of altruistic punishments.
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Table 7.3: Self reporting
Treatment Antitrust1 Leniency1
# of reports (% of possibilities to report) 60 (4.7%) 195 (35.6%)
# of First In total 4 168
Reports Simultaneous deviation 1 140
In total 56 27
# of Second At least one deviated 54 27
Reports Only rival deviated 46 13
Rival deviated more 7 1
In LENIENCY, most reports took place during the first secret reporting
stage andwere combined with a simultaneous undercutting of the agreed
upon price. This is consistent with optimal deviations and the ”protection
gains fines motive”. Still there were a non-negligible number of first
reports where the subjects did not simultaneously deviate. Furthermore,
there were also some second reports and these were typically carried out
as a punishment against an undercutting rival who for some reason did
not simultaneously report the cartel during the first reporting step.
Finally, Table 7.2 reports the rates of deviation from agreed upon
prices - a second source of cartel instability.
Result 3 (Cartel stability and price deviations) Both modern antitrust
laws (LENIENCY) and traditional ones (ANTITRUST) increase cartel
stability by reducing the rate of deviations from agreed upon prices.
Result 3 stems from the fact that the rate of deviation in both the
ANTITRUST and LENIENCY treatments are significantly lower than in
the COMMUNICATION treatment. This suggests that antitrust polices
may generate trust among subjects, provided that none of the subjects
have previously reported the cartel. As we will see when we next
comment on the subjects’ price choices, this observation implies that
current antitrust policies are not unambiguously positive despite the fact
In their experiment the individual punisher never meets the same subject again and thus
the observed patten cannot be explained by optimal punishments.
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they increase ex ante cartel deterrence (and, in the LENIENCY treatment
also the probability of detection due to higher rates of self reporting).
Prices
The ultimate objective of antitrust law enforcement is to generate low
prices. Table 3 presents for our first three treatments the average price,
the average price within cartels, the agreed upon price and the average
price given that subjects do not communicate. The first lesson to be
drawn from this table is that cartel deterrence is desirable, since it reduces
prices. Indeed, for each treatment in Table 3, prices within cartels are
higher than the prices without communication. (Although not reported,
these differences are statistically significant.) Combined with our earlier
finding that ANTITRUST reduces the rate of cartel formation relative
to COMMUNICATION and that LENIENCY further reduces that rate, it
suggests that average prices should be highest in COMMUNICATION
followed by ANTITRUST and lowest in LENIENCY. If anything, our data
suggests the reverse:
Result 4 (Average prices) Both traditional (ANTITRUST) andmodern (LE-
NIENCY) antitrust laws appear ineffective in reducing average prices.
Result 4 stems from the fact that average prices in ANTITRUST and
LENIENCY are higher (although not significantly so) than in COMMUNI-
CATION. This pattern thus suggests that both traditional and modern
policies embedded with a leniency program are counter productive by
increasing prices. The main driving force behind this result is that these
policies appear to increase cartel stability (as noted in Result 3) and
naturally this translates into higher prices within cartels (see Table 7.4).
Result 5 (Priceswithin cartels - what does not kill usmakes us stronger)
Both traditional (ANTITRUST) and modern (LENIENCY) antitrust
laws increase cartel prices significantly.
Spagnolo (2000b) [97], Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001 [14], 2006 [15])
and Ellis and Wilson (2001) suggested that antitrust policies embedded
134
Ta
bl
e
7.
4:
Pr
ic
e
le
ve
ls
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
A
nt
it
ru
st
Le
ni
en
cy
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
ic
e
4.
91
3
≈
5.
34
8
>
∗∗
∗
4.
84
4
Pr
ic
e
w
it
hi
n
ca
rt
el
s
4.
97
1
<
∗∗
∗
6.
11
4
<
∗∗
7.
02
4
A
gr
ee
d
up
on
pr
ic
e
7.
68
9
<
∗∗
∗
8.
24
2
≈
8.
21
8
Pr
ic
e
w
it
ho
ut
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
3.
22
7
≈
3.
89
0
≈
4.
01
3
N
ot
e:
Fo
r
th
e
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
ic
e,
a
si
ng
le
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
re
pr
es
en
te
d
by
th
e
av
er
ag
e
am
on
g
th
e
pr
ic
es
ch
os
en
in
a
pe
ri
od
by
th
e
tw
o
m
em
be
rs
of
a
du
op
ol
y.
Th
e
sa
m
e
is
tr
ue
fo
r
Pr
ic
e
w
it
hi
n
ca
rt
el
s,
bu
t
he
re
w
e
on
ly
co
ns
id
er
th
e
ca
se
s
in
w
hi
ch
th
e
m
em
be
rs
of
a
du
op
ol
y
ha
ve
fo
rm
ed
a
ca
rt
el
w
hi
ch
ha
s
no
tb
ee
n
de
te
ct
ed
or
re
po
rt
ed
ye
t.
Fo
r
A
gr
ee
d
up
on
pr
ic
es
w
e
on
ly
co
ns
id
er
th
e
ca
se
s
in
w
hi
ch
th
e
su
bj
ec
ts
ha
ve
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
an
d
fo
un
d
an
ag
re
em
en
t
on
th
e
pr
ic
e
to
se
t.
A
si
ng
le
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
ag
re
ed
up
on
pr
ic
e
pe
r
du
op
ol
y,
pe
r
pe
ri
od
.
Fo
r
Pr
ic
e
w
it
ho
ut
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
w
e
re
st
ri
ct
ou
r
an
al
ys
is
to
th
e
ca
se
s
in
w
hi
ch
no
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
ha
s
ta
ke
n
pl
ac
e
in
th
e
pr
es
en
t
pe
ri
od
,
an
d
an
y
po
ss
ib
le
pr
ev
io
us
ag
re
em
en
t
on
pr
ic
es
ha
s
al
re
ad
y
be
en
br
ok
en
.A
si
ng
le
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
re
pr
es
en
te
d
by
th
e
av
er
ag
e
am
on
g
th
e
pr
ic
es
ch
os
en
by
th
e
tw
o
m
em
be
rs
of
a
du
op
ol
y,
in
ev
er
y
si
ng
le
pe
ri
od
.
A
s
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
ab
ov
e,
w
e
us
ed
a
th
re
e-
le
ve
l
ra
nd
om
in
te
rc
ep
t
lin
ea
r
m
od
el
to
co
m
pa
re
th
e
re
su
lt
s
ac
ro
ss
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
si
nc
e
th
e
an
al
ys
is
he
re
co
nc
er
ns
du
op
ol
y-
le
ve
l
da
ta
.
W
e
ra
n
a
re
gr
es
si
on
pe
r
ea
ch
co
up
le
of
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
.
135
with a leniency program could have the effect of stabilizing those cartels
that are not deterred. Their idea was that reporting could be used as
a punishment against deviators, since reporting is less costly with a
leniency program. This potential explanation for the high cartel prices in
LENIENCY is not completely convincing in the context of our experiment;
since we allowed for secret reports, deviators could in effect protect
themselves against such punishments. In fact, one may argue that reports
as threats against deviators should be more relevant in ANTITRUST, since
optimal punishments in that treatment involve reports. However, since
we observed very few reports in ANTITRUST (although most of these few
reports were used as punishments against deviators), it seems unlikely
that reports as a threat against deviators were the main explanation for
the high cartel prices in ANTITRUST.
In our view it seems more reasonable that antitrust policies generate
trust among cartel members provided that the cartels are not reported.
It is also interesting to note that cartel prices are significantly higher in
LENIENCY than in ANTITRUST. This pattern suggests that the tougher
the policy, the larger is the potential for generating trust among cartel
members.
It is also interesting to note that the price levels for non cartel members
appear to be higher (although insignificantly so) in the Antitrust and Le-
niency treatments than in the Communication treatments. One possible
interpretation of this pattern is that a refusal to communicate when it is
costly to do so, does not signal as clearly an unwillingness to cooperate.
As a result, current antitrust policies may also facilitate tacit collusion.
It should be emphasized, however, that because of higher deterrence,
average prices overall are not significantly higher in the Antitrust and
Leniency treatments.
High expected fines
To test the robustness of our findings to changes in α and F , we ran
the two additional treatments, ANTIHIGH and LENHIGH with higher
expected fines of 60 (α = 0.2 and F = 300). Table 7.5 reports the rates
of communication attempts and of cartel formation as well as average
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prices and prices within and outside cartels. These figures are compared
with those for our original treatments, ANTITRUST and LENIENCY.
The first lesson from this table is that higher expected fines increase
deterrence and reduce average prices under traditional antitrust laws but
not under modern laws embedded with a leniency program. The reason
is probably that the expected fine mostly increased through an increase in
the probability of detection - this probability was doubled while the size
of the fine increased by 50 % only - and that under leniency, many cartels
are reported irrespective of the probability of detection, thereby reducing
subjects sensitivity to changes in that probability. Note also that the prices
within cartels increased in the leniency treatment but not in the antitrust
treatment.
Post-conviction behavior
In this section we analyze agents’ behavior after they are convicted and
fined for a cartel they had formed before. This is interesting for at least
two important and related reasons. The first reason is that of course there
is not only general, ex ante deterrence. A second form of deterrence that
any law enforcement policy should presumably generate is ex post specific
deterrence, some times called desistance in the antitrust literature: the
policy should ensure that convictions stop the convicted wrongdoer(s)
from committing the crime again. The crucial question here is, therefore,
how do convictions, in general and in particular when generated by
different law enforcement policies (presence of leniency, size of fines),
affect agents’ following decision whether to form another cartel and -
whether or not a new cartel is formed - their price choices? The topic
is particularly interesting for antitrust in light of Sproul’s (1993) [100]
empirical finding that for a sample of US antitrust indictments prices
often rose after antitrust conviction (see also the discussion in Whinston
2006 [106]).
The second related reason why post-conviction behavior is important
is that a number of recent studies, theoretical and experimental, suggest
that in oligopolistic industries the payment of a large sunk cost by
competitors may lead to an increase in prices, either because the sunk cost
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acts as a coordination device for explicit or tacit collusion (e.g. Offerman
and Potters 2006 [80]; Janssen 2006 [57]), or because agents are subject to
a ’sunk-cost bias’, that is, they use simple mark-up pricing rules of thumb
to try to recover the costs sunk by charging a higher markup (see e.g.
Baliga et al. 2006, who also describe how the best business administration
textbooks in fact suggest these pricing rules based on average cost and
mark ups as optimal ones). Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) [16] noted
that if these effects were present and significant in oligopolies, then
the existing theory of optimal fines could not be applied to cartels as
commonly done in the antitrust debate (it would bemisleading): it should
first be extended to incorporate these effects in the evaluation of the costs
and benefits trade offs that lead to the optimal fines.
Specific deterrence (or ’desistance’) Figure 7.3 shows the cumulative
number of new cartels (vertical axis) formed by convicted agents in the
five periods following the conviction (horizontal axis), separately for our
Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The plots are slightly ’optimistic’,
in the sense that some of the matches end before the five periods after
conviction considered, possibly leading to a slight underestimation of the
number of cartels that form again after conviction. Still, the data tell us
quite a lot.
Figure 7.3: % of cartels re-established
First, there is a large fraction of agents that do not form new cartels
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after having been convicted and fined for a first cartel, even though our
treatments are designed so that agents’ situation in terms of expected
fines, discount factors, available actions and payoff functions after a
conviction is exactly identical to that before the first convicted cartel was
formed. What differs after a conviction is only the history of play, as
agents now have played several rounds, formed one or more cartels,
and were convicted and fined. If history or agents’ experience did not
matter, so that ’bygones are bygones’, in our stationary framework we
would expect all ’rational’ agents that chose to form a cartel a first time
and were convicted and fined to form a new cartel the period after
conviction. Instead, more than half of former cartelist did not form a new
cartel periods days after the conviction. This suggests that history and
experience matter a lot in our experiment.
Second, there is a strong difference between the specific deterrence
effects of Antitrust and Leniency: close to 40% of convicted cartels come
to life again in Antitrust treatments, but not in Leniency treatments. In
other words, in our experiment the introduction of leniency policies produces
a strong increase in desistance. Leniency policies appear much better at
reducing recidivism than standard antitrust policies without leniency.
This result is in stark contrast with Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006),
who in their experiment find no improvement in desistance linked to
the introduction of leniency policies. The reason behind their opposite
result, in our view, is most likely due to their experimental set up not
allowing for secretly reporting and simultaneously deviating from cartel
agreement, as is possible in our experiment and in reality. As we have
seen before, in our experiment most of convictions in Leniency treatments
are linked to agents simultaneously undercutting cartel price and self-
reporting. This joint action is likely to generate substantial more distrust
among agents than a discovery by the competition authority, and thereby
to make substantially more difficult for convicted agents to trust each
other again.
Post-conviction prices In his paper on the effects of antitrust indict-
ments on prices charged after the indictment - in the absence of an
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effective leniency program - Sproul (1993) [100] finds that:
1. On average prices rise gradually after an indictment for price
fixing.
2. The largest immediate drops in price after conviction are about
9-10 percent.
3. Post-conviction prices are negatively correlated with the sever-
ity of penalties.
Sproul suggests that some of the cartels he analyzes could involve
efficiencies, and imputes the increase in average prices to a loss of these
efficiencies. A comparison between his results and ours, particularly
under Antitrust treatments (there was no serious leniency program at
the time of the cartels studied by Sproul) might help to understand some
aspects of the phenomenon under analysis.
Figure 7.4 shows price choices in cartels before conviction (conviction
takes place at time 0) and after conviction, separately for convicted agents
that have formed again a new cartel and by those that did not do it, and
for Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The stylized facts that emerge
from our experiment are the following:
Figure 7.4: Price before and after detection
a) Prices after conviction are on average lower than in cartels before
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conviction.
b) When cartels are re-established after conviction, prices stabilize at
levels close to that prevailing in the cartel the period when the cartel was
convicted.
c) When cartels are not re-established, prices fall substantially with
respect to the prevailing cartel price at the time of conviction, and remain
low.
d) Post-conviction prices are higher in Leniency than in Antitrust
treatments when a new cartel is formed after conviction, while the
opposite happens when a new cartel is not formed after conviction.
The fact that average prices within cartels that are restored after
conviction remain close to the level observed in the period in which the
previous cartel was detected, whether leniency is granted to the whistle-
blowers or not, appears consistent with Sproul’s (1993) [100] findings
given that in our framework there are no efficiencies linked to collusion.
Somewhat in contrast to Sproul (1993) [100] we also find that, in the
large number of cases where a novel cartel is not formed after conviction,
prices fall much below the level reached in the period in which detection
took place, which drives down average post-conviction prices. True, this
happens much more often in Leniency treatments than in Antitrust ones,
and prices when new cartels do not form aremuch lower in Leniency than
in Antitrust treatments, while at the time of Sproul’s cartels an effective
leniency policy was not in place. Still, even focusing only on Antitrust
treatments, it appears that prices fall on average after conviction. On
the other hand, to explain why in his sample prices do not fall after
indictment, Sproul hypothesizes that “the government mainly prosecutes
cost-reducing cartels”. Such an interpretation is not questioned by our
data, since in our experiment cartels have no effects on costs.
As for the effects of Leniency, it appears to have the novel effect
of strongly increasing desistance thereby reducing average prices, even
though prices are substantially higher in cartels that manage to form
again after a conviction caused by a leniency application.
The difference that arises between Leniency treatments and Antitrust
treatments when players decide not to form a new cartel after being
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detected is also interesting (stylized fact d)). While under Leniency the
average price remains close to Bertrand and to the level observed before
the (detected) cartel arose, under Antitrust average non-collusive prices
after detection rise as if – after having formed an explicit cartel and
having experienced the fine – some of the subjected try to reach a tacit
agreement on prices. A possible interpretation of this effect is that under
Antitrust detection does not affect trust between cartelists, while under
Leniency detection and defection are often simultaneous, and the cartel is
discovered because it is reported by the deviating player; therefore, post-
conviction tacit collusion is more difficult to achieve under Leniency.
Size of the fine and post-conviction prices: ’sunk cost bias’ and co-
ordination effects As mentioned before, there are studies pointing at
possible coordination role of sunk costs (e.g. Offerman and Potters 2006
[80]), while other studies point at possible ’sunk cost bias’ in decision
making, where agents try to recover sunk fixed cost by increasing a mark
up on the average cost chosen when setting the unit price (Baliga et al.
2004). To distinguish the two effects, we hypothesized that the first effect
should imply improved coordination in general, and therefore also in
newly formed cartels.
Table 7.6 reports post conviction prices from our experiment, in newly
formed cartels and outside, and the level of the fines levied on convicted
agents. Consistently with Sproul’s finding number 1, we observe a
negative (though not always significant) correlation between the size
of the fine and post-conviction prices. In our experiment this effect is
somehow puzzling, since even before getting fined our subjects were
informed about the size of the fine and the probability of detection, so
if they were fully rational they should not change their behavior after
detection. A deeper analysis is required to understand the reasons that
lead to this finding 15.
We observe that post conviction prices are generally lower when the
fine (and the expected fine) is higher, both within cartels and outside
15To investigate this matter, we ran some other related experiments’ whose results will be
presented in a companion paper.
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Table 7.6: Size of the fine and post-conviction pricing
Treatment Fine Prices outside cartels Prices within cartels
Antitrust 200 4.418 7.297
≈ ∨∗
AntiHigh 300 3.310 5.750
Leniency 200 3.776 6.732
≈ ≈
LenHigh 300 3.181 4.700
cartels, whether leniency is granted to the “whistleblowers” or not.
Consequently, our evidence seems to contradict the hypothesis of a sunk
cost bias, whichwould affect prices of firms that choose not to re-establish
a cartel after being fined; our results are also against the hypothesis
of a coordination effect of the fine for cartels restored right after their
detection.
To test the significance of the observed difference in post convic-
tion prices between Antitrust and AntiHigh, and between Leniency
and LenHigh, we estimated a three level random effect linear model
using GLLAMM, following the procedure explained in section 7.3.6. As
mentioned above, this procedure allows us to keep into account the
correlation between observations from the same duopoly, and also the
correlation between observations from the same city. We notice that the
differences we observe are economically, but not statistically significant
in most of the cases. According to our results, the difference in post
conviction prices between Leniency1 and Leniency3 is not significant, nei-
ther within cartels nor outside cartels. On the other hand, the difference
between prices observed in Antitrust1 and Antitrust3 is significant, but
only outside cartels. This lack of statistical significance may be due to the
sample size, which is very small since we restrict our analysis only to the
cases in which a cartel was discovered and dismantled in the previous
period.
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7.4.2 Ineligibility for Cartel Ringleader16
Under the US Corporate Leniency Policy, a firm is ineligible for amnesty if
it is the instigator of the cartel - the so called ringleader. In order to qualify
for amnesty, the policy requires that the ”corporation did not coerce
another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the
leader in, or the originator of, the activity” (Corporate Leniency Policy,
supra note 58). By contrast, and following the revision of the EU Leniency
Notice in 2002, also the ringleader is eligible for amnesty in the EU.
Whether or not ineligibility of the ringleader has desirable consequences
in terms of deterrence and prices is not clear cut. Excluding the ringleader
from the leniency program may increase deterrence if each firm wait for
some other firm to take the initiative of forming the cartel. As noted
by Leslie (2006) [71], however, extending amnesty to the ringleader may
increase deterrence as well by ensuring that even the ringleader cannot
be completely trusted, as it may also loose confidence and rush to report
under the leniency program.17
Table 7.7: Deterrence effects
Leniency LenRing
Rate of communication attempts 0.344 ≈ 0.290
Rate of cartel formation 0.146 ≈ 0.135
Rate of individual deviation 0.472 >∗∗∗ 0.230
Rate of detection 0.646 >∗∗∗ 0.289
To evaluate the pros and cons of ringleader ineligibility, we ran the
additional treatment, LenRing. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 compare the effects on
deterrence and on price levels of eliminating the possibility of amnesty
for the ringleader. Three features are striking in these tables. First, the
LenRing treatment has no significant effect on cartel deterrence relative
16We thank Joe Harrington for suggesting this treatment.
17There are other arguments for and against the ineligibility of ringleaders. Extending
leniency to the ringleadermay be important to elicit self-reporting, as it may not be that clear
to a firm considering whether to apply for leniency if it risks being regarded as ringleader.
On the other hand, in an adversarial system, where testimony is crucial to persuade juries,
testimony by a ringleader may not be convincing.
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to the Leniency treatment. Second, cartels appear to become more stable
and third the LenRing treatment increase prices significantly according to
all our price measure. These findings are summarized in the next result18.
Result 6 (Ringleader) If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency
program, the deterrence effect of leniency falls and prices are higher
than otherwise.
Result 7 thus suggests that the US practice of excluding the ringleader
from the leniency program is unambiguously bad in our set up. While
we find this result an interesting first step, that confirms some observers’
concerns that excluding ringleaders may reduce the effectiveness of the
leniency program, we should also emphasize one important caveat. In
our experiment subjects were matched pairwise into duopolies to avoid
social preferences effects towards non-defecting third parties.
Table 7.8: Price levels
Leniency LenRing
Average price 3.926 <∗∗∗ 4.847
Price within cartels 5.494 <∗∗∗ 7.284
Agreed upon price 7.099 ≈ 7.833
Price without communication 3.457 <∗∗∗ 3.912
This, however, is the worst conceivable situation for the US policy
of excluding ringleaders, as the ban leaves only one cartel member with
the option to self-report obtaining leniency, eliminating the incentives
to ”race to report” generated by the risk that another cartel member
could do it before. With more than two firms, therefore, it is likely
that LenRing treatment will show more desirable properties. Therefore,
further experimental research with many cartel members is needed to
attempt any policy conclusion on this feature.
18Treatment LENRING was run only in Rome. For sake of consistency, in tables 7.7 and
7.8 we only consider observations gathered in Rome for treatment Leniency as well.
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7.4.3 Rewards
So far we have only considered policies that have been extensively
implemented in reality. Given that none of these policies yielded fully
satisfactory results, it is natural to turn attention to policies that have
been advocated in the literature on optimal law enforcement. The type
of policy that we consider here is one where the reporting subject gets
rewarded by an amount equal to the fine paid by its rival.19 Tables 7.9 and
7.10 compare the effects on deterrence and on price levels of introducing
such reward schemes.
Result 7 (Ex post deterrence) Cartels are systematically reported in the
Reward treatment.
This result is corroborated by Table 6 showing that the rate of detec-
tion due to reporting is almost equal to one in the Reward treatment. In
fact, a simple inspection of the data in the Reward treatment reveals that
almost every time a cartel was formed, at least one of the subjects reported
it: out of the 120 times a cartel was formed, the cartel was reported
during the first period in 118 cases. In one of the remaining cases, it was
reported in the subsequent period, while there was only a single duopoly
in which the players resisted the temptation of reporting and managed
to sustain the collusive agreement for 7 consecutive periods. This cartel
ended because a re-matching took place.
There are two potential explanations to this phenomenon. First the
subjects could in principle exploit the reward system by taking turns
in reporting and cashing in the reward. The second hypothesis, first
proposed by Apesteguja et al, is that subjects form a cartel with the hope
of fooling their competitor by undercutting the agreed-upon price and
by reporting the cartel in order to cash in the reward. The next result
confirms this latter hypothesis.
Result 8 (Cartel stability) The antitrust policy with rewards significantly
reduces cartel stability.
19Korea is the only country we are aware of that adopts this kind of reward schemes
for whistleblowers in antitrust; analogous schemes are however used in other fields of law
enforcement, particularly in the US.
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Table 7.9: Deterrence effects
Antitrust Reward Leniency
Rate of
communication
decision
0.566 >∗∗∗ 0.484 >∗∗∗ 0.377
Rate of cartel
formation 0.315 >
∗∗∗ 0.220 ≈ 0.178
Rate of individual
deviation 0.424 <
∗∗∗ 0.781 >∗∗∗ 0.373
Rate of detection 0.092 <∗∗∗ 0.937 >∗∗∗ 0.507
This result is reflected by the fact that the rate of individual deviation
increased substantially in the Reward treatment. Note also that at least
one subject undercut the agreed upon price in 111 out of the 118 cartels
that only lasted one period.
Table 6 also suggests that the antitrust policy with rewards is not
more efficient in deterring cartels ex ante than the traditional policies.
Indeed the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation in
the REWARD treatment are not significantly different from corresponding
rates in the ANTITRUST and LENIENCY treatments. Nevertheless:
Result 9 (Ex ante deterrence) The antitrust policy with reward strongly
deters explicit cartel formation, the more the longer subjects play.
Result 7 is explained by the fact that the subjects eventually learned
that it was not possible to form cartels for the purpose of cashing in
the reward and, as a result, the number of formed cartels was reduced
drastically. This appears clearly in Figure 7.5 showing that the number of
cartels formed were reduced as subjects were re-matched.
Result 10 (Prices) The antitrust policy with rewards strongly reduces
both prices in explicit cartels and subjects’ ability to collude tacitly.
The systematic reports when subjects took part in cartels probably
undermined trust among the subjects and, as a result, also prices dropped
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Figure 7.5: Rates of cartel formation and communication attempts in the four
matches of the Reward treatment.
Table 7.10: Price levels
Antitrust Reward Leniency
Average price 5.348 ≈ 3.975 ≈ 4.844
Price within cartels 6.144 >∗∗ 5.339 <∗∗∗ 7.024
Agreed upon price 8.242 ≈ 8.512 ≈ 8.218
Price without
communication 3.890 ≈ 3.565 ≈ 4.013
(though not significantly) in the Reward treatment. This is most striking
in Table 3 where all measures of prices are the lowest in the Reward
treatment. In particular, prices also dropped when subjects did not
communicate. Thus prices were not only low because cartels were
deterred from forming, giving further support for the claim that the
systematic reports undermined trust. Rewarding whistleblowers appears
therefore the only antitrust policy able to reduce price and increase
welfare in our experimental set up.
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Also, note that we designed the reward scheme in such a way that
it could be exploited by cartel members: the scheme is such that if
cartel members took turns in self-reporting and cashing the reward, the
expected fine would be zero (Spagnolo 2004 [98], 2008 [99] makes it clear
that - for this reason - in reality the whistleblower’s reward should always
be strictly smaller than the sum of fines paid by the other wrongdoers, so
that there exist no possibility to manipulate/exploit the scheme). Still,
none of our subject appear to have realized this opportunity, a result
that confirm that some legal scholar’s claims that reward schemes could
be manipulated are unfounded empirically, besides being incorrect the-
oretically when the scheme is appropriately designed (by an economist).
The result is consistent with Dal Bo’s (2005) [29] finding that asymmetric
(alternating) actions cooperative equilibria in the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma are never played by experimental agents even when they are
way more efficient than standard, stationary cooperative equilibria.
In theory, and contrary to any previous result in the economic liter-
ature on law enforcement, it is possible to achieve the first best of full
deterrence with finite fines and no inspection probability using reward
schemes (Spagnolo, 2000 [96], 2004 [98]). To verify this we ran a further
treatment REWLOW, identical to REWARD but for the probability of
detection that we set at zero (α = 0). The results showed that some agents
still need to try a couple of times to induce others to form a cartel just to
report and cash the bonus. After a couple of attempts they learn that
with the whistleblower reward scheme everybody reports immediately
once a cartel forms, so that entering a cartel is never profitable, and
cartels disappear. The first best is therefore only achieved in asymptotic
form. Indeed, after enough learning our agents appear to converge to
the first best. We also run a second treatment REWHIGH, exactly equal
to REWLOW but for the fine, which was higher (F = 1000). In this
last treatment we observed a further increase in deterrence (the rate
of communication attempts dropped to 25.9%, and the rate of cartel
formation was 7.8%). Yet, full deterrence was not achieved even in
this treatment, because at least some of the players still tried to form a
cartel and to fool their opponent by deviating from the agreement and
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simultaneously reporting it.
As a final remark we stress that that the results of our treatments with
rewards forcefully confirm the importance of learning in experimental
settings with complicated/realistic games if we compare to those of
Apesteguja et al. (2006) [2]. In particular, the results show that the
preliminary and strange conclusion by Apesteguja et al. (2006) [2] - that
Rewards are not more effective than Leniency - was premature and due
to the subjects’ inability to learn in that set up, as these authors already
conjectured.
7.4.4 Culture, Trust and Antitrust
We run our experiments in Stockholm and in Rome, two towns with
quite distinct cultures. It is not obvious that one or the other culture
should lead to more cartels given the legal framework, as our experiment
was framed, cartel formation was presented as illegal, and Swedes are
thought to be more law abiding than Italians. This would point at Italians
colluding more. On the other hand, if one reads the World Values Survey
(1999), finds other important differences between Sweden and Italy that
may point in a different direction. In particular, here are two relevant
questions with relative answers:
(i)”Give authorities information to help justice”: Strongly agree
[Italy: 40.2% vs. Sweden: 26%]
(ii) ”Most people can be trusted” [Italy: 31.8% vs. Sweden: 63.7%]
The difference in the answers to the first question suggests that
leniency programs could be more effective in Italy. The difference in the
answers to the second question suggest that Swedes are more confident
in the cooperation of partners, so that they are more likely to coordinate
on collusive/cooperative equilibria.
Separating treatments according to location we found results con-
sistent with the differences in answers to the World Value Surveys:
Swedes collude more often, coordinate on higher prices, and deviates
much less often than Italians. In all treatments prices lower and cartels
less frequent in Italy than in Sweden, and defection and applications to
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leniency are muchmore frequent in Italy. According to our results, nordic
countries may be in more need of antitrust enforcement because of their
’cooperative’ culture than southern ones.
7.5 Conclusions
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the
effects of fines, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistle-
blowers on firms’ decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on
their price choices. We consider an experiment in which subjects play a
repeated Bertrand price game with differentiated goods, running several
treatments different in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of
fine, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a fine), the existence
of a reward for reporting, the option to communicate, and cartel leaders
access to leniency. We find that fines following successful investigations
but without leniency have a deterrence effect (reduce the number of
cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive effect (increase collusive prices
in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more efficient
than standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they do
deter a significantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they
induce even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing
average market price higher than without antitrust enforcement. With
rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported,
which completely disrupts subjects’ ability to form cartels and sustain
high prices. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program the
deterrence effect of leniency does not increasewhile prices are higher than
otherwise. As for tacit collusion, we find that under standard anti-trust
enforcement or leniency programs, subjects who do not communicate
(do not go for explicit cartels) choose weakly higher prices than where
there is no anti-trust enforcement. We also analyze and post-conviction
behavior, finding that after convictions caused by a report under the
leniency program much fewer cartels form and prices are lower than
when conviction takes place under standard antitrust policies without
leniency. Finally, we find a strong cultural effect in the deterrence power
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of the various law enforcement regime when comparing treatments in
Stockholm and Rome.
Our results have policy implications for general deterrence of orga-
nized crime similar to cartels, and as a test for the theoretical results
mentioned in Section 2 (the protection from fines effect, the reward effect,
the reporting as a threat and tacit collusion). Our results have only
marginal implications for most of the many other theoretical papers,
including cornerstone contributions to this literature.
For example, Motta and Polo (2003) [76], the first economic analysis on
leniency programs, focuses mainly on the effects of the second part of the
leniency programs opened to firms already under prosecution. The only
implication of our experimental results for that paper is that they do not
support its two policy conclusions that (i) to have deterrence effects leni-
ency programs must be opened to firms already under investigation (in
our experiment they aren’t), and that (ii) introducing a leniency program
is a second best choice relative to standard antitrust law enforcement if
there is a large enough budget. Analogous, Harrington (forthcoming) [45]
does not consider general deterrence but focuses on desistance effects,
i.e. the ability of law enforcement mechanism to shorten the duration
of cartels that were not deterred by the mechanism. It also introduces
a stochastic movement in a law enforcement parameters to generate
equilibrium applications of cartel members to the leniency schemes. The
only implication of our experimental results for that paper is that our real
world agents did form cartels and then apply for leniency in our fully
deterministic, stationary oligopolistic environment. This suggests that
deterministic theoretical analyses are perfectly OK, they are not at odd
with the evidence that people form cartels and then report them.
Aubert et al. (2006) [4] do focus on the first part of leniency programs,
on general deterrence and on rewards, but their contribution is about the
costs and benefits of providing leniency and rewards to the individual
employees of colluding firms. In our experiment we only have single
decision makers, so we have no evidence relevant to that issue. This
sounds, however, as an exciting topic for future experimental work.
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Chapter 8
Risk Aversion, Prospect
Theory, and Strategic Risk
in Law Enforcement1
joint with Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloe´ Le Coq and Giancarlo
Spagnolo
8.1 Introduction
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the
effects of fines and of leniency programs on firms’ decision to form cartels
(cartel deterrence). We consider an experiment in which subjects play a
repeated Bertrand price game with differentiated goods, running several
treatments, which differ in the probability of cartels being caught, in the
level of fine and the possibility of self-reporting and getting leniency.
1Many thanks to Magnus Johannesson for discussions and advice related to this project,
and to audiences in Rome (World ESA Meeting 2007) and in Gothenburg (Second Nordic
Workshop in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2007). We also gratefully acknowl-
edge research funding from Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority) that
made this research possible.
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Leniency policies, or programs, grant full or partial reductions of
the sanctions to firms that report hard information about their cartel
to the Antitrust Authority and cooperate with it along the prosecution
phase, helping to convict their former partners. These policies have
been introduced in most OECD countries and have become the main
tool for cartel discovery and prosecution; their validity and effectiveness,
though, is hard to asses since in fact the number of undetected cartels
is not observable. Therefore, it is only possible to compare the number
of detected cartels with and without leniency programs, but not the total
number of existing cartels, meaning that in principle an observed increase
in convicted cartels could even be due to an increase in cartel activity. For
this reason, we think that an experimental approach is needed to collect
more evidence about leniency’s effects.
The results presented in this paper appear to be also relevant to the
analysis of many other forms of multi-agent organized crime – corrup-
tion, auditor-manager collusion, corporate crime in general – which share
with cartels some crucial features that well designed law enforcement
programs may exploit 2. A first important characteristic of these category
of crimes is that cooperation among several agents is required to perform
the illegal activity, so that free riding, “hold-up”, and “moral hazard”
issues become relevant. Moreover, the criminal activity takes the form
of an ongoing relation, meaning that the membership of the criminal
organization produces flows of present and expected future benefits
and damages, instead of isolated gains or losses. Finally, cooperating
wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up having information on
each others’ misbehavior that could be reported to third parties, which is
the main characteristic that could be exploited by leniency programs.
In this paper we don’t only investigate if, but also how leniency
programs work. In particular, we try to figure out which are the
determinants of deterrence.
From a theoretical point of view, there are three conditions that have to
be satisfied for a cartel to be formed. First, the individual incentive to
commit the crime must be strong enough, which means that the expected
2Spagnolo (2004) [98]
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utility it provides overcomes the expected disutility from the uncertain
punishment. Second, the incentive compatibility constraint must be
satisfied; so the long run gains from sticking to the collusive agreement
must be higher than the short run gains from deviation plus its long run
negative consequences. Third, the level of trust among cartel’s members
must be high enough: indeed we claim that the stability of a cartel does
not only depend on each member’s incentives to deviate, but also on the
perceived risk of being cheated upon by other members, or strategic risk,
which increases as trust among cartel’s members decrease, and also as
the “sucker’s” payoff worsen. Strategic risk also affects cartelists’ ability
to coordinate on the joint profit maximizing equilibrium. Indeed, if the
level of perceived risk associated to it is too high, then they could select a
different equilibrium, with lower incentives to deviate or better outcomes
for the cheated upon players in case a deviation takes place.
According to these considerations, the perceived risk of detection and
trust – intended as the perceived risk of being cheated upon – are two
important drivers of individuals’ proclivity to collusion. In our study,
we analyze how different legal frameworks impact on these two types of
risk. In doing this, we also keep into consideration the many findings in
psychology and in behavioral and experimental economics which show
that the way people react to probabilities attached to risky outcomes
departs in many ways from the standard model of full rationality.
Our main results are that (i) deterrence is generally higher when
leniency is granted to the whistleblowers,(ii) a negative relation emerges
between the sum of the fines paid and participants’ willingness to
cooperate, and (iii) communication rates drop after conviction. Our
analysis shows that strategic risk and availability heuristic are among
the main drivers of these three outcomes, even if they are generally
disregarded in the traditional approach to the study of law enforcement.
In particular, strategic risk is determinative both in explaining deterrence
under Leniency treatments, and in justifying the drop in communication
rates after detection when a deviation took place. Availability heuristic
and the salience of fines, on the other hand, are the most plausible reasons
why players willingness to communicate decreases after detection even
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if no deviation has previously taken place, as a fresh memory of the
punishment increases the perceived probability of detection. These
behavioral biases also seem to motivate the negative effect exerted by the
sum of the fines paid on participants’ willingness to cooperate.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the literature related
with crime deterrence and with the behavioral effects that might affect
it. The experimental design and procedure are described in Section
3. Section 4 reports the results and explain the empirical methodology
adopted to analyze our data, and Section 5 concludes, also mentioning
possible perspectives for further research.
8.2 Related Literature
8.2.1 Rational agents
Individual benefits and costs from criminal activities. Public enforce-
ment of law is a widely investigated subject since 1968, when Gary Becker
[9] published an article which was to become one of the cornerstones of
economic analysis of law.
Under Becker’s approach, then followed by many scholars such as Polin-
sky and Shavell [83], individuals are fully rational utility maximizers, and
so are offenders. It is assumed that
a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other re-
sources at other activities. Some persons become “criminals”,
therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that
of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.
According to this approach, the number of offenses committed by a
person can be related, by means of a function, to the probability of
conviction, to the punishment imposed in case of detection and to
the gains associated with the illegal activity: in practice, the potential
offender will commit a crime only if the expected utility attached to the
crime’s outcome exceeds the expected (dis)utility of the possible sanction.
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Organized Crime. As noticed by Spagnolo (2004) [98] and by Motta
and Polo (2003) [76], when we consider organized crime as opposed to
individual crime, the balance between private benefits and costs from
the offense cannot be the only determinant of the decision to commit
it. Spagnolo states that “criminal organizations suffer of an intrinsic
‘governance problem’ since to curb moral hazard and ensure internal
cooperation they cannot rely on explicit contracts enforced by the legal
system. For this reason, many forms of organized crime must take
the form of – or be conducted within – long-term dynamic criminal
relationships”. Such relationships can be modeled as repeated Prisoner’s
dilemma like games, in which each player is always tempted to “take the
money and run”, and does not do that as long as the expected long run
gains from sticking to the illegal agreement overcome the short run gains
from defection plus the long run consequences that might result from it.
It is precisely on this balance that Leniency programs exert their deterrent
effect: in absence of leniency, reporting the crime to the authority is
always a dominated action, while with a Leniency Program agents may
in fact find it convenient to report when they deviate from the criminal
agreement, which can make defection more desirable than adherence to
the illegal organization.
Strategic risk According to the prevailing theory, an individual’s de-
cision to cooperate – i.e. to take part in a criminal agreement – is
determined by the trade off between the consequences he expects from
sticking to the agreement and the anticipated outcome from deviation,
but not by the consequences possibly yielded by a deviation by some
other member of the agreement.
In a recent paper Blonski and Spagnolo [11] critique this approach,
suggesting that
real world agents do care about what would happen if other
agents defected from the agreed strategy profile, and that
these considerations should not be left out of our models.
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They formalize the consequences of a variation in the sucker’s payoff in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and argue that a decrease in the cheated upon
player’s payoff increase the “strategic risk” associated with playing coop-
eratively, reducing the sustainability of cooperative equilibria in the long
run. To sketch the idea of strategic risk, consider an infinitely repeated
PD game, whose stage game is represented in table 8.1: According to the
C D
C r s
D t p
Table 8.1: Prisoner’s dilemma
standard approach, the discounting factor required to sustain collusion
must be higher than a threshold value δ, identified by the constraint:
r
1− δ ≥ t+ δ
p
1− δ
which can be rearranged as
δ
r − p
1− δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
LR inc. to coop.
≥ t− r︸︷︷︸
SR inc. to def.
.
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the long-run in-
centive to cooperate, and the right-hand side stands for the short-run
incentive to deviate.
Strategic risk approach suggests that also the short run disincentive to
cooperate (p − s) matters, so the appropriate threshold value for the
discount factor is δ∗ > δ, determined by:
δ
r − p
1− δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
LR inc. to coop.
≥ t− r + p− s︸ ︷︷ ︸
total SR inc. to def.
Bolnski and Spagnolo’s theoretical hypothesis has found some support
in the experimental evidence recently provided by Dal Bo´ and Frechette
[30], who study how the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated
prisoners dilemmas is affected by changes in the difference between the
reward from cooperation and the sucker’s payoff.
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8.2.2 Behavioral Law and Economics
Themodels mentioned above proceedwith the hypotheses of neoclassical
economics, assuming individuals to be perfectly rational expected utility
maximizers. Empirical evidence collected by psychologists and by exper-
imental economists, though, casts some doubts about these assumptions:
people’s behavior has been proved to violate the classical paradigm of
homo oeconomicus in many ways. More specifically, according to Jolls,
Sustein and Thaler (1998) [65], human behavior departs from the standard
conception of homo oeconomicus under three main respects: they state that
people display
• bounded rationality, in that they suffer from certain biases – such as
overoptimism, mis-perception of probabilities or self serving biases
– and they adopt heuristics that lead to mistakes;
• bounded will power, which sometimes reflects into myopic behav-
ior;
• bounded self interest, meaning that they care for other people’s well
being.
In light of these findings, the authors suggest that models of economic
analysis of law that do not keep this factors into account may lead to erro-
neous conclusions, therefore they develop and propose a new approach
to this branch of studies, “informed by a more accurate conception of
choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human behavior and
its wellsprings.”
Since their seminal article, Behavioral Law and Economics has developed
and has been applied to several specific topics in economic analysis of
law (Jolls 2007, [64], and Garoupa 2003 [41] for a critical review).
In what follows, we will focus only on one aspect of bounded rationality:
in particular we will consider how a biased perception of risk may affect
law enforcement.
Risk attitude Of the various behavioral aspect that might affect law
enforcement, risk attitude and risk perception are among the most im-
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portant ones. Indeed, the effects of risk aversion were already mentioned
by Becker (1968) [9], who argues that, if players were risk neutral it
would be possible to minimize the costs of apprehension and conviction
by lowering the probability of detection arbitrarily close to zero while
rising the severity of the punishment, and states that this should be
a fortiori true if offenders were risk avoiders. Notice that this is not
only a theoretical matter, but it has strong policy implications which are
currently under debate within the Competition Authority of a European
country.
Considerations about agents’ risk attitude are generally well integrated
into the traditional approach to economic analysis of law 3. But other
aspects seem to be important too.
Heuristics and biases. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) [67] already
observed that the way people react to probabilities attached to risky
outcomes departs in many ways from the basic tenets of expected utility
theory: they notice for example that individuals tend to overweight
outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are
merely probable (certainty effect); they also observe that agents round
probabilities or outcomes in order to simplify the analysis of risky
prospects, and that “a particularly important form of simplification
involves the discarding of extremely unlikely outcomes.” On the other
hand, they also suggest that low probabilities are overweighted, meaning
that people overreact to rare events but may underreact to common
ones. The interplay of the two last mentioned effects implies that
“highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the
difference between high probability and certainty is either neglected or
exaggerated.” This consideration clearly plays a role for the analysis of
optimal law enforcement: indeed, if a very small probability of liability is
approximated to zero, then Becker’s argument claiming that it is possible
to reduce prosecution costs without affecting deterrence, by lowering
the probability of detection and harshening the penalties, does not hold
anymore.
3see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) [83]
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The weight attached by individuals to the risk of conviction may
be also affected by another behavioral bias: the salience effect. As
highlighted by Akerlof (1998) [1], outstanding events and vivid informa-
tion may exert undue influence on decisions: he refers to this principle
to explain time inconsistent decisions – arguing that present costs and
benefits are salient if compared to future ones – and to provide a possible
reason for the “undue” obedience to authority – which can emerge when
disobedience is perceived as more salient than compliance because it
implies a deviation from the status quo or from a previous course of
actions, and when some degree of disutility is attached disobedience.
Similarly, one could argue that an exacerbation of punishments may
increase deterrence since extremely harsh penalties are more salient, than
overweighted.
A close but different behavioral effect concerning probability perception,
foregrounded by Tversky and Kahneman (1982) [66], is “availability
heuristic”: a mechanism by which occurrences of events associated
with extremely high utilities or disutilities are perceived as being more
frequent than they actually are. The main difference between availability
heuristic and salience is that according to the first one risk perception is
driven by memory-dependent mechanisms, while the second one states
that attention is guided by the most vivid present stimuli.
Availability heuristic has been tested and confirmed by Folkes (1988)’s
studies on the risk perceived by consumers when purchasing a product
[37], and by a recent study by Keller et al. (2006) [69] on perception of
flood risk, which testifies that past experience of flooding increases risk
perception independent on the information exogenously provided about
this risk. This piece of evidence supports the hypothesis that people
who experienced past flooding events and have of them images that are
tagged with affect perceive the same probability information differently
from people without such memories.
Availability heuristic and salience can be interpreted as a result of the
interplay of two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend
risk: “risk as analysis and risk as feelings” (Slovic et al., 2004 [95]), the first
one being based on the brain “analytical system” – which encodes reality
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in abstract and symbolic terms, builds logical connections between events
and requires logical or empirical justification for actions – the second
one being related to the “experiential system” – which on the contrary
is associated with the experience of affects, motivate actions on the basis
of the emotional memory of related events and encodes reality in concrete
images, metaphors and narratives. The authors suggest that availability
heuristic may work because images and events that are tagged with affect
are more easily recalled or imagined. Events that are more sensational
or salient are also more affectively charged, which might explain the
overestimation of their frequency or probability, both ex ante, before they
are actually experienced by the subjects, and ex post, when individuals
have memories associated with these events.
Empirical evidence As we have just seen, there are many psychological
effects that might affect law enforcement through the way people per-
ceive the risk of being liable. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, the empir-
ical and experimental evidence collected to test the different theoretical
predictions in the specific context of crime deterrence is not very rich.
Levitt performed some interesting field studies about the actual relation
between punishment and deterrence, also keeping into account possible
bias like criminals’ myopia or overoptimism (Levitt, 1998 [72]), but
experimental approach seems to be more suitable to analyze psycho-
logical motives behind peoples responses to legal sanctions. In this
second field of research, we should mention a study performed by
Cason and Gangadharan (2006) [22], who experimentally analyze a
model of compliance developed by Harrington (1988) [46] in which the
enforcement agency modifies the inspection frequency and severities of
the penalties depending on the firms past compliance. They find that
violation rate does not change as sharply as predicted by the model when
the probability of detection and size of the fine change, and show that the
observed behavior might be captured by a quantal choice model, which
accounts for boundedly rational decisionmaking by allowing individuals
to make errors, assuming though that errors that are more costly are also
less probable.
163
A second experimental work testing predictions of behavioral economics
in the context of law enforcement has been carried on by Jaquemet et al.
(in press) [56], who study the role of optimism bias on the monitoring
of illegal activities. They show that subjects exhibit a strong tendency
to under-evaluate their own likelihood of experiencing an unfavorable
event as compared to the one of others, which leads to a lower level of
deterrence.
A third empirical work on punishment and deterrence has been recently
presented by Fishman and Pope (2006) [36]: they study punishment
induced deterrence, i.e. “the subsequent deterrent effect [...] that actually
experiencing punishment for a crime has on the specific individual who
was punished, conditioning for changes in expected benefits and costs
of future criminal activity”. Using field data from the movie-rental
market, they explore the effect of having to pay a late fee on costumers’
movie-rental and movie-return decisions, and show that:(i) experiencing
punishment decreases the offender’s crime rate (in the short run); (ii)
salience (size and temporal proximity) of punishment is positively related
with deterrence and (iii) the effect does not vanish with experience.
Their results confirm that the experience of a penalty affects the weight
individuals attach to punishment when they have to decide whether to
comply or not to a prescription, an effect that to us could be attribute to
the aforementioned availability heuristic.
Organized Crime and Trust. Assessing and evaluating the risk of
liability is an important problem for every potential offender, regardless
the nature of his crime. When we focus on organized crime, though,
another significant element has to be taken into account, namely trust
between members of the “criminal organization”. Reciprocal trust is
important for two reasons: first, as mentioned before, organized crime
can be modeled as a repeated prisoner’s dilemma like situation, in which
each player will choose to stick to the criminal agreement only if he has a
strong enough belief that the other will do the same. Second, cooperating
wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up having information on
each others’ misbehavior that could be reported to third parties, and each
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of the members of the organization has to be sufficiently confident that
this will not happen.
Behavioral and experimental economics offer a rich literature about
trust; for sake of conciseness, we cannot mention it all, and we will
only cite one recent paper by Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007) [89],
whose results are particularly interesting to us. They study a standard
trust game and, among other things, they find that a trusting behavior is
determined by three main factors: beliefs about others trustworthiness,
risk aversion and other regarding preferences. Considerations about the
third element are outside the scope of our work, while the first two
factors play a crucial role for the analysis of organized crime. The relation
between risk aversion and trust reveals that offenders’ risk attitudes affect
deterrence not only via the risk of liability, but also because of the risk of
betrayal on behalf of some other member of the criminal organization;
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness, on the other hand, appears to be
even more important in repeated prisoner’s dilemma like games that
they are in one shot trust games, since they affect the level of perceived
strategic risk, modifying the critical discount factor required to sustain
the illegal agreement.
8.3 Experimental Design
In our experiment, each subject represented a firm and played in anony-
mous two-persons group a repeated duopoly game. In every stage game,
the subjects had to take three types of decisions. First, the subjects had to
choose whether or not they wanted to form a cartel by discussing prices.
Second, they had to choose a price in a discrete Bertrand price game with
differentiated goods. Third, the subjects could choose to self report cartels
to a competition authority. The attractiveness of this latter opportunity
depended on the details of the antitrust law enforcement institution - the
treatment variables of our experiment.
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8.3.1 The Bertrand game
In each period, the subjects had to choose a price from the choice set
{0, 1, ..., 11, 12}. Their payoff depended on their own price choice and
on the price chosen by their competitor and were reported in a payoff
table distributed to the subjects. This table indicated a subjects’ profits
depending on its own price choice and the price chosen by its competitor
(see figure 8.1) and was derived from the following standard linear
Bertrand game. (The details of the Bertrand game were not described
to the subjects.)
Figure 8.1: Payoff table
The demand function for each firm iwas given by:
qi(pi, pj) =
a
1 + γ
− 1
1− γ2 pi +
γ
1− γ2 pj
where pi (pj) is the price chosen by firm i (competitor j), a is a parameter
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accounting for the market size and γ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the degree of
substitutability between the two firms’ products. Each firm faced a
constant marginal cost, c, and had no fixed costs. The profit function,
pii(pi, pj), was thus given by
pii(pi, pj) = (pi − c)qi.
In our experimental setup, we chose a = 36, c = 0 and γ = 4/5 and
restricted the subjects’ choice set to {0, 2, ..., 22, 24}. These parameters
yield the payoff table distributed to each subject. To simplify the table we
also relabeled each price by dividing it by 2 and rounded the payoffs to
the closest integer. In the unique Bertrand equilibrium, both firms charge
a price equal to 3 yielding per firm profits of 100. The monopoly price
(charged by both firms) is 9, yielding profits of 180. Note also that a firm
would earn 296 by unilaterally and optimally undercutting the monopoly
price, i.e. by charging a price of 7. In this case the other (cheated upon)
firm only earns a profit of 20. Similarly, there are gains from deviating
unilaterally from other common prices than the monopoly price as well
as associated losses for the cheated upon firm; in the range of prices
in between the Bertrand price and the monopoly price, ie in the range
{4, ..., 8}, these gains and losses are smaller than when a subject deviates
unilaterally from the monopoly price.
8.3.2 Cartel formation
Throughout the experiment, the subjects could form cartels by discussing
prices. At the beginning of every period, a communication window
opened if and only if both subjects agreed to communicate. This commu-
nication stage, which is described in more detail below, was designed in
such a way that it would result in a common price on which to cooperate.
This agreed upon price was non-binding, however, and therefore each
subject could cheat on the agreement by subsequently charging a price
different from the agreed upon price.
Whenever two subjects chose to communicate, they were considered
to have formed a cartel. In this case, the subjects risked to be fined as long
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as their cartel was not detected by the competition authority. This implied
that two subjects could be fined in a period even if no communication
took place in that specific period; for example, two subjects could be fined
in a period in which they did not communicate if they communicated
in the previous period and the competition authority did not detect the
associated cartel in that period. Once a cartel was detected, however, it
was considered to be dismantled and in subsequent periods, the former
cartelists did not run any risk of being fined unless they communicated
again.
8.3.3 Treatment variables
Whenever two subjects had formed a cartel, a competition authority
could detect the cartel and convict its members for price fixing. Detection
could happen in two ways. First, in every period, the competition
authority detected cartels with an exogenous probability, α. If this
happened, both cartel members had to pay an exogenous fine, F . Second,
the cartel members could self-report the cartel, in which case the cartel
members were convicted for price fixing with certainty. If this happened,
the size of the fine depended on the details of the law enforcement
institution.
We ran nine treatments of our game, adopting a between subjects
design, so that every subject only played the game under a single
treatment. The nine treatments differ in the specific type of antitrust law
adopted (with or without leniency for those who report the cartel), in
the probability of detection and in the size of the fine imposed to the
detected cartels’ members. The differences between the treatments are
summarized in table 8.2.
Antitrust Policy. Our baseline treatment corresponds to a laisser faire
regime and is denoted COMMUNICATION: in this treatment, α = F = 0
so that forming a cartel by discussing prices is legal. To simplify the
instructions and to eliminate irrelevant alternatives, subjects were not
allowed to report cartels. In the five other treatments cartel memberswere
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allowed to report cartels in which they participated. The ANTITRUST
treatments corresponds to traditional antitrust laws without any leniency
program: in case a report took place, both cartel members (including
the reporting one) had to pay the full fine F . The LENIENCY treatments
corresponds to current antitrust laws embeddedwith a leniency program:
in case the cartel was reported by one of the cartel members only, the
reporting member paid no fine while the other one paid the full fine, F ;
if instead both cartel members reported the cartel simultaneously, both
paid a reduced fine equal to F/2. Note that under Leniency treatments a
player who decides to deviate from the agreement is always better off if
he simultaneously reports the cartel. So, in principle, the introduction of
Leniency Programs should tighten the incentive compatibility constraint,
since deviating becomes less risky, thus more attractive. Leniency should
also harshen strategic risk, because the cheated upon firm not only suffers
for the exploitation, but also has to pay the fine for sure.
Probability of Detection and Size of the Fine We also vary the proba-
bility of detection and the size of the fine across treatments: in particular,
per each of the two considered antitrust policies, we have two treatments
with an expected fine of 20 – one with a high probability of detection
(α = 0.10) and a low fine (F = 200), the other in which, vice versa, the
probability of detection is low (α = 0.02) and the fine is high (F = 1000)
– and one treatment in which the expected fine is higher: α = 0.2 and
F = 300.
A different mix of magnitude and probability of the fine affects the
riskiness of the collusive outcomes, but, as discussed above, it is not
obvious what kind of effect this could generate in terms of deterrence. For
example, if agents are perfectly rational and risk neutral, and they do not
react to strategic risk, their preferences should be onlymarginally affected
by a change in the determinants of the fine which leaves the expected
fine constant. Such a change, in fact, has no impact on the expected
collusive profits and has at most a marginal effect on the profitability of
a deviation from collusion. As suggested by Becker, if on the contrary
agents are risk averse we should observe higher deterrence when the
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size of the fine is higher and the probability lower, whether leniency
programs are present or not. In addition, under Leniency Programs an
increase of the magnitude of the fine dramatically reduces the profit a
firms obtains when “cheated upon”, that is when their opponent deviates
from the collusive agreement. As mentioned above, these profits play
no role in the standard theory, since they do not affect the conditions
for an agreement being supportable in equilibrium, but they do matter
for strategic risk, because they enter the definition of the short run
disincentive to cooperate. Moreover, all the behavioral biases affecting
risk perception we enumerated above might play a role in determining
the outcome of such changes in the components of the expected fine.
The experiment we present here was not specifically designed to test any
of these theoretical predictions, but to investigate the effects of different
legal settings in light of them. With the same exploratory aim, we
designed two additional treatments –one with Leniency, one without it
– in which the fine is high (F = 1000), but can be inflicted only in case
of reporting because the probability of detection is set to be null (α = 0):
that is, the antitrust authority is not able to discover any cartel that is
not reported by at least one of its members. Comparing the results of
these treatments with those we get from the corresponding treatments
where the size of the fine is the same (F = 1000) but the probability of
detection is positive (α = 0.02), we can study if a very small probability
of detection is overweighted or underestimated, and we can also check
for the role played by strategic risk in this setting. Indeed, if strategic risk
did not affect players’ decision, we should not observe any deterrence in
the treatment with α = 0.
8.3.4 Experiment’s timing and rematching procedure
At the end of each period, subjects were rematched with the same
competitor with a probability of 85%. With the remaining probability
of 15%, all subjects were randomly matched into new pairs. When this
happened, cartels formed within the previous match could not be fined
anymore. The experiment lasted at least 20 rounds. From the 21st round
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on, we introduced a termination probability of 15%, while the probability
of rematching was reduced to 0. Subjects were also informed that the
game would have been stopped in case the experiment lasted for more
than 2 hours and 30 minutes. This latter eventuality never took place.
This re-matching procedure had several advantages. First, the subjects
were playing truly infinitely repeated games without problems associated
with end effects. Second, each subject played several repeated games
against different competitors, which allowed us to observe the subjects’
behavior in a larger number of repeated games.
Before the experiment started, the subjects were paired with the same
competitor for five practice periods. Participants were informed that dur-
ing these practice periods, they were paired with different competitors
than those that they faced in the first period of the ‘true’ (i.e. remuner-
ated) experiment. They were also told that profits realized during the
trial periods were not to affect their earnings from the experiment.
8.3.5 The timing of the stage game
In the ANTITRUST and LENIENCY treatments, a stage game consisted of 7
steps (see figure 8.2). In the COMMUNICATION treatment steps 4,5 and 6
were skipped.
Figure 8.2: Stage game
We will now describe more in details each single step.
Step 1: Communication decision. Each subject was asked whether or
not he wished to communicate with his competitor. If both subjects
pushed on the yes button within 15 seconds, the game proceeded to step
2. Otherwise the two subjects had to wait for an additional 30 seconds
before pricing decisions were taken in Step 3. In all periods, subjects were
also informed whether they were matched with the same opponent as in
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the previous round or if a re-match had taken place.
Step 2: Communication. If both subjects decided to communicate in
step 1, a window appeared on their computer screen asking them to
simultaneously state a minimum acceptable price in the range {0, ..., 12}.
When both of them had chosen a price, they entered a second round of
price negotiations, in which they could choose a price from the new range
{pmin, ..., 12}, where pmin was defined as the minimum among the two
prices selected in the previous negotiation round. This procedure went
on until 30 seconds had passed. The resulting minimum price pmin was
referred to as the agreed upon price.
Step 3: Pricing. Each subject had to choose his price from the choice set
{0, ..., 12}. Possible price agreements reached in step 2 were not binding.
The subjects were informed that if they failed to choose a price within
30 seconds, then their default price would be so high that their profits
became 0.
Step 4: First Reporting Decision. If communication took place in the
current period or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been
discovered by the competition authority, subjects had a first opportunity
to report the cartel.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision. Subjects were
informed about the prices set by their opponent, their own profits and the
profits of their competitor, gross of the possible fine. If communication
had taken place in the current period or in one of the previous periods
and had not not yet discovered by the competition authority and nobody
had reported it in step 4, subjects had again the opportunity to report the
cartel. The crucial difference between this second reporting opportunity
and the first one is that the subjects knew the price chosen by their
competitors.
Step 6: Detection. If communication took place in the current period
or in one of the previous periods and had not yet been discovered or
reported in steps 4 or 5, the competition authority discovered the cartel
with probability α.
Step 7: Summary of the current period. At the end of each period, all the
relevant information about the stage game are displayed: agreed upon
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price (if any), prices chosen by the two players, possible fines and net
profits. In case players were fined, they were also told how many players
reported.
Note that with our experimental setup subjects have two opportuni-
ties to report the cartel: first at step 4, right after having set their price,
then again at step 5, after having been informed about the price chosen
by their opponent. In our design, reporting can thus be used for two
different purposes: (i) deviating subjects may report to get protection
against prosecution and (ii) cheated upon subjects may report to punish
their opponents, if they have not reported before.
8.3.6 Measuring risk aversion
We needed also a measure of risk aversion, to check for the effects it
has on subjects’ decision to communicate; due to the length of our main
game, though, we could not adopt the – now standard – ten paired
lotteries choice proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) [51], which is too time
consuming, and we chose a shorter procedure, which provided us with a
less precise but still reliable proxy.
At the end of the main game, each of the subjects was presented the
following situation: given an initial endowment of 25 Euro they were
asked to choose how much to keep and how much to invest into a risky
project, yielding a return equal to 2.5 with 50% probability, and a return
equal to 0 otherwise. After all the answers had been collected, a coin
was tossed to determine the outcome of the risky project and only one
of the subjects was randomly drawn to be paid according to his choice.
It was made clear to the subjects that their choice and earnings in this
second game could not affect in any way the profit they had made in the
previous game.
Note that the initial endowment was chosen so that the amount of
money at stake had approximately the same magnitude than the average
cumulated profit in themain game: the amount ofmoney invested should
then be a reliable proxy of the degree of risk aversion displayed by the
subjects when playing the Bertrand game.
174
8.3.7 Experimental procedure
Our experiment took place in May 2007 at Tor Vergata University (Rome,
Italy) 4. Session lasted on average 2 hours, including instructions and
payment. We ran all the eight treatments and the investment game to
check for risk attitude, involving 282 students in total. The average
payment in the main game was equal to 23.60 e, with a maximum of
34eand a minimum of 11e, while the average payout for the investment
game was 30.33e, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 62.5e.
For some of the results, we will present also data collected within the
same experimental project, in March and April 2007 at the Stockholm
School of Economics (Sweden). In Stockholm we did not run the
investment game, while the Bertrand game was exactly alike the one
we did in Rome. We ran only 5 treatments in Stockholm, namely:
Communication plus the two Leniency and two Antitrust treatments in
which the expected fine is equal to 20. 78 students were involved, in all.
The average payment in Stockholm SEK 2485, with a minimum of 130
SEK and a maximum of 330 SEK.
The experiment was computerized, and the programs were written
with z-tree [35]. At the beginning of each session, subjects werewelcomed
in the lab and seated, each in front of a computer. When all subjects
were ready, a printed version of the instructions and the profit table was
distributed to them. Instructions were read aloud to ensure common
knowledge of the rules of the game. The subjects were then asked
to read the instructions on their own and ask questions, which were
answered privately. When everybody had read the instructions and
there were nomore questions (which always happened after about fifteen
minutes), each subject was randomly matched with another subject for
the five practice rounds. After the practice rounds, participants had a last
opportunity to ask questions about the rules of the game. Again, they
were answered privately. Then they were randomly rematched into new
4Treatment Antitrust with α = 0 and F = 1000 was run in an additional session, taking
place at Tor Vergata University in December 2007. Students having taken part to previous
sessions were not admitted.
5At the time of the experiment, 1 SEK=0.109 Euro
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pairs and the real game started.
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid privately in cash.
The subjects started with an initial endowment of 1000 points in order
to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. At the end of the experiment
the subjects were paid an amount equal to their cumulated earnings
(including the initial endowment) plus a show up fee of 50 SEK in
Stockholm and 7 Euros in Rome. The conversion rates were 20 points
for 1 SEK in Stockholm and 200 points for 1 Euro in Rome.
8.4 Results
In this section, wewill first present some aggregate results: wewill briefly
analyze the data collected through the investment game, and we will
compare the average rate of communication in the different treatments.
We will then study what are the drivers of the subjects’ decision to
communicate, according to the results we got from a logit regression.
In the last part we will focus on the effects of conviction on players’
behavior, analyzing how their willingness to communicate changes after
they had got fined.
8.4.1 A proxy for risk aversion
Figure 8.3 displays the distribution of choices in the investment game: we
find that more than 20% of the players are risk neutral or risk lover, which
is in line with Holt and Laury (2002)’s findings; consistently with most
empirical and experimental findings (see Eckel and Grossman, in press
[32]) we also observe that women invested significantly less than men:
the correlation between gender and investment is 21.65%, (significant at
the 0.1%).
8.4.2 The decision to communicate under different treat-
ments
Here we present an overview of our results about how the legal frame-
work affects the individual decision of taking part in a cartel, when this
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Figure 8.3: Choice distribution in the investment game.
Table 8.3: Communication decision rates under different treatments
α F Antitrust Leniency
0.1 200 0.59 0.34
0.02 1000 0.38 0.25
0.2 300 0.45 0.43
0 1000 0.54 0.28
Communication 0.78
Data collected in Rome. 5026 observations in total.
choice is illegal and risky. Notice that in our setting, communication is
risky only when subjects are not currently cartel members, because the
decision to communicate againwhen a cartel has already been established
does not affect the probability of detection, nor the punishment imposed
in case of liability. For this reason, for Antitrust and Leniency treatments,
we restrict our attention to the attempts of communicate made by subjects
that are not alreadymembers of a cartel. Comparing the rate of communi-
cation decision observed under the six Antitrust and Leniency treatments
with those obtained in the benchmark treatment, Communication, we can
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evaluate the success of different legal frameworks in terms of ex ante
deterrence, that is the main objective of Antitrust policies. A first look
at these data leads to some preliminary observations:
• A large increment in the actual fine increases deterrence
• A large increment in the expected fine does not increase deterrence
• Given α and F , deterrence is higher under leniency
• When α = 0 deterrence does not drop under leniency, but it does
under antitrust.
To assess the significance of these results and to individuate the drivers
of the communication decision, we need to study our data more in detail,
taking into account some technical aspects of our dataset that make the
econometric analysis less straightforward, as we shall explain in next
paragraph.
8.4.3 Empirical methodology
A critical point in our analysis is how to control for repeated observations
of the same subject or the same duopoly, when testing the significance
of the observed differences across treatments. Given the rematching
procedure we adopted, we need to account for correlation between two
observations from the same individual, as well as correlation between
two observations from different individuals who belong to the same
duopoly. Moreover, since the experiment was run in two different cities,
when we pool together the data gathered in Rome and Stockholmwe also
have to control for the possible correlation among observations collected
in the same city. To this purpose, we adopted multilevel random effect
models.
Since in our experiment a subject may take part in more than one
duopoly during the game, the random effects at the subject level and at
the duopoly level are not nested, which makes it difficult to estimate a
model with a random effect at the duopoly level and a random effect at
the subject level at the same time.
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To overcome this complicacy, we hypothesized the presence of a random
effect for every subject within any particular match (which accounts for
the correlation among observations pertaining to the samematch), nested
with a random effect for every subject across different matches, which is
in turn nested with a random effect at the city level.
To analyze data collected both in Rome and in Stockholm, we adopt a
four-levels random intercept logit model of the following form:
CommDechijk = xhijkβ + η
(2)
ijk + η
(3)
jk + η
(4)
k
where h, i , j and k are indices for measurement occasions, subjects in
matches, subjects across matches and cities, respectively. CommDechijk
represents the h−th communication decision of subject j in match i, and in
city k. xhijk is a vector of explanatory variables (including the constant),
with fixed regression coefficients β; η(2)ijk represents the random intercept
for subject j in match i, and in city k (second level), η(3)jk represents the
random intercept for subject j in city k (third level) and η(4)k represents
the random intercept for city k (fourth level). Random intercepts are
assumed to be independently normally distributed, with a variance that
is estimated through our regression.
When comparing observations collected in a single city, we adopt a
model which is analogous to the previously described one, but without
the last level.
To estimate our model used GLLAMM 6, a software specifically
designed to provide a maximum likelihood framework for models with
unobserved components, such as multilevel models, certain latent vari-
able models, panel data models, or models with common factors.
8.4.4 Drivers of the decision to communicate
In this section we present the results of a logit regression we ran to
assess which are the most important factors affecting subjects’ decision to
communicate. For these results, we only consider the data we collected
in Rome, therefore we will adopt a three levels random intercept logit
6see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004 [94] and http://www.gllamm.org
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model of the form presented above. Table 8.4 presents the results of this
regression7.
Table 8.4: Results of the logit regression.
Coefficient Std. Err.
A0.1,200 -0.425 0.488
A0.02,1000 -1.890*** 0.566
A0.2,300 -1.704*** 0.500
A0,1000 -0.377 0.506
L0.1,200 -2.340*** 0.387
L0.02,1000 -3.198*** 0.529
L0.2,300 -1.764*** 0.475
L0,1000 -2.631*** 0.491
Paid fine (/1000) -1.048*** 0.216
Frequency of detection -0.073 0.598
Cumulated earning (/1000) -0.002 0.083
Investment (/25) 1.216** 0.557
Constant 0.927* 0.517
LogLikelihood -2666.716
#obs. 5398
Data collected in Rome. 5026 observations in total.
The dependent variable is the decision to communicate: as mentioned
before, since we are interested in deterrence of cartel formation, we do
not consider in this regression the decisions taken by subjects already
members of an existing cartel.
The independent variables are:
• 8 dummy variables, one for each treatment (communication is the
benchmark)
• the total fine paid by the subject up to the period in which he takes
the decision.
7Note: In this table as well as in the following results, the symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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• the frequency of detection observed by the subject, measured as
the ratio between the number of times a cartel he belonged to
was detected by the Authority (without it being reported) and the
number of periods in which the subject had taken part in a cartel.
• the subject’s cumulated earnings.
• the amount of money put into the risky asset in the “investment
game”
Note that the cumulated fine and cumulated earnings have amuch higher
magnitude than the other regressors; for this reason, we divided those
numbers by 1000, so that all the variables had approximately the same
scale. For similar reasons, the sum chosen by the subject in the investment
game enters the equation in terms of ratios of the total amount of money
available, namely 25.
The regression’s results substantially confirm our preliminary obser-
vations.
Result 1: the size of the actual fine matters. Deterrence is significantly
higher when actual fine is higher, the expected fine being the same.
According to one-sided z-tests, we have:
A0.02,1000 <
∗∗ A0.1,200 and L0.02,1000 <∗ L0.1,200
Result 2: the size of the expected fine has no direct effect on deter-
rence. A higher expected fine does not necessarily imply higher
deterrence:
A0.1,200 >
∗∗ A0.2,300 and L0.1,200 ≈ L0.2,300
but
A0.02,1000 ≈ A0.2,300 and L0.02,1000 <∗∗∗ L0.2,300
These first two results seem to confirm Becker’s suggestion that it is
possible to achieve higher deterrence while decreasing prosecution costs
by increasing the size of the fine and reducing the effort spent in
investigation.
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Result 3: deterrence is generally higher under Leniency. Only for the two
treatments with higher expected fine (α = 0.2 and F = 300) the
effect does not seem to be significant:
L0.1,200 <
∗∗∗ A0.1,200
L0.02,1000 <
∗∗ A0.02,1000
L0.2,300 ≈ A0.2,300L0,1000 <∗∗∗ A0,1000
Result 4: deterrence when α = 0. As mentioned before, according to the
standard theory we should not observe any deterrence when the
probability of detection is null. Indeed, we notice that the coefficient
for A0,1000 is not significantly different from zero. Remarkably, a
different result holds for Leniency treatments: a small probability of
detection seems to play no role in deterrence under Leniency, when
the fine is high enough:
L0.02,1000 ≈ L0,1000
Currently, some concern has been expressed about the contingency that
the many leniency applications keep the agency busy with prosecution,
to the detriment of investigation; thus, the probability that a cartel is
detected because of the autonomous investigation by the authority would
decrease (lower α.)
According to our results, this should not be a serious problem: we
observe that deterrence remains high even if α = 0, provided that the
fine is high enough.
Now we would like to examine these results in light of the theories about
players’ behavior mentioned in section 8.2, to see if and to which extent
these theories are supported by the evidence we collected.
Risk aversion. Our regression shows that subjects who chose to put
more money in the risky lottery of the investment game are also more
incline to communicate, which is in line with the ideas discussed in
section 8.2.2. There, we have seen that risk aversion can affect deterrence
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in at least two ways: first, it increases the perceived dis-utility connected
to the risk of conviction; second, it can also worsen the perceived risk
of being betrayed by the other player, in case a cartel is established. A
certain degree of risk aversion in some of the players is also a possible
reason why deterrence is higher in treatments A0.02,1000 and L0.02,1000
than in treatments A0.1,200 and L0.1,200, respectively, even if the expected
fine remains constant.
Strategic risk. We do not observe any significant difference between the
levels of deterrence under Leniency when the fine is high (F = 1000)
and the probability of detection is low or null. This fact supports the
idea that in presence of leniency programs it must be the risk of being
cheated upon by the other cartelist – i.e. strategic risk – and not the risk
of being liable that determines deterrence. In treatments Antitrust, on the
other hand, we observe that deterrence when the probability of detection
is low but positive is significantly higher than when this probability is
null. Moreover, the estimated coefficient for treatment dummy A0,1000
is not significantly different from zero. This is not in contrast with the
theory of strategic risk. In fact, both findings suggest that it is the risk of
detection and punishment – and not the risk of being betrayed by other
cartelists – that discourage players from colluding, when no leniency is
granted to those who report the cartel. In fact, in this case reporting the
cartel when deviating from the collusive agreement is not a dominant
strategy, so it is possible that the perceived strategic risk is lower and
may even be negligible when there is no risk of detection.
Perception of small probabilities. We mentioned above that according
to the research developed by Tversky and Kahneman [67], the perception
of very small probabilities may have ambiguous outcomes: it is possible
that they are overemphasized or even approximated to zero, depending
on the context and on the individual characteristics of the subject. The
significant difference between the estimated coefficients for A0,1000 and
A0.02,1000 seems to imply that in general, in our game a very small
probability of detection is not disregarded. In a sense, this is another
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element supporting the importance of strategic risk in the situation
we depicted. In fact, the difference in deterrence disappears under
the two Leniency treatments with fine equal to 1000. If players do
not approximate a probability of 2% to zero, then this proability must
be disregarded because other factors predominate, and among them
strategic risk appears to be one of the most plausible.
Availability heuristic. The hypothesis that people’s perception of a risk
is based not only on its actual probability, but also on its vividness
and emotional impact is validated by our data. According to our
regression, the sum of the fines paid by a subject in previous periods
has a significant and substantial negative effect on his willingness to
communicate, meaning that subjects who have paid a very high fine,
but also those who have repeatedly paid a lower fine, are less incline
to collude again. This is in line with the findings of Fishman and Pope
(2006) [36] about punishment-induced deterrence and with the idea that
the experience of the penalty affects subjects’ willingness to commit the
crime, the more the harsher is the penalty, or more generally the stronger
is its memory.
The sum of the fines paid appears to be the only factor affecting players
behavior throughout the game, thus introducing some dynamics in their
choice pattern. Communication decision does not seem to be affected
by the player’s cumulated earnings, which is obviously highly correlated
with the number of periods elapsed since the beginning of the game
and of the match. This seems to rule out an endowment effect, and
any learning effects other than the one deriving from the experience of
punishment.
8.4.5 Post-conviction Behavior
In this section we will describe how players modify their decision to
communicate in the periods following conviction. First, we introduce
a distinction between two categories of conviction, according to the
outcome they generate for the players in terms of payoffs: we will say
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that conviction has a
• symmetric outcome, if it hurts both players (approximately) in the
same way. For example, this is the case when a cartel is detected
by the Authority, but also when reporting is used as a punishment
device under Leniency. In this last case, only one of the players
deviated from the collusive agreement, thus getting higher profits,
but the cartel was reported only by the other player: both players
then obtain low profits, because one of them was cheated upon, the
other one got fined.
• asymmetric outcome, if one of the cartel’s members got hurt more
than the other, as when only one player deviate and simultaneously
reports the cartel.
In this section we use data collected both in Rome and in Stockholm, since
we are not going to use the information about subjects risk aversion. We
will also pool together the data across treatments.
First, we observe that conviction has a symmetric outcome 94.12% of
the time under Antitrust treatments, and only 37.90% of the times under
Leniency. This is mainly due to the fact that deviators often report the
cartel to protect themselves from fines under Leniency, but not under
Antitrust: indeed, under Leniency treatments, players who undercut
the agreed upon price also reported the cartel in 62.38% of the cases,
while under Antitrust treatments this percentage drops to 4.95%. So, if
conviction with asymmetric outcomes discourages communication more,
then we would have at least a partial explanation of why we generally
observe more deterrence under Leniency treatments.
Figure 8.4 displays the percentage of convicted agents (vertical axis)
who chose to communicate again in the five periods following conviction
(horizontal axis), separately for symmetric and asymmetric conviction
outcomes. We observe that, as a consequence of asymmetric conviction,
most of the subjects decide not to communicate anymore with the same
competitor, while the about one subject out of two chose to communicate
again when conviction’outcome was symmetric.
To check whether this finding is significant and robust to other factors,
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Figure 8.4: Post-conviction communication decision.
we ran the following four levels random intercept logit regression:
CommDechijk = β0 + β1CumEarningshijk + β2Finehijk+
+ β3Symmhijk + β4SymmXFinehijk + η
(2)
ijk + η
(3)
jk + η
(4)
k
where, the dependent variable is communication decision in the period
immediately following conviction, CumEarnings represents the cumu-
lated earnings of the subject, Symm is a dummy variable equal to 1
when the outcome of conviction was symmetric, Fine measures the fine
actually paid by the convicted subject, and SymmXFine represents the
interaction between these two factors. Finally, as explained before, η(2)ijk
represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city k
(second level), η(3)jk represents the random intercept for subject j in city
k (third level) and η(4)k represents the random intercept for city k (fourth
level).
Results from this regression, displayed in table 8.5, show that symme-
try of conviction outcomes positively and significantly affects subjects’
decision to communicate after conviction. Columns three, four and five
of the table present the estimation results for the reducedmodels obtained
progressively deleting the factors the turned out not to be significant,
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according to loglikelihood-ratio tests at the standard 5% significance
level.
Noticeably, even when the outcome of conviction is symmetric, only
half of the convicted subjects decide to communicate again. Part of
this effect is due to the fact that most of the collusive agreements had
been broken before they were detected: more precisely, if we restrict our
attention to the cases in which conviction had a symmetric outcome, we
still observe that in 76.22% of the detected cartels at least one member
undercut the agreed upon price before detection took place. Some players
therefore probabily decided non to communicate again because of a lack
of trust that had already emerged before conviction.
On the other hand, table 8.6 shows that even if the cartel had not been
previously broken, still about 30% of the subjects chose not to commu-
nicate again. The number of observations is too small to make sound
inference; nonetheless we believe that the behavior of these players could
be explained with reference to availability heuristic: indeed, they behave
as if the punishment recently experienced affected their perception of the
level of risk of liability.
Table 8.6: Communication rate when conviction outcome is symmetric
rate of comm. N. obs.
broken 46.13% 310
not broken 70.59% 102
8.5 Conclusion
Our experiment shows that strategic risk, availability heuristic and
saliency bias have important effects on cartel deterrence, though in
general they are not taken into account in most of the theoretical anal-
yses of law enforcement. This result, obtained through an exploratory
experiment – probably the first one in this field – calls for further,
more specific experimental tests of the observed effects. A deeper and
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wider experimental evidence could then support the development of a
theoretical analysis of cartel deterrence which incorporates strategic risk
and the behavioral effects that have non-negligible effects according to
our findings.
It would be also interesting to check whether our results are robust to
a change in the framing of the experiment, so to see if our conclusions can
be extended to other kinds of organized crime, such as corruption, fraud,
auditor-manager collusion, and corporate crime in general.
The interplay of rational considerations and behavioral biases in
shaping deterrence of criminal activities deserves our attention and is a
promising area for future research. While substantially more evidence
is needed before drawing definitive theoretical conclusions, the glimpse
that our study offers hopefully is a useful first step which will open the
way for a rather new branch of experimental studies.
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Appendix A
A.1 Experiment 1: Figures
Profit Calculator
(a) example 1
(b) example 2
Figure A.1: Profit calculator
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Information about past rounds
The following three graphs are the only means through which informa-
tion about what happened in the past round is displayed to the subjects.
Figure A.2: Information about the past periods displayed to the subjects at each
round.
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Figure A.3: Plot displayed to each subject after the last period, at the end of the
game.
193
Graphical Interface
Figure A.4: Graphical interface through which the game is presented to the subjects.
194
A.2 Experiment 1: Instructions
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A.3 Experiment 2: Graphical Interface
Figure A.5 represents the graphical interface of the second experiment.
Translation From top to button, left to right. [] indicate a button.
bar at the top: period 13 out of 40, remaining time [sec.]: 13, total profit:
3097
box at the top: how many units do you want to produce in this period?
first box on the left: Profits in the previous period
your profit: 252
competitor 1: 168
competitor 2: 392
competitor 3: 644
second box on the left: # of units produced in the previous period.
To know the number of units produced in the previous period by
one of your competitors, push the corresponding button. [competi-
tor 1] [competitor 2] [competitor 3]
center-right box: before taking a decision, you can look at the informa-
tion at your disposal and use the profit calculator. [OK]
bottom-left box: history of play
# of units you produced and profits you obtained in the
previous periods [show]
# of units produced on the whole by your three competitors in
the previous periods [show]
bottom-right box: profit calculator
do you want to use the profit calculator? [yes]
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A.4 Experiment 2: Instructions
Welcome to this experiment about decision making in a market. The
experiment is expected to last for about 1 hour and 15 minutes. You will
be paid a minimum of 4efor your participation. On top of that you can
earn up to 20 eif you make good decisions.
We will first read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to
read them on your own. If you then have questions, raise your hand
and you will be helped privately. From now on, you are requested not to
communicate with other participants in any way.
Your task. During this experiment, you will be asked to act as the
manager of a firm which produces and sells a given product: your task
consists in deciding how many product units to put on the market in
every period.
Your firm has three competitors that sell on the same market a
product which is exactly identical to yours. Your competitors are three
among the participants to the experiment taking place today in this room,
but you will not have the opportunity to discover who they are, not even
at the end of the game. Your identity will be kept secret as well.
The experiment consists in 40 consecutive periods. In every period,
you will be asked to choose how many units to produce (between 0 and
30), and the same will be done by your competitors. Your choices affect
both your firm’s profits and the ones of your three competitors.
Every period lasts 30 seconds: if in a period you fail to make your
choice within the time limit, the computer will automatically set the
number of units produced by your firm in that period equal to 0, and
your profit in that period will be equal to 0 too.
Price, costs and profits. The market price at which you will be able
to sell your product will be the higher, the smaller the total number of
product units your firm and your competitors put on the market; if the
total number of product units sold on the market is sufficiently high, the
price will be equal to zero.
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No product unit remains unsold: all the product units you put on the
market will be purchased by consumers at the market price.
To produce, you will have to bear a production costwhich will be the
higher, the more product units you put on the market.
Your profitwill be equal to the market price times the number of units
you sell, minus production costs.
Earnings and Payment. You will receive an initial endowment of 2000
points. At the end of each period, your per-period profits or your possible
losses will be added to your total profit, which will be always displayed
in the top right corner of the screen. Notice that your total profit cannot
become negative.
At the end of the game, your total profit will be converted in Euros,
according to the rate:
1000 points = 1 Euro
The corresponding amount of money will be payed to you in cash,
privately, at the end of the session. Remember that, in addition, you will
be payed 4 efor your participation.
Information at your disposal. At the top of your computer screen you
will read:
1. the number of periods elapsed since the game began (top left
corner)
2. your total profit (top right corner)
3. the number of seconds (top, center) you still have at your disposal
to take a decision. Remember that every period lasts 30 seconds,
and if you do not take a decision in time it will be as if you decided
to produce 0 units and in that period your profit will be equal to 0.
Before choosing how many units to produce, you will have the opportu-
nity to look at some information on market characteristics and on what
happened in the previous periods.
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In particular, in every period following the first one, you will be
informed about the profits obtained in the previous period by your
firm and by your competitors. Moreover, you will be able to get more
information about:
1. the quantity produced in the previous period by each of your
competitors;
2. the quantities produced and the profits obtained by your firm in
each of the previous periods: this information will be displayed
both by means of a plot and in a table;
3. the quantity produced on the whole by each of your three competi-
tors in the previous periods: this information will also be presented
both by means of a plot and in a table.
In addition, you will have the opportunity to use a profit calculator, a
device you can use to better understand how the market works. the profit
calculator has two functions:
1. evaluate your profit, given the number of units produced by your
firm and the number of units produced on the whole by your
competitors.
2. evaluate the maximum profit you could earn – and the number of
units your firm should produce in order to get such profit – given
the number of units produced on the whole by your competitors.
Progress of the experiment. When the reading of these instructions is
over, you will have the opportunity to ask for clarifications about the
aspects of the experiments which are unclear.
When we have answered all the possible questions you will be asked
to complete a test on your computer, which will allow us to check that
you have fully understood the instructions, and you to get to grips with
the software used in this experiment. The answers you give in this test
will not affect your earnings in any way, nor they will influence any
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other aspect of the experiment. During the test, you will still have the
possibility of asking questions, always raising your hand.
When all the participants have completed their test, the real experi-
ment will begin. The computer will randomly generate groups of four
persons; every participant to the experiment will belong to one and only
one group during the whole experiment. The other three members of the
group you belong to are your competitors, who then remain the same
over all the 40 periods of the game.
Every period lasts at most 30 seconds. The maximum length of the
game therefore is approximately 20 minutes.
At the end of the fortieth period the game will end, and the points
scored by each of the participants will be converted into Euros.
Before being paid privately, you will be asked to answer a short
questionnaire about the experiment, and you will have to hand back the
instructions.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERI-
MENT AND GOOD LUCK!
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Appendix B
Instructions for the Leniency1 treatment
Welcome to this experiment about decision making in a market. The
experiment is expected to last for about 1 hour and 45 minutes. You will
be paid a minimum of 50 SEK for your participation. On top of that you
can earn more than 300 SEK if you make good decisions.
We will first read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to
read them on your own. If you then have questions, raise your hand and
you will be helped privately.
In summary, the situation you will face is the following. You and one
other participant referred to as your competitor produce similar goods
and sell them in a common market. As in most markets, the higher the
price you charge, the more you earn on each sold good, but the fewer
goods you sell. And, as in many markets, the lower the price charged
by your competitor, the more customers he or she will take away from
you and the less you will sell and earn. It is possible, however, to form
a cartel with your competitor, that is, you will have the possibility to
communicate and try to agree on prices at which to sell the goods. In
reality, cartels are illegal and if the government discovers the cartel, cartel
members are fined. In addition members of a cartel can always report
it to the government. The same happens in this experiment. If you
communicate to discuss prices, even if both of you do not report, there
is still a chance that the ‘government’ discovers it and if this happens,
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you will have to pay a ‘fine’. If you report, and if you are the only one
to report, you will not pay any fine but your competitor will pay the full
fine. Conversely, if only your competitor reports the cartel, you will pay
the full fine and your competitor will not pay any fine. If instead both of
you report the cartel you will both pay 50% of the fine.
Timing of the experiment
In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions in several
periods. You will be paired with another participant for a sequence of
periods. Such a sequence of periods is referred to as a match. You will
never know with whom you have been matched in this experiment.
The length of a match is random. After each period, there is a
probability of 85% that thematch will continue for at least another period.
So, for instance, if you have been paired with the same competitor for 2
periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a third
period is 85%. If you have been paired with the same competitor for 9
periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a tenth
period is also 85%.
Once a match ends, you will be paired with another participant for a
new
match, unless 20 periods or more have passed. In this case the
experiment ends. So, for instance, if 19 periods have passed, with a
probability of 15% you are re-matched, that is you are pairedwith another
participant. If 21 periods have passed, with a probability of 15% the
experiment ends.
When you are re-matched you cannot be fined anymore for a cartel
formed in your previous match with your previous competitor.
The experimental session is expected to last for about 1 hour and
45 minutes but its actual duration is uncertain; that depends on the
realization of probabilities. For this reason, we will end the experimental
session if it lasts more than 2 hours and 30 minutes.
Before the experiment starts, there will be 5 trial periods during which
you will be paired with the same competitor. These trial periods will not
affect your earnings. When the experiment starts, you will be paired with
a new competitor.
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Prices and Profits
In each period you choose the price of your product. Your price as
well as the price chosen by your competitor determines the quantity that
you will sell.
The higher your price, the more you earn on each sold good, but the
fewer goods you sell. Therefore your price has two opposing effects on
your profit. On the one hand, an increase in your price may increase your
profit, since each good that you sell will earn you more money. On the
other hand, an increase in your price may decrease your profit, since you
will sell less.
Furthermore, the higher the price of your competitor, the more you
will sell. As a result, your profits increase if your competitor chooses a
higher price.
To make things easy, we have constructed a profit table. This table
is added to the instructions. Have a look at this table now. Your own
prices are indicated next to the rows and the prices of your competitor
are indicated above the columns. If you want to know your profit if, for
example, your competitor’s price is 5 and your price is 4, then you first
move to the right until you find the column with 5 above it, and then you
move down until you reach the row which has 4 on the left of it. You can
read that your profit is 160 points in that case.
Your competitor has received an identical table. Therefore you can
also use the table to learn your competitor’s profit by inverting your roles.
That is, read the price of your competitor next to the rows and your price
above the columns. In the previous examplewhere your price is equal to 4
and your competitor’s price is equal to 5, it follows that your competitor’s
profit is 100 points.
Note that if your and your competitor’s prices are equal, then your
profits are also equal and are indicated in one of the cells along the table’s
diagonal. For example, if your price and the price of your competitor are
equal to 1, then your profit and the profit of your competitor is equal to
38 points. If both you and your competitor increase your price by 1 point
to 2, then your profit and the profit of your competitor becomes equal to
71.
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Note also that if your competitor’s price is sufficiently low relative to
your price, then your profit is equal to 0. The reason is that no consumer
buys your good, since it is too expensive relative to your competitor’s
good.
Fines
In every period, you and your competitor will be given the op-
portunity to communicate and discuss prices. If both of you agree to
communicate, you will be considered to have formed a cartel, and then
you might have to pay a fine F. This fine is given by:
F = 200 points
You can be fined in two ways. First, you and your competitor will
have the opportunity to report the cartel. If you are the only one to report
the cartel, you will not pay any fine but your competitor will pay the full
fine, that is 200 points. Conversely, if only your competitor reports the
cartel and you do not, then you will have to pay the full fine equal to 200
points and your competitor will not pay any fine. Finally, if both of you
report the cartel, you will both pay 50% of the fine, that is 100 points.
Second, if neither you nor your competitor reports the cartel, the
government discovers it with the following probability.
Probability of detection = 10%.
Note that you will run the risk of paying a fine as long as the cartel has
not yet been discovered or reported. Thus you may pay a fine in a period
even if no meeting takes place in that period. This happens if you had a
meeting in some previous period which has not yet been discovered or
reported.
Once a cartel is discovered or reported, you do not anymore run the
risk of paying a fine in future periods, unless you and your competitor
agree to communicate again.
Earnings
The number of points you earn in a period will be equal to your profit
minus an eventual fine or plus an eventual reward. Note that because of
the fine, your earnings may be negative in some periods. Your cumulated
earnings, however, will never be allowed to become negative.
You will receive an initial endowment of 1000 points and, as the ex-
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periment proceeds, your and your competitor’s decisions will determine
your cumulated earnings. Note that 20 points are equal to 1 SEK. Your
cumulated earnings will be privately paid to you in cash at the end of the
session.
Decision making in a period
Next we describe in more detail how you make decisions in each
period. A period is divided into 7 steps. Some steps will inform you
about decisions that you and your competitor have made. In the other
steps you and your competitor will have tomake decisions. In these steps,
there will be a counter indicating how many seconds are left before the
experiment proceeds to the next step. If you fail to make a decision within
the time limit, the computer will make a decision for you.
Step 1: Pairing information and price communication decision
Every period starts by informing you whether or not you will play
against the same competitor as in the previous period.
Remember that if you are paired with a new competitor, you cannot
be fined anymore for cartels that you formed with your previous com-
petitors.
In this step you will also be asked if you want to communicate with
your competitor to discuss prices. A communication screen will open
only if BOTH you and your competitor choose the ”YES” button within
15 seconds. Otherwise you will have to wait for an additional 30 seconds
until pricing decisions starts in Step 3.
Step 2: Price communication
After the communication screen has opened, you can “discuss” prices
by choosing a price out of the range { 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12 }. In this way you can
indicate to your competitor the minimum price that you find acceptable
for both of you. When both of you have chosen a price, these two prices
are displayed on the computer screen. You can then choose a new price
but now this price should be greater or equal to the smaller of the two
previously chosen prices. This procedure is repeated until 30 seconds
have passed. The screen then displays the smaller of the two last chosen
prices, which is referred to as the agreed-upon price. Note, however, that
in the next step, neither you nor your competitor is forced to choose the
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agreed-upon price.
Step 3: Pricing decision
You and your competitor must choose one of the following prices: 0, 1,
2, . . . , 12. When you choose your price, your competitor will not observe
your choice nor will you observe his or her price choice. This information
is only revealed in Step 5. The experiment proceeds after 30 seconds have
passed. If you fail to choose a price within 30 seconds, then your price is
chosen so high that your profits will be 0.
The experiment proceeds to the first reporting decision in Step 4 if you
communicated in Step 2 or if in previous periods you formed a cartel not
yet discovered or reported. Otherwise you have to wait for 10 seconds
until market prices are revealed in Step 5.
Step 4: First (secret) reporting decision
By choosing to push the ”REPORT” button, you can report that you
have been communicating in the past. As described above, if you are the
only one to report, you will not pay the fine; the opposite happens if only
your competitor reports; and if both of you report, you will both pay 50%
of the fine.
If you do not wish to report, push instead the “DO NOT REPORT”
button.
When you decide whether or not to report, your competitor will
not observe your choice, nor will you observe his or her choice. This
information is only revealed when market prices are revealed in Step 5.
If you do not reach a decision within 10 seconds, your default decision
will be “DO NOT REPORT”.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision
In this step your and your competitor’s prices and profits are dis-
played.
In case you have formed a cartel not yet discovered or reported, the
screen will also display whether or not you or your competitor reported
it in the first reporting step (Step 4). If not, you will get a new opportunity
to report.
If you wish to report, push the ”REPORT” button. If you do not wish
to report, push instead the “DO NOT REPORT” button.
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Figure B.1: Timing of the stage game
Again, if you are the only one to report, you will not pay the fine. On
the contrary, f your competitor reports and you don’t you will have to
pay the fine and he will not. If both you and your competitor report, you
will both pay 50% of the fine, that is 100 points.
Step 6: Detection probability
If this step is reached, you formed a cartel either in the current
period or in previous periods. Furthermore the cartel has not yet been
discovered or reported. The cartel can nevertheless be discovered. This
happens with a probability of 10%. If the cartel is discovered, you and
your competitor will have to pay the full fine of 200 points.
Step 7: Summary
In this step you learn the choices made in the previous steps: your
and your competitor’s price choices and profits, your eventual fine, your
eventual reward and your earnings.
If you paid a fine in this period, you will also know whether your
competitor reported the cartel or the government discovered it.
In case a cartel was detected or reported in this period, you will
not run any risk of being fined in future periods, unless you and your
competitor discuss prices again.
Step 7 will last for 20 seconds.
Period ending and ending of the experimental session
After Step 7, a new period starts unless 20 or more periods have
passed and the 15% probability of pair dismantling takes place. In that
case, the experiment ends.
The following time line summarizes the seven steps of each round.
Throughout the experiment, a table will keep track for you of the
history with your current competitor. For each previous period played
with your current competitor, this table will show your price and profit,
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your competitor’s price and profit as well as your eventual fine.
Payments
At the end of the experiment, your earnings in points will be ex-
changed in SEK. In addition you will be paid the show up fee of 50 SEK.
Before being paid in private, you will be asked to answer a short
questionnaire about the experiment and you will have to handle back the
instructions.
Please read now carefully the instructions on your own. If you have
questions, raise your hand and you will be answered privately.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERI-
MENT AND GOOD LUCK!
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